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PARENTAL STATUS IN STATUTE LAW 
AND CASE LAW(ABSTRACT) 
This thesis deals with the law of parental status in 
England from the beginning of the 19th century until the 
present time. It is concerned with the changes of the 
substance of law as well as of the methods of statutory 
drafting and judicial reasoning against the background 
of changing social conditions. Undergoing these changes 
the traditional English common law system acquires some 
features of a civil law system. 
Chapter I contrasts the traditional common law 
approach with the traditional civil law approach. Chapter 
II describes the general legal and social developments cf 
the relevant period as far as family life is concerned. 
Chapter III deals with the development of substantive law 
on parental status, thereby mainly concentrating on the 
status of the mother and the father rather than on the 
parent/child relationship. Finally, in Chapter IV, 
methods of statutory drafting and judicial reasoning are 
considered. 
In the first part, it is shown how the changes take 
place in society and the law, it is also shown from which 
quarter the changes are initiated, which branches of society 
as a whole, including Parliament and the legal profession, 
show themselves particularly in favour of or opposed to 
reform. In the second part, particular emphasis is laid 
on the mutual influence of judge-made and statutory law 
during the period, it is shown that this mutual influence 
can take different guises. In the last part, possible 
mutual influences of the methods of statutory drafting and 
legal reasoning are considered, in particular showing the 
effects of increasing use of statutes which leads to a 
system of law which thus seems to take an appearance that 
shows some similarities with civil-law systems. 
It is finally considered how the different threads of 
development relate to each other. 
The copyright of this thesis rests with the author 
No quotation from it should be published without 
his prior written consent and information deri1·ed 
from it should be acknowledged. 
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COMMON LAW AND CIVIL LAY SYSTEMS CONTRASTED 
A. Purpose of the Study 
The object of this study is the development of the 
law of parental status since about 1800. Looking at 
this development the study will seek to demonstrate how 
not only the substance but also the methods of the law 
have changed.Thereby the law - at least in this branch -
has lost some of its common law characteristics. It 
will be shown here that it has turned into something 
resembling a civil law system. 
The law of parental status commends itself as an object 
for study for mainly two reasons. First, it is a narrow 
field which makes it possible to achieve a certain degree 
of depth even within a shorter study. Secondly, it pro-
vides a feature which is of particular interest here : it 
shows, since the beginning of the last century, a develop-
ment from a nearly entirely case-based,to a nearly entirely 
statute-based law. As the basis of the law changed thus, 
the methods of the law also changed in several aspects. 
Traces of the development can be seen in statutory drafting, 
mainly in respect of compass and structure of statutes, 
and in judicial reasoning mainly in respect of construction 
o~ and attitude towards status, the approach to precedent 
and to general legal principles. 
Before giving an outline of the study as a whole, it 
will be useful at this stage to select the main character-
istics of a common law system as compared to a civil law 
system~so as to provide the theoretical background against 
which the strands of development in the substance and the 
,., 
'"; '\ -· ' .. 
l·. ' '· • 
'<~\~> 
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structure of the law will be shown. 
B. common Law and Civil Law 
The characteristics of common law will be described 
as they present themselves in the English legal system 
as on the one hand it stands for the traditional common 
law approach and on the other hand this study does not 
go beyond the English legal system anyway. It will be 
necessary here to rely mainly on the traditional and there-
fore perhaps old-fashioned understanding of the common law 
rather than on modern developments as it is the purpose of 
this study to show how these modern developments take 
place and what~ shape they take. However. where appropriate, 
modern ideas of understanding shall be taken into account. 
For characterizing the civil law system this study 
will rely on what is common to the different civilian 
systems - especially the French and the German systems -
rather than on one specific representative. 
In order to make a broad understanding of the issue 
possible, the outline of the differences between the two 
legal systems which now follows will in parts cover aspects 
which are not needed for the rest of the study. 
1. The Legal Sources 
The traditional common law consists of the holdings 
of a series of cases, or rather the rules derived from 
these cases as they are brought before the courts as 
individual disputes, and in addition to this, statutes 
passed by Parliament. 
The traditional civil law consists of principles and 
8 
occasionally also rules 1implanted in broadly termed codes, 
amplified by legal writers and sometimes also by court 
decisions. 
a) Case Law and Judicial Reasoning 
aa) Common Law System 
The main source of law in a common law system is the 
body of cases as decided by the judges. 
The judge, confronted with a new dispute, will turn 
to the cases decided in the past and reason from them 
inductively(l) by analogy( 2 ) in order to find a decision 
for the set of facts before him. 
He is guided by a notion of justice, according to 
which like cases should be treated alike. Thus he will 
take the set of facts which were the basis of the earlier 
decision and he will determine the rule upon which the 
earlier case was decided, the ratio decidendi. Then he 
will compare the two sets of facts and when he is satis-
fied that they are sufficiently similar to each other or, 
alike in their material points, he will apply the rule of 
the earlier decision to the case now before him. 
This way of reasoning is due to a deeply rooted 
scepticism towards intangible ideas in English legal think-
ing. (2a) This scepticism in its turn leads to concentration 
1). Friedmann, Legal Theory, p.517. 
2). Cross, Precedent in English Law, p.24.(hereafter cited: 
Cross, Precedent). 
2a) .Or 'pure theory' as Dowrick, Justice According to the 
English Common Lawyers~ put it, at. p.217. 
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on the facts which can be perceived, to an attitude of 
empiricism( 2b). The judge considers the facts before him 
and settles the dispute as it appears fair to him. When 
conflict of the same type is brought before him, he will 
be guided by his experience of a successfully settled 
dispute and therefore apply the same rule he applied 
before. Acordingly when a new type of conflict comes 
before him he will look among previously decided cases in 
order to find out whether there is anything comparable to 
his present case - with some rule tested by practice to 
settle it. Only when he does not discover any applicable 
rule, will he find a new one to settle the new case fairly. 
From this stems the understanding of justice that two 
sets of facts that are alike should be treated alike. 
Accordingly, on deciding a case before him the judge 
may be absolutely bound by previous decisions as this is 
the only way to achieve a fair treatment of the litigants 
and thus justice. 
Hence - though there may be several ways of avoiding 
and irksome precedent without actually overrulling it, (3 ) 
the 'worst the judge can do is to narrow a previous border-
line decision down to the 'facts of the case' (4 ), he cannot 
2b). Allen, Law in the Making , at p.517, speaks of the 
empirical tradition of common law. 
3). cf. Julius Stone, Legal System and Lawyers' Reasoning, 
pp.24lff, 267; Llewellyn, The Bramble Bush, pp.66£. · 
Friedman, op.cit., p.468. 
4). cf. Llewellyn, op.cit., p.66. 
10 
wholly ignore it. (4a) 
In earlier times there was also a special device for 
the judge to circumvent a displeasing precedent : as it 
was then maintained that the judge~ work was to declare 
the law(S) (not to make it), a judge could always say 
that his predecessor 'had not declared the law correctly, 
therefore his decision was not law. As Blackstone put it: 
"For it is an established rule to abide by former 
precedent, where the same points come again in 
litigation; ... Yet this rule admits of exception, 
where the former determination is most evidently 
contrary to reason; much more if it be contrary to 
divine law. But even in such cases the subsequent 
judges do not pretend to make a new law, but to 
vindicate the old one from misrepresentation. For 
if it be found that the former decision is manifestly 
absurd or unjust, it is declared, not that such 
sentence was bad law, but that it was not law. 11 (6) 
Thou~h this theory is no longer adhered to there are 
still devices for a judge determined to circumvent prece-
dent. However, this should not deceive the observer of 
the English legal system as to how deeply the doctrine 
of precedent itself it rooted even in today's English legal 
thinking. There is a good example not yet 20 years old : 
4a). The doctrine of precedent, however, does not mean that 
every judge is bound by a previous decision of any 
previous court. Everybody is bound by decisions of 
the House of Lords except, since the Practice Statement 
Cl966J l W.L.R. 1234, the House of Lords itself. How-
ever,it had to be stated firmly as recently as 1972 in 
Broome v CassellCl972J A.C.l027 that the Court of 
Appeal was not free to depart from House of Lords 
Decisions. Court of Appeal decisions are binding on 
every lower court, and also since Young v Bristol 
Aeroplane Cl944J K.B.7l8, on the Court of Appeal of 
itself. High Court Judges are not bound by their own 
previous decisions. It seems somehow ironical that 
the court which has been most innovative in recent years, 
is most strictly bound by precedent. 
5). cf. Cross, Precedent, p.27 on the declaratory theory of 
judicial decision; as the declarative theory is a 
'natural law' approach, it had accordingly to be aban-
doned when leqal positivism came to its high-tide by the 
early 19th Century. 
6). Blackstone, Commentaries on the Law of England, Vol. l 
pp.69-70. 
ll 
In 1966 the House of Lords decided that it would no 
longer be bound by its own previous decisions, if it felt 
they would better be set aside. (7 ) The power given to the 
House of Lords by this statement was sparingly used, (8 ) 
and in connection with the case of Conway v Rimmer the 
result has been aptly described as follows 
"When the opportunity presented itself ... to overrule 
Duncan v Cammel Laird Cl942J A.C. 624, at least 
eight reasons were adduced why Duncan should not 
govern. Only Lord Morris was bold enough to suggest 
that Duncan should be overruled." (9) 
Leaving the doctrine of precedent aside for a 
moment : if a new set of factsis brought before the 
courts and no precedent can be found, it is the task of 
the judge to find a new rule for the new set of facts, 
thus creating a new precedent, in fact - making law. (lO) 
The shape and structure of the legal rules in a 
common law system are influenced by the way in which they 
are created, namely by adjudication in individual dis-
putes : they deal with details not with broad principles, 
they are themselves in fact rules rather than principles. 
as shall be seen later(ll), they are more concerned with 
individuals' rights and their vindication than with the 
organization of society as a whole and the implementation 
of collective goals into the law which are necessary for 
7). The Practice Statement of l966,Cl966J 1 W.L.R. 1234 
8). Paterson, The Law Lo..-ds;., pp.162-165. 
9). Lord Lloyd of Hampstead, Introduction to Jurisprudence, 
p.706; it is not clear, however, whether in this case 
the new power was in fact invoked or not, cf.Paterson, 
p.l64. 
10) .As to judicial law-making other than this, see below.2. 
11) .See below 3. 
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this organization. 
bb) Civil Law System. 
In a civil law system the case-law has a function 
distinctly different from its function in a common law 
system. To the civilian judge the code is his main source 
of law. When a case comes before him, he will turn to a 
code and select a suitable provision possibly applicable to 
the case. He will then order the facts before him under the 
words of the provision and when he can do this successfully 
he will apply the code provision to the facts. This type 
of reasoning is called deductive(l 2 ) as opposed to the 
inductive reasoning from case to case. 
As the source of legal truth for the continental 
judge is the code, he will look to previous decisions 
only for a gloss on the code, in order to understand how 
the general words of the code might be understood. 
The important point in a civil law judgement is the 
result and not the argument. This way of reasoning and 
this approach to law has its roots in a legal thinking 
different from that of the common lawyers. The civil 
lawyer does not share the common lawyer's basic scepticism 
vt everything intangible. He is much more inclined to 
idealism or, at least he thinks one can (and should!) work 
out a system of the law, if one only thinks thoroughly 
12). cf.Friedmann, op.cit. p.517. 
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enough(l 3 ), hence the belief in general principles and the 
deductive reasoning. Accordingly, the idea of justice 
as found in code-law countries is different from that of 
the common law system. There is on the one hand also the 
aspect that like things should be treated alike, but this 
is only one and not the central part of justice, this 
is the formal justice. There is on the other hand the 
substantive idea of justice in that everybody shall receive 
his due. What is everybody's due, however, is dependent on 
time and circumstances. This aspect stands for flexibility 
of justice, flexibility of law, whereas the aspect of like 
things being treated alike stands for certainty. 
Coming back to the civilian approach towards case 
law : as cases only provide a gloss on the code-law they 
cannot themselves be a binding precedent. However, a 
long line of similarly decided cases from a higher court 
or the Supreme Court does provide some authority for lower 
court judges, but the lower court has no legal obligation 
to follow the higher court's decision. If it has a 
different view of the law it may, perhaps aided by argu-
ment of legal writers, legally decide the cases before it, 
according to this view. The higher court can never reverse 
such a decision simply on the grounds that the court below 
did not follow the 'law as laid down' by the higher court 
13}. This is only a rough sketch of the civilian approach 
to law to show its principal differences to the common 
law approach, rather than to describe it in full. 
Obviously, there have been powerful and successful 
movements of legal positivism - and along with the 
scepticism towards intangible ideas - on the continent 
both in the 19th and 20th century, but they were never 
as much part and parcel of the law than this kind of 
positivism is part of the English common law. For the 
latter cf. Atiyah, Law and Modern Society,pp.l00-104. 
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but can only declare that the court below has misinter-
preted the code. 
Only if the line of cases is of long standing and 
firmly rooted it might amount to something like law by 
custom and be binding on the courts. But the Supreme 
Court itself could always find at some point in the future 
that the custom was in fact developed against the law and 
overrule it. A single decision of a higher court could 
never have a bearing on the lower courts' decisions, in 
contrast to the common law. This way of judicial 
reasoning has a bearing on the shape of 'legal rules' in 
a civil law system. They never really become 'rules' as 
in the common law system(l3a). As they are derived from 
the codes and the single cases only provide for 
application without normally forming independent rules, 
they remain broad principles. And even when a case lays 
down how a general principle should be understood, and 
thereby possibly narrows down the'legal rule' of this case -
which is not binding anyway - will still bear a strong 
resemblence to the principle itself. 
B) Statutes and Codes. 
There are basically two types of parliamentary law; 
statutes and codes. Though it is not always possible to 
determine without doubt into which category a particular 
piece of legislation belongs, in principle they are quite 
distinct from each other. 
l3a). cf. above as the character of legal rules in the common 
law system, p. ll 
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A code is an enactment which comprehensively covers 
a whole area of the law, e.g., the civil law and the law 
of civil procedure. Because it is meant to be compre-
hensive, it may contain many provisions governing situa-
tions of daily life which have never before been brought 
to court and are not likely ever to be brought there. One 
striking example of this may be taken from the Prussian 
Code of 1794 : 
"A healthy mother is required to suckle her child her-
self. The father is to decide, however, how long the 
child is to be suckled". (14) 
Contrary to this example, however, a code will 
normally contain broad terms, provision embodying principles; 
like §241 of the German Civil Code, 
"The effect of an obligation is that the creditor 
is entitled to claim performance from the debtor. 
The performance may consist of refraining from 
acting", 
as ~1359 
"The spouses answerable to each other in the dis-
charge of the obligations arising out of the marital 
relationship only for such care as they are accus-
tomed to exercise in their own affairs". 
In contrast to this, statutes usually cover only a small 
area of the law, like the law concerning married women's 
(15) 
property or the position of children born out of lawful 
wedlock. (l 6 ) 
14). Allgemeines Landrecht der Preussischen Staaten, 
Part II second title,second subtitle,paras,67 & 66 
15). There were several Acts of Parliament in England in 
this field during the second half of the 19th Cen-
tury, see below, Chapter II. 
16). Like the Legitimacy Act of 1926, 16 & 17 Geo.V., c.60 
16 
Statutory provisions tend to be more specialized than 
code provision and they normally do not embody general 
principles 
"On an application under section 9 of the Guardian-
ship of Minors Act 1971, the court may, in any case 
where it adjourns the hearing of the application for 
more than 7 days, make an interim order, to have 
effect until such date as may be specified in the 
order and containing -
(a) provision for payment for either parent to the 
other, or to any person given the custody of the 
minor, of such weekly or other periodical sum 
towards the maint-e,/nance of the minor as the 
court thinks reasonable having regard to the 
means of the parent on whom the requirement 
is imposed; and 
(b) whereby reason of special circumstances the 
court thinks it proper, any provision regarding the 
custody of the minor as the right of access 
to the minor of the mother or father; 
but an interim order under this subsection shall not 
be made to have effect after the end of three months 
beginning with the date of the order as of any 
previous interim order made under this subsection with 
respect to the application, and shall cease to have 
effect on the making of a final order or on the dis-
missal of the application". (17) 
aa) Common Law 
Parliamentary law in a common law system will normally 
fall under the category 'statute' rather than 'code'. 
There are, however, Acts of Parliament with a broader com-
pass, they are called 'consolidating' or 'codifying' 
statutes. The consolidating statute just sums up previous 
17) . Sub-section(i) (4), s.2 of the Guardianship Act 1973, 
21 & 22 Eliz.II, c.29. cf. also Honor~'The Quest for 
Security : Employees. Tenants. Wiyes. pp.l20-122, where 
he sets out provisions on main~ance after divorce 
from the German and French Civil Codes and from the 
Matrimonial Causes Act 1973, the English Statute 
dealing with this matter. 
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statutes on a certain topic, mostly using the old pro-
visions as they are. A codifying statute embodies the 
common law as settled by the judges and possibly also 
previous statutes- if there are any - in a certain area 
of law~lS) 
However, both these types of statute are not a main 
feature in the common law. Also, though their compass 
is larger than that of 'normal' statutes they still do not 
have the scope of traditional continental codes and their 
provisions are detailed and do not usually contain broader 
principles. The latter is especially true for the con-
solidating statute as it mainly contains provisions from 
previous statutes of the branch of law dealt with. It 
is conceded, however, that especially the codifying 
statute can resemble a code and that perhaps the differ-
ence between them is only a matter of degree. (l 9 ) Leaving 
this one point aside, it can be safely maintained that 
parliamentary law in a common law system means statute 
law. 
The traditional approach to statutes in a common law 
system is that, though they are a source of law preceding 
the judge-made case law, they are an exceptional appear-
ance, their functions mainly is to fill a gap in the common 
law as to mend a flaw in its web:i.e. to change it. 
18). cf. Cross, Statutory Interpretation, P·5j 
Bennion, Statute Law, pp. 
19). cf. Ehrmann, Comparative Legal Cultures, p.25. 
18 
Blackstone mentions a case which provides a suitable 
example for this understanding 
"Yet, as nothing is so apt to stifle the calls of 
nature as religious bigotry, it is enacted (Stat. 
112 12 W III c.4), that if any popish parent shall 
refuse to allow his protestant child a fitting 
maintenance, with a view to compel him to change 
his religion, the ~ord Chancellor shall by order 
of court constrain him to do what is just and 
reasonable". (20) 
Blackstone relates further that this was not held to 
apply to a daughter of a Jew who had become Christian so 
that another statute had to be passed to effect this 
object - It seems only too probable, having in view this 
approach and the attitude towards catholics in those days, 
that a Protestant father could still starve his 'popish' 
child after the passing of the statutes. 
According to this approach towards statute-law, as 
an exception of,and a substitute for
1
parts of the common 
law
1 
especially the earlier statutes1 take the shape 
of giving power or discretion to the Lord Chancellor as 
a court of law : 
"That after the passing of this Act it shall be 
lawful for the Lord Chancellor and the Master of the 
Rolls in England ..• upon hearing the petition of the 
Mother of any Infant or Infantsoo.if he shall see 
fit, to make Order for the Access of the Petitioner ... " 
(21) 
As the commonlaw is pronounced- if not made( 22 ) -by 
the judges, Parliament, when it wants to change the law 
20) o Blackstone, op.cito, Vol.I, p.437o 
21). s.lo Talfourd's Act 1839, 2 & 3 Victo,c 54; there 
is a similar provision in the Custody of Infants Act 
1873, 36 & 37 Victo 1 c.l2. 
22) o cf. below, 2. 
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tells the judges how to approach a certain type of case 
in future. 
Later statutes no longer take the shape of "it shall 
be lawful for the Lord Chancellor," but in the area of 
law dealt with in this study, they are full of provisions 
giving power to the courts to decide cases in a certain 
way. (23 ) There are few provisions setting out the law 
without mentioning the courts. (24 ) 
Hand in hand with this form of statute, goes the 
judicial approach towards them. The traditional method 
of statutory interpretation is the literal rule, (2 S) this 
means, taking the words of a statute at their ordinary 
meaning and applying them to the case before the court. 
In case of doubts, the aid of the 'intention of Parlia-
ment' mayrreinvoked. However, the intention of Parlia-
ment may only be derived from the words of the statute 
as a whole and possibly from other statutes in the same 
field of law. 
This at least was the way in interpreting statutes 
at the outset of the period here examined. (26 ) There 
were also presumptions to be applied, if there was still 
some doubt. These included that penal statues had to be 
construed narrowly. (27 ) When two meanings could still be 
23). As for one representative example, See s.2 ss4 of 
the Guardianship Act 1973, cited above, fnt.l7. 
24). This particular aspect will be looked into more 
thoroughly later, Chapter IV.B. 
25) . 
26) • 
Cro~~, Statut()y)' [hterpteh~t-on 1 pp. Cf-t0 11s-iS",All..e(!t.1 ~- C.A,.·t 'f)p. ffi (I. 
Montrose, Pr~cedent in English Law, p.l3l; There were 
before that two other, more liberal approaches to 
statutes, more or less abandoned by the 18th century : 
the 'mischief'-rule (basically allowing for the social 
history of an Act to be taken into account when con-
struing, it) and the 'equity of a statute'. For both 
concepts see Allen, op.cit., pp.495f and 45lff. 
27). Blackstone, op.cit., Vol.I. p.88. 
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given to a word, the meaning should be applied which 
caused the least change of the common law. (28 ) 
Even today, though wide areas of the law are governed 
by statute, narrow methods of statutory construction do 
prevail.- This is presumably the reason for some academic 
writers still to maintain that there is even today a 
deeply rooted hostility towards statute in the English 
common law. ( 2 9 ) 
However, the strict literal rule has been exchanged 
for an approach of contextual interpretation. (30) It is 
also allowed to take the social history of an Act of 
Parliament into account( 3 l). The presumption against a 
change of the common law has changed into a presumption 
against an unclear change of the law. <32 ) 
28) . ~,d., "'frg,ioJ1 0\1\. cf.Cross, Statutocy p.~; having the practical affect 
of narrowing down the scope of the statute, Montrose, 
op.cit., p.l3l. 
29). Friedmann, op.cit., p.72, cf. also p.452 for the 
statutes still being, from a psychological point of 
view, an exception; and Davfd, Major Legal Systems in 
the World Today, at pp.336 and 355 stating that 
statute law for the English lawyer is 'abnormal in 
character' and 'something of a foreign element', 
Ehrmann, op.cit., p.23. 
30). As set out by Driedger, The Construction of Statutes, 
at p.67, words are to be read in the entire context 
of the Act, in their grammatical and ordinary sense, 
in harmony with the scheme and object of the Act and 
31) . 
3 2) • 
the intention of Parliament. 
Montrose, op.cit., p.l31, maintains that this was as 
early as the second quarter of the last century. While 
there may be some doubt as to this allegation,there 
is enough evidence that social history may be used 
today; starting with Driedger, who points out that 
context of the Act means verbal (i.e. the meaning of 
words and the grammatical structure) as well as 
substantive context (i.e. the law as it was enacted 
by the legislature and why) , whereby in case of 
conflict the substantive con ext is to prevail, at p. 
106; cf. also Cross, Statuto f, citing authori-
ties. Allen p.495 to the mo ern application and revival 
of the 'mischief'-rule in this century after it had been 
abandoned during the 18th and 19th centuries. 
T.:.Jctq>r~-hc~\ Cross, StatuwyY:-~pp. 5£.1 
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However, penal statutes still have to be construed strictly 
and there is still a strong presumption against an infringe-
ment of the jurisdiction of the or~inary courts. For both 
the latter rules there are recent examples : 
The Criminal Attempts Act 1981( 33 ) was enacted to 
reverse the effect of Reg. v Smith( 34 ). In this case the 
accused had waited to receive stolen goods brought by a 
lorry. The lorry, however, was intercepted by the police, 
I I 
so that the goods ceased to be stolen goods. The lorry 
was then left to proceed on its journey to the accused and 
he received the goods and was caught. It was held that 
he was not guilty of an attempt to handle stolen goods as 
the completion of the offence was legally impossible, the 
goods being no longer 'stolen goods'. 
The provision in the Criminal Attempts Act 1981, sl, 
which deals with the problem caused by Reg. v Smith is 
somewhat lengthy and not very clear. (35 ) 
In the subsequent case Anderson v Ryan( 36 ) the defen-
dant had handled a video cassette recorder which she thought 
33).29&30Eliz. II,c.47. 
34). (Roger) Cl975J A.C. 476. 
35). 29 & 30 Eliz. II, c 47i sl(l), If, with intent to 
commit an offence to which this section applies, a 
person does an act which is more than merely prepara-
tory to the commission of the offence, he is guilty 
of attempting to commit the offence. 
(2) A person may be guilty of attempting to commit an 
offence to which this section applies even though the 
facts are such that the commission of the offence is 
impossible. 
(3) In any case where :-
a) apart from this subsection a person's intention 
would not be regarded as having amounted to an 
intent to commit an offence, - but 
b) if the facts of the case had been as he believed 
them to be, his intention would be so regarded 
then, for the purposes of subsection(l) above, 
he shall be regarded as having had an intent to 
commit that offence. 
( 4) ...... 
36). Cl985J A.C. 560. 
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had been stolen. It could not be established whether 
it had in fact been stolen. Their Lordships held that 
she was not guilty of an attempt to handle stolen goods 
under s 1of the Criminal Attempts Act 1981. Though it 
is freely admitted that the Act was introduced to abolish 
the effect of Reg. v Smith, (37 ) one of the Law Lords 
even goes as far as to state that, if Reg. v Smith came 
again before the Court after the passing of the Act, it 
would still have to be decided the way it was in 1975. (38 ) 
Though he states that : 
"Statutes should be given what has become known 
as a purposive construction, that is to say that, 
the courts should, where possible, identify 'the 
mischief' which existed before the passing of the 
statute and then, if more than one construction is 
possible, favour that which will eliminate 'the 
mischief' so identified". (39). 
Lord Roskill also maintains that the application of the 
misdtief-rule "must not be carried to extremes", ( 40)carrying 
37). Lord Roskill at p.573, Lord Edmund-Davies (dis-
senting) at p. 572. 
38). Lord Bridge of Harwich at p.584. 
39). at p.573. 
40). at p.578. 
on 
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"The problems to which the decision (Reg v Smith) 
of this House gave rise were many. It by no means 
follows that Parliament in its efforts to solve 
some at least of those problems intended by this 
legislation to solve them all, ... " 
There are also some cutting comments on the language of 
the Act, (4 l) and following this strand of argument, Lord 
Bridge of Harwich points out : 
"I should find it surprising that Parliament, if 
intending to make this purely subjective guilt 
criminally punishable, should have done so by 
anything less than the clearest express language ... " 
( 42) 
It becomes self-evident from these quotations that 
the presumption of narrow construction of penal statutes 
and the presumption against an unclear change in the law 
( 42 a) 
are still thriving in the common law of today. 
The other example is 
" _I· Co .. (43) LoviiLpevzC.ct-~'00' V.1M lSSIO!(l 1 
the case of }IAi~VIIll~ ic ·v Tor-e-\jl.-\. 
where the defendant, aC:ommission, 
issued a "provisional determination" that the plaintiff 
could not participate in the fund set up for compensating 
like losses of property. Their reason given was that the 
plaintiff had not shown that he fulfilled all the nee-
essary requirements to establish his claim. 
There was a provision in the Foreign Compensation 
Act 1950( 44 ) ousting the jurisdiction of the ordinary 
courts. (45 ) 
41). p.578 
42). p.583 
42a) .However, this proved to much even for the House of 
Lords. They have recently declared that Anderton v 
Ryan had been wrongly decided and over-ruled it 
accordingly in Reg. v Shirpuri, The Times, May 16th, 
1986. 
43). Cl969J 2 A.C. 147. 
44). 14 Geo.VI. c.l2 
45). S4(4) The determination by the commission of any 
application made to them under this Act shall not be 
called in question in any court of law. 
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Nevertheless, their Lordships found that while 
entertaining the plaintiff's application the defendant 
had misconstrued the relevant legal provision, there-
fore their determination was a nullity and g~ ( 4) of the 
Foreign Compensation Act could not be construed as to 
protect a nullity. They held that by creating this 
nullity the Cvmmission had done something beyond the 
limits of its own jurisdiction and it was the task of the 
ordinary courts to ensure that these limits were observed. (46 ) 
Again, only lip-service is paid to the intention of Parlia-
ment : 
"If the draftsman of Parliament had intended to 
introduce a new kind of ouster clause so as to 
prevent any inquiry even as to whether the document 
relied on was a forgery, I would have expected to 
find something much more specific than the bold 
statement that a determination shall not be called 
in question in any court of law. Undoubtedly such a 
provision protects every determination which is not 
a nullity. But I do not think that it is necessary 
or even reasonable to construe the word "determina-
tion" as including everything which purports to be 
a determination but which is no determination at all". 
( 4 7) 
This narrow way of construing at least a certain type 
of statute has at least two roots in common law thinking. 
One of them is the scepticism towards intangible ideas which 
makes the judges refrain from interpreting a 'spirit' from -
or even into - the statute which may not be there,and makes 
them stick to the words which at least provide some cer-
tainty in the law, an i~portant component (if not more) 
46). Lord Wilberforce, at p.208 
47). Lord Reid, at p.l70. 
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Of . t' (48) JUS 1ce. 
It is this scepticism towards ideas,and the belief in 
the word itself,both signs of a philosophy of positivism 
which is in many ways still prevalent in English legal 
thinking, (49 ) which makes common law judges look with 
suspicion on the 'unruly horse' of public policy which is 
really for Parliament to look after. Even when they 
implant public policy into their decision they will sel-
dom overtly admit that they are doing it. (50) It is for 
similar reasons that English judges do not consult the 
Parliamentary history of an Act ~ 51 ) it is the words 
of the Act themselves which Parliament enacted that 
matter, not how Parliament discussed and put them into 
the statute. 
However, whereas Hansard is still not consulted, at 
least not officially, other Parliamentary materials are 
from time to time admitted by the courts, with the 
approval of academics. <52 ) 
The other root for narrow construction of statutes in 
English legal thinking is the common lawyer~ concern for 
the individual's liberty and the protection of his rights. (53 ) 
Common law developed out of the rules found by the 
early judges to settle the disputes brought before them. 
These disputes naturally were concerned with very basic legal 
48). cf. above, p. 






Atijah, op.cit., pp.l04f, stating, however, that there 
is a decline of this attitude in very recent times. 
Allen, op.cit., pp.492-494, 510-513 ~iti~author­
ities from case-law; Cross, Statutp~~~P~~4,~, citing 
further authorities from case law. 
~~tt.:fGcr£'1'$.:-lai iOV"I I 
cf. Cross, .statutcpp 12 9-134,136-13 9, 141. 
Atiyah, op.cit., pp.81,89. Dicey, An Introduction to 
the Study of the Lew of the Cop..s_titution, pp. 9'7,202, 
394 (hereafter cited : Dicey, Constitution). 
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problems and values( 54 ). As the disputes were between 
individuals they were about one individual's interest 
colliding with another individual's interest, it was for 
the court judge to settle how far each of them could pursue 
his interest as against the other,and thereby help the 
aggr~eved party. It follows from this that the first 
common law rules are concerned with the rights of individ-
uals, how to vindicate them, how to settle the problems 
arising from them. (55 ) Remedies were provided for the 
individual as against the state power in the same vein, as 
can be seen by the Habeas Corpus Act. (S 6 ) 
This tradition led to the 'Rule of Law' being the 
basic rule of the English constitution, meaning that 
(1) The regular law has supremacy as opposed to the 
influence of arbitrary power 
(2) everybody is equal to everybody else in the face 
of the law. (57) 
And it is thus that the rights and the liberty of the 
individualare protected by the 'ordinary law of the land'. (58 ) 
Hence there is a sound suspicion to everything which is not 
the ordinary law of the land, i.e. any kind of arbitrary 
power, especially when it is exercised against the 
individual. (59 ) And it is from this notion there springs 
54) . Atiyah, op.cit., p. 3. 
55) . cf. Atiyah, op. cit., p. 81. 
56) . Dicey, Constitution, pp.l97,199 
57) . Dicey, Constitution, p. 202. 
58) . Dicey, Constitution, pp.202,195. 
59) . Dicey, Constitution, p.l88, cf. also p.394. 
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the principle that penal statutes which substantially inter-
fere with the individual's liberty, and other similarly 
infringing provisions, must not be used arbitrarily and 
cannot be seen as giving arbitrary power to anyone,and 
hence have to be constructed narrowly. English legal 
thinking has changed since Dicey( 60) - even Dicey himself 
described a change from individialism to collectivism 
in public opinion which he credited to have influenced 
the law during the last century( 6 l). It is only the pur-
pose of this outline, however, to show from where certain 
ideas and presumptions originate, not to give a full 
account of the development of English legal philosophy. 
There are other features in common law calling for 
attention. There are the phenomena of Interpretation 
Acts( 62 ) and interpretation clauses( 63 ), a comparatively 
recent feature, they are mainly devices of the draftsman 
to shorten his language, e.g. "the male shall include the 
female", "the singular shall include the plural", "In this 
60). cf. for example Jennings, The Law and the Constitution, 
who criticizes at p.55 that Dicey - wrongly - never 
considered the powers of authorities. 
61). cf. p.69 in Dicey, Law and Public Opinion in England 
~uring the 19th Century (hereafter cited : Dicey Law , __ __ 
and Opinion) . 
62). An Act for shortening the lanugage used in Acts of 
Parliament, 13 & 14 Viet., c 21 (1850) Interpretation 
Act 1889, 52 & 53 Viet., c.63. Interpretation Act 
1978, 26 & 27 Eliz. II, c.30. 
63). eg. s2(8) sl3(1) of the Guardianship Act 1973, 21 & 
22 Eliz. II c 29. 
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Act 'maintenance' includes education". (64 ) 
There is also the phenomenon that common law develops 
on top of the statutes, and precedents are created from 
statutory interpretation. (65 ) Sometimes this is carried 
far indeed; as Allen describes it, "there is not a comma 
or a hyphen which has not its solemn precedent". (66 ) 
Whereas this may have been the right approach in 
times where statutes mended a flaw, or filled a gap in the 
common law by one or two provisions, telling the courts how 
to proceed in future< 67 ), there is some doubt whether this 
is an appropriate approach today when wide areas are 
gover~ned by statute. (68 ) However, precedents are still 
created for statutory interpretation and it is only 
occasionally and in more recent times that the judges 
themselves call this procedure into question. (69 ) 
bb) Civil Law 
Parliamentary law in a civil law system will mainly 
fall under the category 'codes', rather than 'statutes'. 
However, there are statutes in modern civil law, often 
64). s 1 of the Interpretation Act 1889, cited in footnote 
62 s 20(2) of the Guardianship of Minors Act 1971, 
192 20 Eliz., II, c 3. 
65). Atiyah, Common Law and Statute Law, 1985 M.L.R. for 
a modern view in this matter Montrose, op.cit., p.l47 
doctrine of precedent does a~~lYt to statutory inter-
pretation, Cross, Statub)r-~lJf('i&;~.~, 42, no binding prece-
dent in statutory interpretation. 
66). op.cit., p.507, he even gives an example for previous 
decisions being followed although they give a misin-
terpretation of the statute, for the sake of certainty 
of the law, at p.321. 
67). cf. p. 18 above. 
68). Friedmann, op.cit., p.537, David op.cit., pp.336; ·353, 
Ehrmann, op.cit., p.ll3. 
69). Lord Denning, for example, would discriminate between 
two forms of statutory interpretation, as he states in 
Paisner v Goodrich cl955 J 2 All ER 330, at 332: "When 
the judges of this court give a decision on the inter-
pretation of an Act of Parliament, the decision itself 
is binding ... but the words which the judges use in 
giving the decision are not binding ... when interpreting 
a statute the sole function of the court is to apply 
the words of the statute to a giver situation. Once 
a decision has been reached on that situation the doctrine 
of precedent required us to apply the statute in the 
same way in any similar situation ~ but not in a 
(footnote contd/ .. overleaf 
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enacted as auxiliary to, or a substitute of parts of a 
code, like the Marriage Law (Ehegesetz) which deals with 
the contracting of marriage and the validity of marriage 
and was enacted as a substitute for the second and third 
title of the first section of the fourth book of the 
German civil code, the book on family law. Even though 
there are statutes, the codes, though not in law superior 
to them, form the basis of a civil law system. Both 
together are the principal sources of law for the civil 
lawyer. 
As said before the codes are meant to cover, compre-
hensively, a wide area of the law. They are organized 
in a particular way, which can be demonstrated by shortly 
describing the structure of the German civil code. It 
is divided into 5 books the first of which is called the 
General Part and it contains all the provisions that are 
common to the areas of law laid out in the subsequent books 
(Law of Obligations, Law of Property, Family Law, Law of 
Succession) . This part contains a fair number of 
definitions, something like an equivalent to the English 
Interpretation Actsand interpretation clauses. However, 
they are much more broadly termed and allow for a range of 
objects or notions to be covered, quite in contrast to the 
English provisions. For example §90 "only corporeal 
objects are things in the legal sense". This can, e.g. also 
include things the legislative has not thought of when the 
code was enacted. Each of the other books of the code in 
Footnote 69 ~ntinued ... 
different situation. Whenever a new situation emerges, 
not covered by previous decisions the court must be governed 
by the statute and not by the words of the judges." 
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their turn have some general provision to start with, 
most strikingly so the book of the law of obligations which 
contains 432 general provisions and 421 provisions on 
'particular obligations'. Most of the sections and titles 
in the books of the civil code will also be headed by a 
general provision laying down the main principl~ 
of the area of law to follow. An example is the 
concept of gift in §516 "A disposition whereby a person 
out of his own property confers a benefit on ano·ther is 
a gift, if both parties agree that the disposition is 
made gratuitously". There follows provisions defining 
what is not a gift, requirements of form, provisions on 
liability of the donor, on special types of gifts and on 
the possibility of revoking a gift. 
This particular organization of a code helps its 
object to cover an area of law comprehensively : if a 
special term to apply to a certain cause cannot be found, 
recourse can be taken to one of the general principles 
embodied in the general parts of the code - and most of 
those are intentionally, so broadly termed iu would 
be difficult not to apply them. An example of this may be 
§§241 and 242 of the German civil code, reading: 
and 
"The effect of an obligation is that the creditor is 
entitled to claim performance from the debtor. The 
performance may consist of refraining from acting". 
"The debtor is bound to effect performance according 
to the require~ents of good faith, giving considera-
tion to common usage". 
The latter provision. also demonstrates how notions of 
public policy are directly implanted into a provision, 
something unheard of in a common law statute. The 
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provisions of the civil code hardly ever expressl~ relate 
to the courts, and even if they do - like in §1666 where 
the Family Court may take a child away from his or her 
parents when his or her welfare is jeopardized - they 
do it in general terms without mentioning, for example, 
who may apply for a court ruling to that purpose. This 
is partly due to the German legal system having a separate 
code for civil procedure and partly to the fact that the 
German civil code has not been developed to fit into a web 
of judge-made common law, but has been developed by a large 
committee of professors of law to spell out the civil law 
of the land systematically and comprehensively. 
Codes do not solely provide for the settling of 
individual disputes,they also regulate parts of daily 
life that do not come to litigation and thereby influence 
the daily conduct of people in this area( 70), like the old 
version of §1356 of the civil code : 
"The management of the household is the wife's 
individual responsibility. She is entitled to be 
gainfully occupied to the extent that this is 
compatible with her duties to marriage and family". 
Provisions like this are just by their existence 
interfering with the individual's freedom. (7l) Hand in 
hand with this structure of parliamentary law goes the 
judicial approach, to it. Though the canons of inter-
pretation also contain rules of etymological and gramma-
tical interpretation, these are not the only rules. The 
70). Lucke, The Common Law as Arbitral Law,pp.28,171. 
71). Lucke, op.cit., pp.l68 ff, statute law is by its 
nature intrusive. 
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judges may equally ~ell employ rules of historical and 
teleolOgical interpretation. (72 ) The historical inter-
pretation is a rough equivalent of the rule in common law 
that the judge may take the social history of an Act into 
account. The teleological interpretation is a very broad 
version of 'determining the intention of Parliament' 
and it allows that old provisions are adapted to modern 
times in a way never thought of by the parliament enact-
ing them. Continental canons of statutory interpreta-
tions generally allow the consultation of parliamentary 
materials. (73 ) 
Continental judges are also encouraged to apply the 
spirit of the codes (if necessary against the word) and 
thereby applying provisions by analogy. This works as 
follows if there is a set of facts not provided for by 
the code, the judge has to ask himself whether the gap 
in the code is deliberate or not. If he finds the gap 
is there by accident, he may draw principles from pro-
visions applicable to related situations as from the 
general parts of the code and apply them to the facts 
before him. The whole German law on breach of contract 
other than the types defined by the code and breach of 
pre-contractual obligations has been developed by analogy. 
72). These four rules comprise the traditional German canons 
of interpretation, taught to any first-year law 
student, cf. Philip M. Blair, Federalism and 
~udicial Review in West Germany, at p.32. 
73). For the French law, see Allen, op.cit., p.514, 
referring to 'travaux preparations'; also Lloyd of 
Hampstead op.cit., p.73Q. 
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The Swiss Civil Code has an opening article summing 
up the continental approach to analogy from statute : 
"The code governs all questions of law which come 
within the letter or- the spirit of any of its 
provisions, - It the code does not furnish an 
applicable provision, the judge shall decide in 
accordance with customary law, and failing that, 
according to the rule which he would establish as 
a legislator". 
This structure of law and reasoning being so dif-
ferent from that of the common law has its root in the 
different legal thinking stated as above( 74 ), the con-
tinental lawyer puts more trust in general ideas and he 
believes that something like 'justice' or especially 
'substantive justice' can be achieved by establishing the 
'right' legal system, in short he is much more inclined 
to idealism. He sees discretion rather as a means to 
achieve this substantive justice than as a dangerous 
source for artitrariness. In spite of historical experi-
ence he has a certain trust, lacking in the common laywer, 
in the executive powers. 
c) Legal Writers 
There is a different approach to legal writers in 
both legal systems. In the civil law system they have a 
high reputation among the judiciary and are frequently 
quoted in judgments . In the common law system living 
legal writers are traditionally not referred to,as they 
may still change their mind and bring themselves into 
discredit. 
74). cf. above, p. 8f 
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This different view of legal writers has its source 
in the general understanding of the law in either system. 
The bases of the civil law are broadly termed codes, 
embodying general principles which may even be social 
rather than legal principles, like §826 of the German 
civil code, which reads, "Whoever causes injury to another 
intentionally in a manner offending good morals is bound 
to repair the injury". These principles are often too 
broad to be directly applied, so academic writers provide 
a gloss on these principles to provide some help for 
interpretation for the courts. Also, as the continental 
lawyer is not hostile towards ideas and pure theory as 
relying upon 
is the common lawyer, there is no barrier againstjtheoret-
icians, namely the academics. In addition to this, in 
Germany before the Civil Code and in the face o~ an over-
whelming flood of particular laws and the partly received 
Roman law, legal writers were often relied on to give 
an opinion on some difficult matter, and professors of law 
were involved to a high extent in the shaping of the civil 
code. Thus there is a long tradition of inter-relation 
. (75) between academics and the judiciary or the leg1slature. 
In contrast to this the common law was moulded 
closely on the courts and its empirical tradition left 
little room for broader principles which might 
75). In Germany professors of law are for example eligible 
for the bench, even if they have not undergone prof-
essional training, and it is a frequent occurence 
to see a professor sitting in a High Court perhaps 
once a month and hearing cases together with two 
professional judges. 
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induce academics to write on. And the scepticism towards 
theory did not help accepting writings which had not 
directly sprung from the law in practice. In addition 
to this, the links between the judiciary and the law 
faculties in England is traditionally not as strong as it 
is on the Continent : it is still possible to become a 
lawyer without having obtained a university law degree 
beforehand. 
However, there is evidence that the rule against 
citing living legal authors has been relaxed in recent 
years (76 ) , and it is Lord Denning who went as far as 
placing a then living author above a well reputed academic 
of the past, when he said: 
"In reading this conclusion, I should like to 
express my indebtedness to the articles and book 
of Dr. J.H.C. Morris, whose contribution to the 
conflict of laws has excelled even that of his 
great predecessor A.V.Dicey." (77) 
2. The Judges. 
Judges in the two legal systems differ as to their 
career and their personalities. Accordingly, there is 
also a different approach to judicial dissent and to 
judicial law-making in either system. 
Common law judges are called to the bench after a long 
and outstanding work at the bar - at least in theory. The 
work as counsel will strengthen an individualistic outlook 
76). cf. Paterson, op.cit., pp.l4-20. 
77). Re Hollandia Cl982J 1 All ER 1076, at 1081 
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on the law. (78 ) There are also very few judges at the 
higher courts of the country, they enjoy an extraordinary 
high social prestige, they are paid handsomely - as 
Atiyah points out, more than a Minister of the Cabinet(Zg) 
and they are practically irremovable. 
In a civil law system judges enter their profession, 
when they are still under thirty years of age, in excep-
tional cases they may even be as young as 25. Their 
career can normally only be within the profession once 
entered. The structure of their career and the payment of 
their income, in method and amount, is closely modelled 
on the career and payment of civil servants. They hardly 
ever have any experience outside their profession. 
Having never been forced for example to work for 
different clients, the civil law judge is from the beginning 
in the position of state authority. This and his concern 
for his own career( 80), will make him a much readier 
servant of the tzjDVt,.~W\e.hf' and he will be prepared to stand 
up for collective goals as opposed to individuals' rights 
than his common law colleague. 
According to this image of the judge in either legal 
systems there is also a different attitude towards judicial 
dissent, which is a frequent phenomenon in common law 
systems and extremely rare in civil law systems. (8 l) This 
78). Atiyah, Law and Modern Society, p.l8. 
79). Atiyah, op.cit., p.9. 
80). As Dicey already pointed out, longing for advance-
ment is bad for judicial independenceJ Constitution, 
at p.402. 
81). However, there is some relenting of the rule against 
judicial dissent in judgments of the German con-
stitutional court in recent times. 
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has its reasons, first, in the different personality or 
professional outlook of the judges. A civilian judge 
finding himself in a professional situation modelled on 
that of a civil servant will not be encouraged to develop 
ideas of his own or show his personality while acting 
professionally. It is in fact, a habit in civilian law 
courts to make the dissenting judge write the majority 
judgment. (82 ) In contrast to this, the common law 
judge who more or less is at the height of his career (at 
least the judges who come as far as having their judgments 
printed in the law report~); has no qualms of this sort. 
The second reason for the different attitude towards 
judicial dissent is the different outlook on law. Here 
as well as in respect of the professional outlook, the 
common law judge has a much more individualistic approach 
than his civilian colleague, encouraged by the structure 
of the common law itself. (83 ) 
The third reason lies in the function of judicial 
dissent. In the common law system, the argument,the 
reasoning of a judgment means at least as much as the 
result. Thus the dissent has a distinct task within the 
law : subsequent judges often use the arguments of a 
dissenting judgment in an earlier case to overrule or 
distinguish this earlier decision. <84 ) In a civil law 
82). Friedmann, op.cit., p.532. 
83). cf. above, p.l1 
84). Friedmann, op.cit., pp.543f. 
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system it is the result rather than the argument of the 
judgment that matter as the law is laid down in the code 
itself and not in the judgment. An equivalent for this 
in the English system are the findings of the Privy 
Council. They are in theory advice to the sovereign and 
therefore only the result matters, there is nor~ally 
no dissent, and in theory these findings have also - like 
civilian judgments - no binding force. They nevertheless 
are often persuasive to a high degree. 
The last difference between the judges' position in 
the two systems is the attitude towards judicial law-
making. 
The common law judge does in fact make law in respect 
to the case law though he does it within limits and with 
due restraint. He does not make law in respect of 
statutory provisions, as they are law as they are and as 
Parliament intended, and any law-making with - or around -
them would be usurping( 8S) the function of Parliament -
this at least is the theory. Judicial law-making in the 
field of statute law would violate the principle of 
separation of power~, (86 ) 
The civilian judge makes the law under the broad 
cover of the code by filling gaps by analogy from other 
provisions or expounding the general principles embodied 
85). "It appears to me to be a naked usurpation of the 
legislative function under the thin disguise of inter-
pretation", ~ere the cutting words of Lord Simonds 
when he censored Lord Dennin?s liberal approach to 
statute "filling the gaps", ~agor R.D.C. v Newport 
Corp. Cl951J 2 All ER 839 at 84l. 
86). cf. Friedmann, op.clt., p.480 
39 
in it. It is true that whatever the judge evolves this 
way may be overruled by a higher or later court as not 
being in accordance with the principles of the code, but 
this will rarely be done. 
In fact in the German legal system there are several 
examples of the extent to which the judges moulded the 
law. They developed the law of breach of contract other 
th2h~in the ways specified by the code and the law of 
breach of pre-contractual duties. They also used §242 of 
the ~vil Code : 
"The debtor is bound to effect performance according 
to the requirements of good faith, giving considera-
tion to corrunon usage"" 
in order to cope with legal and economic consequences of 
inflation after the First World War by adapting contracts 
made in the years before the changed circumstances. (87 ) 
3. Equity 
A last aspect of differences between the two systems 
is the understanding ot equity. 
Equity is traditionally a separate body of law( 88 ) in 
a corrunon law system, and though the two bodies of law were 
l&&J 
merged more than a century ago, there is still a difference 
between legal and equitable rules,e.g. the enforcing of 
87). Dav{d, op.cit., pp.llOff. 
88). There is also a distinct boqy of law in civil law 
systems, the droit administrative an administrative 
law, which Dicey has likened to the law of equity as 
far as principle structure goes, Constitution, pp. 
379£. It is, however, without importance for the 
present study. 
ggu} Py 4~e- ~upre-lNle Courl q JucllCCt.~kY~ Act 18 t'3, 3(o ~ 31-
VcL.c l:k· t 
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an equitable rule is always at the discretion of the 
courts( 89 ). Equity never really had the function of 
pervading the whole legal system providing mitigation 
for every possible case as it had in the civilian systems. 
However, there are some signs of a tentative change 
in this respect. (90) 
4. General Implications 
As the old judge-made common law - for reasons 
already pointed out( 9l) -is mainly concerned with 
individuals' rights, their vindication and protection, 
and also as the development of the common law is depen-
dent on the disputes brought to the court and therefore 
sometimes necessarily slow and piecemeul it follows , 
consequentially that judge-made common law could not cope 
with rapid social changes starting in the last century. 
The industrial revolution caused rapid changes in 
many areas of social life : family, housing, labour and 
others. Legal structures that had - in family law-
sprung from the ~iddle ~ges proved unadaptable to modern 
needs, and the social controls that had worked so far 
became useless, Different kinds of social relation-
ships developed; like trade unions and political parties, 
89). Atiyah ., Law and Modern Society, p.90. 
90). cf. Friedmann 1 op.cit., p.544, see also Lord 
Denning'spleading for a new equity; The Need for a 
New Equity (1952) 5 C.L.P. 1 
91). See above, p. 11, 35~ 
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the individual lost his importance and attitudes of 
collectivism( 92 ) sprang up. 
To satisfy the new social needs and to implant 
collective goals into the law, Parliament stepped in 
with increasing legislation. Legal Change by Parlia-
ment had the advantage of being fast and comprehensive as 
opposed to the slow and piece-meal change by the judges. 
Also the legislature could implant collective goals into 
the law, which the individualistic common law judges 
would not develop by themelves. And there is a fixed 
point where parliamentary law differs from judge-made 
law in effect it sets out the law for the future and thus 
can regulate( 92 a) social conduct in general as outside the 
courts, whereas the courts only deal with a case after the 
event, settling the dispute, and judge the social conduct 
retrospectively. However the structures of individualism 
derived from the old common law proved strong arid found 
their way into the statute law and influenced its inter-
pretation. ( 93 ) 
The civil law systems with their broadly termed 
codes and their inclination towards general principles 
and ideas and their emphasis o~ substantive justice rather 
than formal justice provided less of a barrier for the 
introduction of collective goals and were open to the 
92). see e.g. Dicey, Law and Public Opinion, pp.64ff 
. . 92a) .cf Lucke, op.c1t., who calls statute law 'regulative' 
for this very reason, pp.l3,29, 168ff. 
93). as shown above,vp. 25f 
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setting into practice of public policy considerations. 
They were thus more prepared for modern social develop-
ments .. Considering that modern social development means 
sometimes radical inroads into the individuals' rights 
and liberty( 94 ), this is certainly at best a mixed 
blessing. 
It explains, however, why - though both systems of 
law are held to move towards each other not only in 
respect of substance but also in respect of methods of 
law( 9 S) - it is the common law, that in the face of 
further increase of collectivistic ideas, e.g. the whole 
notion of the modern ~elfare legislation, that moves 
more towards a civil law approach( 96 ) than vice versa. 
It will be the object of this study to trace this move 
in the narrow branch of parental status law. 
C. Outline of the Thesis. 
The thesis will start with a description of the 
social and historical background of the period concerned 
in view of parental status law, followed by a descrip-
tion of the development of the substantive law of paren-
tal status in statutes and cases. 
There are two main aspects of parental status, both 
of which take part in the change. One is the relationship 
94). Atiyah, Law and Modern Society, p.89. 
95). David, op.cit., p.24. 
96). David, op.cit., pp.24,308;Scarman, The New Dimension, 
pp.25f; Friedmann, op.cit., p.550. 
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between mother and father, the other the relationship 
between parent and child. The aspects naturally cannot 
be completely separated from each other but an emphasis 
will be laid on the mother-father relationship. I have 
chosen this emphasis mainly for the reason that the 
development of the law of parental status as between 
mother and father has come to an end with the 1973 
Guardianship Act which introduces perfect legal equality 
between the parents for all legal purposes, whereas the 
law of parental status as between parent and child is 
still changing with the tendency of ameliorating the 
position of the child and strengthening state powers to 
interfere with family life. 
Therefore the description of the general social and 
leg2l background will centre around the position of man 
and wonan in society and law, and in particular in the 
family anc'l in family law. Thereby the mutual influences 
of law Rnrl society will be considered. 
The second part of this study shall concentrate on 
the particular development of the law of parental status, 
treating the relevant Acts and cases in turn over the 
whole period concerned. Particular attention will thereby 
he paid to the interaction between legislature and judici-
ary. 
The next part of the study is devoted to questions 
of method and legal structure. This part will look into 
the shape of statutes and their provisions and into judicial 
reasoning and attitudes of the judges, especially in their 
approach to legal sources. Where it is appropriate, how-
ever, I will take into account other aspects described in 
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this chapter when they can be used to illustrate a change 
in the English legal system. 
To finish this chapter and to provide an outlook on 
what may be expected in the following chapters, I shall 
set out two quite different quotations: 
In a case in 1861 a judge had to determine whether 
to grant or to refuse a mother acceis to her children on 
the basis of s.35 of the 1857 Matrimonial Causes Act 
which provided very generally for orders of such a kind. 
He narrowed down the scope of this section considerably 
by using an older statute, the 1839 Custody of Infants 
Act which had provided that an adulterous mother should 
not have access to her children. The judge considered 
the older statute as follows, "the enactment establishes 
a precedent I ought to follow" (97 ). 
Two things can be seen from this quotation in its 
context. First, the statute on which the case is based 
is approached by limiting its scope which hints a certain 
hostility to it. Secondly, the other statute is used as 
a precedent, which either shows that in fact a statute 
then was like a precedent or that the judge considered 
it to be so, misreading the different nature 
of statutes compared to precedents. Whichever interpretation 
one chooses, it demonstrates that the English legal system 
at that time was thoroughly a common law system. 
------------------------------------------------------------------
(97). Clout v Clout & Hollebone (1861) 2 Svr. & Tr.391, 
164 ER 1047. 
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115 years later a different attitude evolves. 
Though not in the field of parental status law, but in 
the case on matrimonial property, Ormrod L.J. stated: 
" ... the rules are not very firm. This is inevitable 
when the courts are working out the exercise of the 
wide powers given by a statute ... " and" 
decisions of this court can never be better than 
guidelines. They are not precedents in the strict 
sense of the word." (98) 
It becomes apparent that the Lord Justice relies on 
general principles introduced by legislation, and when 
he states that the decisions are not precedents, he 
really voices an attitude which one would expect in a 
civil law system which is based on a code. 
Thus at least these two quotations point out a 
striking change. In the first, statute is seen like a 
precedent, in the second, not even a precedent is seen 
as a precedent but just as a guideline, and the authority 
is the statute. 
98). Martin v Martin Cl976J 3 All ER 625 
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CHAPTER II 
GENERAL SOCIAL AND LEGAL BACKGROUND 
A Outline and Purpose 
In this chapter I shall describe the general social 
and legal background against which the specific develop-
ment of the law of parental status took place. This is to 
include mainly the changes in the law of divorce and of 
matrimonial property and some child law, which may be 
necessary to illustrate the general development set out in 
this survey, without pre-empting too much of the next 
chapter. 
I shall also consider -\t,e soocx..L c.Lq"'udc tiA. wk(t.k -U-.ese_ 
changes took place, who influenced them, who opposed them, 
and what their further consequences were. 
B Common Law 
The common law as related to family relations at 
the outset of the 19th Century can be described by two 
main criteria: the indissolubility of the marriage and the 
absolute common law rights of the husband and father over 
his wife and children. 
Until the middle of the last century divorce as we 
understand it today, giving the ability to re-marry, 
could only be obtained by Private Act of Parliament and 
was normally only granted to men(l). What was then called 
1). Morris Finer and O.R. McGregor, The History of the Obligation to 
Maintain, Appendix 5 to the Report of the Committee on One-
Parent Families, vol.II (chairman: Sir Morris Finer) Cmnd 5629 
(1974) 1 p. 94 • 
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divorce as obtained by a suit in the ecclesiastical courts 
was the equivalent of today's judicial separation. 
On marriage the husband became the absolute owner of 
of his wife's personal property, "Marriage is a gift of the 
wife's chattels to her husband'', (2 ) or even better "A sixth 
method of acquiring property in goods and chattels is by 
marriage; whereby those chattels, which belonged formerly 
to the wife, are by act of law vested in the husband, with 
the same degree of property and with the same powers as 
the wife, when sole, had over them."()) The wife's landed 
property would also be vested in her husband during the 
marriage, and when there was issue born to the marriage, 
capable of inheriting this property, the husband would 
acquire a life interest of the property after her death, 
even when the child had not survived. (4 ) In order to alienate 
such property, husband and wife together had to 'levy a 
fine', and in the process the wife had to be examined 
separately to make sure that she freely agreed to the 
transaction. (S) Because of her proprietary disabilities 
a married woman could also not enter into contracts, other 
than as an agent of her husband(G). Any conveyance she 
made by herself would be void. She could also not sue by 
herself or be sued independently, and as her husband on 
marriage had "adopted her and her circumstances", he was 
2). W.S.Holdsworth, A History of English Law, Vol.III, p.53l; see 
also Dicey, Law and Public Opinion, pp.37lf. 
3). Blackstone, op.cit., Vol.II, p.433. 
4). R. Megarry and H.W.R. Wade, The Law of Real Property, p.2l. 
5). Megarry and Wade,op.cit.,pp.993f. 
6). Holdsworth, op.cit., Vo •• III, p.528. 
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also liable for her debts and torts incurred before 
marriage.(?) As the husband was liable for his wife's 
wrong_eoings, it was thought proper that he should have 
the power to restrain her personal liberty and also 
otherwise exercise "domestic chastisement, in the same 
moderation that a man is allowed to correct his servants 
or children 11 .( 8 ) It was not until R v Jackson in 1891( 9 ) 
that it was finally settled that a wife could go where she 
pleased without being detained by her husband. The hus-
band had legal power over the children of the marriage, 
the wife and mother had no right to their custody, as 
Blackstone put it, "for a mother-as such- is entitled to 
no power but only to reverence and respect". (9a) The 
wife was considered inferior to her husband to such an 
extent that she was deemed to be under his coercion when 
she committed a crime (other than murder or high treason) 
in the presence of her husband(lO). This was a protection 
which the common-law denied to other people labouring 
under legal incapacities, "for neither a son or a servant 
are excused for the commission of any crime, whether 
capital or otherwise ••• ". (ll) In short, a married woman 
laboured under a number of legal incapacities and had thus 
a special status, as had the infant or the lunatic. (l2 ) 
7). Blackstone, op.cit., Vol.I. p.430. 
8). Blackstone, op.cit., Vol.I, p.432. 
9 .). . 1. Q.B. 671. Blackstone, , 9a) Blackstone,op.cit., Vol.I.p.441 
10). Holdsworth, op.cit., Vol.III p.443. 
11). Blackstone, op.cit., Vol. IV, p.28. 
12). Holdsworth, op.cit., Vol. III p.457; cf. also Dorothy M.Stetson, 
A Woman's Issue, p.S; and Lee Holcombe, Wives and Property, pp. 
21-26, 35. 
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This legal position derived from the notion of a 
complete merger of the two personalities within marriage, 
the resulting united personality being represented by the 
husband alone, as Blackstone put it: 
"By marriage, the husband and wife a-r-e one person in 
law; the legal existence of the woman is incorporated 
and consolidated into that of the husband; under whose 
protection and cover, she performs everything; and is 
therefore called in our law- French a feme-covert ..• ; 
and her condition during marriage is called coverture."(l3) 
There may be several reasons found for this phenomenon one 
of which could 1 for instance, be seen in the woman's in-
ability to comply with the numerous duties imposed on a 
person by the feudal system, and which made it desirable 
to give the rights and duties concerning her property to 
her husband, which had in itself further consequences for 
her legal liability and her capacity to enter into con-
tracts. Alongside such practical reasons went the influence 
of ecclesiastical law with its literal understanding of 
Genesis 2.24 that on marriage man and woman become one 
flesh, alongside with Genesis 3.16 that the husband shall 
rule over the wife. The situation may also be suitably 
described with a quote from de Montmorency (1897): 
11 The Creator took from Adam a rib and made it Eve, the 
common law of England endeavoured to reverse the pro-
cess; to replace the rib and remerge the personalities ... 
(14) 
Although the same author maintained that the theoretical model 
13). Blackstone, op.cit., Vol. I. p.430. 
14). J.E.G. de Montmorency, The Changing Status of a Married Woman, 
(1897) 13 L.Q.R., pp.187-199, at 192. 
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was never enforced to its logical extent by the judges(lS), 
it has, however, to be said that the state of law as des-
cribed was not fundamentally questioned, as can be seen 
from the following two cases on custody law: 
In De Manneville v De Manneville(l 6 ) a father had 
abducted his child then at the mother's breast. His wife 
had separated herself from him and had laid charges of ill-
treatment and heresy against him. After unsuccessful 
habeas corpus proceedings(l?), the wife instituted Chancery 
proceedings to get her child back. Her petition was dis-
missed. Although the court paid lip-service to the benefit 
of the infant, it refused to interfere with the father's 
right, "the law imposed a duty upon parents, and in general 
gives them credit for ability and inclination to execute 
it
1
: (lB) and it also felt that it would unduly encourage 
the wife to live in a"state of actual unauthorised separ-
atio;(lg) if it granted custody to her. In R v Greenhill( 20) 
the father of three small girls had formed an adulterous 
connection upon which the wife had separated herself from 
him, taking her daughters with her. He instituted habeas 
corpus proceedings and the children were ordered to be 
handed to him. He was held to have an absolute right to 
his children, which could only be interfered with when 
the children were in acute danger of health ,of life and 
15) • ibid. 
16). (1804) 10 Ves. Jun. 52, 32 ER 762. 
17). R v De Mannevi11e (1804) 5 East.221, 102 ER 1054. 
18). atp.767. 
19) • at p. 766. 
20) • (1836) 4 Ad. & E. 624 I 111 ER 922. 
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limb or when their moral well-being was jeopardized by the 
father's gross profligacy. It remains to be asked why and 
how such traditional structures could survive as they did. 
The answer lies in the fact that this rigid law did not 
effect the whole population equally. Among the lower 
classes for examples the property laws hardly applied, 
because these people had no property to speak of and also, 
as the husband and father had no possibility of looking 
after small children himself and no money to have them 
looked after by somebody else, it was more often than not 
the case that the mother retained the custody of young 
children even after a separation. (2l) · 
C Equity and Parliamentary Divorce. 
The upper classes evaded the rigid common law rules 
with the help of the Court of Chancery. Proceedings in 
the Court of Chancery were expensive and thus not open to 
the man in the street. This court though had jurisdiction 
to make settlements of property and administered the law 
governing trusts. By the means of trust and marriage settle-
ment the rich could secure separate property for their 
daughters, protected from the grasp of the husbands( 22 ). 
Also by settling money on an infant somebody could make 
this infant a ward of court and the court when enforcing a 
scheme of education for such a ward would not only regard 
21). Susan Maidment, Child Custody and Divorce, p.ll6. 
22). cf. Holcombe, op.cit., pp.38-43. 
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the father's rights but also the welfare of the child. (23 ) 
Although it has to be admitted that often equity followed 
(24) 
the law and the welfare of the child was seen to be pro-
vided for best by leaving the father's right undisturbed -
an attitude which can be found as late as 1883 in Re Agar-
( 2 5) 
Ellis. This was a case where the parents had separated 
and there had been serious disagreement on the question of 
religious education of the children. The father then 
forbade his 17 year-old daughter unsupervised contact with 
her mother. The mother applied for an alteration of this 
mode of access. Her petition was dismissed, the court 
stated that it was normally for the best of any infant when 
the sacred rights of family life were not interfered with. 
Thus the upper classes could at least in part escape the 
rigidity of the common law in the areas of matrimonial 
property law and custody law. They could also, provided 
they were very wealthy; 26 ) and only when adultery had been 
committed by one of the spouses, evade the indissolubility 
of marriage. For that purpose they had to get a decree 
of separation from bed and board in the Ecclesiastical 
Courts and the innocent party had to be successful in a 
suit of criminal conversation in the civil courts,getting 
damages from the spouse's partner in adultery. After 
this they could go and obtain a Private Act of Parliament 
23). Maidment, op.cit., p.95. 
24). As can be seen from the case of De Manneville,cited at fnts 16 
and 171 where in fact legal proceedings were instituted first, 
and the chancery proceedings thereafter brought the same 
result. 
25). In Re Agar-Ellis, Agar-Ellis v Lascelles (1883) 21:l Ch. D. 317. 
26). '(Finer Report, op.cit., Vol.I, para. 4,10, p.67 gives the mini-
mum cost for a Private Act of Parliament as £700, if undefended. 
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which would enable them to marry again. As a matter of 
fact, the Private Acts were mostly obtained by men, there 
are only four cases where women obtained parliamentary 
divorce and none of them was a case of simple adultery. (27 ) 
As the upper classes could thus evade the rules of 
common law they did not feel the necessity for reform~28 ) 
I 
It was a time when pressure and interest groups( 29 )or 
parties were not yet formed and politics were much more 
governed by personalities. The age of collectivism had not 
yet begun. ()O)This proved a handicap for reform and there 
was little chance for new(~~yas to find their way into legislature 
D The 1857 Divorce Act and judiciary. 
However, by the middle of the 19th Century social 
structures which had so far safeguarded family life were 
breaking up more and more rapidly. With increasing 
industrialization a considerable part of the rural popu-
lation moved into the towns and cities and thereby out of 
the reach of local structures of social control . The 
larger family units which had existed in the country-
side broke up into smaller nucl~~ families. It was no 
longer vital for the survival of the family that they all 
stayed together for support but every member of the family 
' 
had to go out and earn and fend for him or herself. This 
was at least true for the newly arising working class town 
population. Besides that, the social middle class grew in 
27). Finer Report, op.cit., Vol.II, p.94. 
28) • cf. Maidment,, op.cit., at p. 94 for custody law reform. 
29). Stetson, op.cit., the organized Women's Rights Movement began 
in the 1850's. 
39). cf. Dicey, Law and Public Opinion, pp.6~f • 
31). Matrimonial Causes Act 1857, 20 & 21, Viet., c.85. 
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numbers. Middle class women started to receive some 
education and increasingly found their way into gainful 
occupation( 3la). Thus they gained some independence which 
would not fit in with the traditional view of marriage as 
provided by the common-law. When they felt aggrieved in 
their family life, (and they did feel aggrieved by the 
fetters the old common law rules imposed on them in spite 
of their developing economic independence), they were often 
not rich enough to ensure for themselves the benefits of 
euality and Parliamentary divorce, but they were educated 
enough to voice their distress. As the indissolubility of 
marriage was now no longer an economic necessity and there 
were also (via an educated middle class) ways to voice dis-
satisfaction with the state of the law, the way became 
open for reform.( 32 ) 
1. Preparation of the Act 
To investigate these matters the first Royal (Campbell) 
Commission on divorce was appointed in 1850 under Lord 
Campbell as chairman. In his report published in 1853 it 
recommended conferring jurisdiction in matrimonial proceed-
ings both for divorce and separation on a secular court and 
it suggested adultery as the only ground for divorce. 
Even this was only meant to benefit a husband, since 
according to the recommendations of the Commission a wife 
could only obtain a divorce if her husband had committed 
incestuous adultery. (33 ) 
3la). cf. Dicey, Law & Public Opinion, p,385, 
32). cf, Stetson, op,cit., p,24, 
33). Stetson, op.cit., p.29. 
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These recommendations were well in line with pro-
fessional opinion which had attacked the cumbersome pro-
( 3 4) 0 
cedure that had existed before. 1.e. that it had been 
necessary to undergo three different legal proceedings to 
achieve one step, namely a divorce. They were also accep-
table for the church as divorce for adultery was at least 
not contrary to the Bible. (35 ) Moreover they were in 
accordance with the views held in the community, insofar 
as they discriminated between husbands and wives. (36 ) 
With increasing industrialization a growing middle-class 
arose with economic and moral standards different from 
those of an earlier period. Their wealth did not come from 
(37) landed property but from other sources and therefore 
could not be protected sufficiently by the laws of 
inheritance and entails which enabled the landed nobility 
to keep their wealth within the narrow boundaries of the 
lawful family. 
For the urban middle class family where (personal) 
property was passed on to all children it was much more 
important that there were no bastards among these chil-
dren and therefore adultery of the wife which would 
impose 'spurious offspring' on her husband and family 
was a much greater crime than adultery of a man. (38 ) 
Accordingly, when the Matrimonial Causes Bill was 
introduced into Parliament in 1856, (39 ) the grounds for 
divorce was one of the main issues in the debates. There 
34). cf. Stetson, op.cit., p.28. 
35). cr. Holcombe, op.cit,, p.97. 
36). Stetson, op,cit., p.47. 
37). Holcombe, op.cit., pp.34f. 
38). qf, Holcombe, op.cit., p.l03. 
39). There had been earlier attempts in 1854 which proved unsuccessful, 
facing overwhelming opposition, cf.~tetson, op.cit,, p,30, 
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was also still major opposition mainly by the Church to 
the admission of divorce at all, and long discussions on 
the matter of re-marriage, re-marriage in Church,and on 
criminal conversation. (40) 
The opposition to admitting divorce at all was not so 
much that it was against divine law - as this argument 
was difficult to be upheld in the face of S.Matthew 19,9: 
"And I say unto you, Whosoever shall put away his wife, 
except it be for fornification, and shall marry another, 
committeth adultery; and whoso marrieth her which is 
put away doth commit adultery." 
But there was a fear for the moral welfare of the popula-
tion as the new law would allegedly open the floodgates to 
matrimonial litigation and deterioration of morality( 4 l) (a 
recurrent argument in all debates on liberalizing the 
divorce law until the present day). The attempt to libera-
lize the law of divorce, apart from making it accessible 
for other than the very wealthy by introducing equal 
I 
grounds for both husband and wife proved to be unsuccess-
ful. Victorian middle-class morals seeing the wife as the 
high priestess of the home, held the field: 
"It was common feeling of mankind that, if a husband 
respected and treated his wife with kindness, the sin 
on the pa~t of the husband was not necessarily an 
unpardonable offence. These were cases in which a 
wife might and ought to condone, but the common feeling 
of mankind told them that this must be on the part of 
the wife only". ( 42). 
40). As can be seen from the debates, Hansard, 3rd. series, Vols. 
141-147. 
41). R.H.Graveson, The Background of the Century, in: Graveson 
and Crane, op.cit., p.lOf. 
42). Debate on the 1854 Bill, Lord Chancellor Cranworth,Hansard 
3rd Series, Vol.l34, c.406. 
or 
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"When adultery was corrunitted by a woman all purposes 
of the marriage were forever annulled, there could be 
no condonation on the part of the husband" (43) 
It was even maintained that unequal grounds were necessary 
to protect women as they might otherwise be forced into 
divorce by an adulterous husband : 
"If adultery on the part of the husband is to entitle 
him to a divorce, in as much as the husband - which 
may be bad morality, but it is the fact - suffers 
little on that account in the opinion of the world 
at large - for it is notorious that, while the wife 
who corrunitted adultery loses her station in society 
the same punishment is not awarded to the husband who 
is guilty of the same crime - he may, without any 
sacrifice, on his part, but by merely being a little 
profligate, and multiplying his acts of adultery, be 
able to effect his object" (44) (i.e. divorce). 
There were however equally emotional corrunents from 
the other side (the following though more on the overall 
effect of the law on women) : 
" ••• but ••• unless something be done to change it -
unless some redress be afforded - we must be content 
to continue tobe held up to the rest of mankind as 
pretending to be a civilised country, while in 
reality living under a system more barbarous and 
more inconsistent with itself than existed in any 
other part of the world" (45). 
As a consequence of the prevailing social climate the 
Act, when finally coming into force in 1858, only seculari-
zed the law of divorce and separation and made it also more 
accessible without changing its principles, i.e. divorce 
for a wife only on the grounds of adultery combined with 
43). Debate on the 185~ Bill, Lord Campbell, Chairman of the 
Royal Commission, Hansard 3rd. Series, Vol.l42, c.l979. 
44). Debate on the 1854 Bill, Lord Chancellor Cranworth, Hansard, 
3rd. Series, Vol • 134, c. 7. 
45). Debate on the 1856 Bill, Lord Brougham, Hansard 3rd. Series, 
Vol. 142, c.422. 
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specified aggravating circumstances. 
The Act also had some ancillary provisions. S.35 
empowered the Divorce Court to make provisions for the 
custody, main~ev.nance and education of children and there 
were also several provisions to alleviate the situation of 
deserted, separated and divorced women respectively 
concerning maint€/nance, property, earnings and the legal 
capability to sue and to be sued. S2l gave a deserted 
wife leave to appeal to the ·court for an order of protec-
tion of the property she would acquire after the desertion, 
for example, her earnings and gifts and bequests by other 
people, s.25 put a separated\vtfe~nto the position of a 
I I 
feme sole in respect of property acquired after the separa-
tion, according to s.26 she could, after separation, sue 
I I 
and be sued like a feme sole and her husband was no longer 
liable for her debts, and s.25 enabled the court to make 
orders for alimony in connection with any decree granted. 
Especially in these latter provisions the influence of an 
individual woman may be seen( 4G), namely Caroline Norton, 
who had the misfortune of a degrading married life and the 
fortune of being a poet and writer, (though the financial 
fruits of her talent were enjoyed by her husband according 
to the existing law of matrimonal property) • Her pamphlet 
"A Letter to the Queen on Lord Chc.mcellor Cram.rorth' s 
46). Margaret Forster, Significant Sisters, p.47. That it was 
possible for a single woman to influence the legislative 
machinery is some evidence that the tide of collectivism 
has not yet risen. 
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Marriage and Divorce Bill" published in 1855 was widely 
read and discussed at the time( 4?} and her influence was 
also openly acknowledged e.g. by Lord Brougham when com-
menting on the pamphlet "as clever a thing as ever was 
written ... I feel certain that the law of divorce will be 
amended and she has greatly contributed to it". (48 } 
2 Effects and Consequences. 
One of the immediate effects of the Matrimonial 
Causes Act 1857 lay precisely in the provisions just 
described : they catered for the worst abuses of the 
existing law in alleviating the fate of separated and 
divorced women - without substantially changing the law 
for married women - and by this they delayed immediate 
further reform, especially of matrimonial property law. (49 } 
Although the numbers of divorce petitions and decrees 
granted increased after the Act, the feared floodgate 
effect could not be seen. This was partly due to the 
high expenses of the proceedings and partly to the social 
stigma still connected with divorce~SO) 
The public morals concerning adultery of the wife 
which underlay the Act can also be shown to have a lasting 
effect on the law of maintenance. Not only that the guilty 
wife was mostly not granted maintenance or alimony or only 




Stetson, op.cit., p.47. 
Forster, op.cit., p.47. 
Holcombe, op.cit., p.93 and perhaps intendedly so 
op.cit., p.47. 
50). Holcombe, op.cit., p.lOS. 
cf Stetson, 
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adultery( 5l), even the innocent wife who had sued and 
obtained a decree of divorce was at one time deemed to be 
punishable because she had sued for divorce at all and not 
asked for a separation. (52 ) 
This case law was developed even though the Private 
Acts of Parliament which had been granted before 1857 had 
always contained some financial provisions for the guilty 
. f (53) Wl e . It was not until 1883 in Robertson v Robertson 
and Favagrossa( 54 ) that a gradual change in attitude be-
came visible. 
Though in the latter case the wife was not granted 
maintenance for procedural reasons and because she had 
refused to admit her adultery and receive maintenance in 
return, but had forced her husband to spend most of his 
moderate fortune in order to prove her adultery committed 
abroad, the Master of the Rolls carefully declared his own 
approach: 
11 I am sorry to hear it ci.e. the recent divorce court 
practiceJ I am not giving a final opinion, but it 
appears to me that s.32 of the 1857 Matrimonial 
Causes Act was intended to give the Court a dis-
cretion .•• and it was not intended that a guilty wife 
should be turned into the streets to starve" (55) 
He also emphasized that, as divorce was not granted to 
members of lower social classes, the parliamentary prac-
tice was not to be copied to the letter, but it had to be 
51). Holcombe, p.lOl; see Latham v Latham and Gethin (1861) 30 L.J. 
P.M. & A. 43. 
52). Fisher v Fisher (1861) 2 Sw.& Tr.410, 164 ER 1055, however, 
already in 1865 this rule is reversed in Sidney v Sidney, 4 sw. 
& Tr.l78 1 164 ER 1485, because a husband who had behaved him-
self grossly enough as to occasion divorce should not be 
given the additional advantage of paying less money. 
53). Finer and McGregor, in Finer Report, op.cit., Vol.II. p.lOO. 
54). 8 P.D. 94 
55). ibid., ~t p.95. 
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taken into account that a working-class woman could more 
easily be expected to maintain herself after divorce. It 
should be noted that in spite of this judgment it had still 
to be stressed in 1966( 56 ) than an adulterous wife did 
not automatically lose every claim to maintenance. 
E Property Legislation and Parliamentary Franchise. 
1 The Social Setting 
In the years after 1857 there was a growing public 
concern about the position of women, mainly centred on the 
questions of parliamentary franchise and matrimonial 
property rather than on the position of a woman as mother. 
This is probably due to the fact that questions of property 
and parliamentary representation show more directly the 
legal disabilities of women. As they were concerned with 
power given to women over themselves they were the main 
target for women's emancipation or liberation. Custody 
of children led one step further in aiming to give women 
power over others namely their children. Moreover in 
custody questions the position of the infant has to be con-
sidered independently in regqrding its welfare. But as 
the child's welfare is in itself an indefinite term, it 
can easily be employed to veil the striving for other 
social aims. It can be used for justifying the father's 
common law right as well as the mother's emancipation. (S?) 
56) . Iverson v Iverson [1966] 1 All ER 258 
57). As will be seen in the analysis of cases, Chapter IV. C. 
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Thus the field of custody of children is on its own not 
an apt one for women's emancipation. 
Hence the emancipation movement concentrated as 
pointed out - on property and the franchise. These two are 
closely linked to each other for two reasons. First 
because in the last century the right to vote was dependent 
on property(SB), and secondly because it could always be 
stressed by the Feminists that only male representation of 
women did not lead to sufficient protection of their 
interests as could be seen in the property laws(sg) and 
that therefore, it was vital to give women the vote in 
order to put pressure on Parliament that these interests 
might be guarded better~ 60 ) 
In 1823 James Mill could still safely maintain that 
women needed no vote because they had their husbands and 
fathers to act for them. (6 l) This argument held good for a 
long time thereafter, it lost force under overwhelming 
evidence to the contrary, namely that husbands and fathers 
did not look 'after their wifes and daughters' properly, 
when acting for them. So the argument could then be made 
that if men did not look after the women of their families, 
the women had to get the vote to make their own needs 
known to Parliament. The public conern showed itself 
58). Holcombe, op.cot., p.210 
59). Holcombe, op.cit., p.209 
60). Holcombe, op.cit., p.214. 
61). James Mill, Article on Government, in:Encyclopaedia Britannica 
1923, cited in Stetson, op.cit., p.25. 
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rrtostly in the activities and writings of educated women 
themselves( 62 ), and unlike the first half of the century, 
when the influence of individuals was most important, 
women's interest groups were formed and bore a strong 
influence on the development( 63 ). There were also men of 
importance whose support could be enlisted for the women's 
quest. Mostly they were enlightened members of Parliament 
and the most prominent is probably John Stuart Mill. 
In his widely read 'Subjection of Women' he illustrated 
the existing legal and social situation : "there remain no 
legal slaves except the mistress of every house". <64 ) 
The 'Subjection of Women' was published in 1869 to 
help the Married Women's Property Bill which was accord-
ingly followed by the Act in 1870. There had been striving 
for reform of property law since the 1850's. John Stuart 
Mill had in fact held back publication of his treatise 
for eight years until the Bill came in sight, then he 
published it in order to influence the public in favour 
of reform, and thus increase the social pressure on Parlia-
ment to pass the Bill. <65 ) 
2 Legislation 
In 1870 a first attempt to amend the property law 
was made with the Married Women's Property Act of that 
year,< 66 ) and twelve years later after prolonged struggle, 
62). cf. Holcombe, op.cit., pp.ll3-ll5, 118-123. 
63). Norman St.John-Stevas, Women in Public Law , in:Graveson and 
Crane, op.cit., pp.26lf. 
64). John Stuart Mill, The Subjection of Women, p.l60. 
65). cf. Holcombe, op.cit., p.ll3 
66). 33 & 34 Viet., c.93. 
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(67) 
the Married Women's Property Act 1882 which provided a 
broad approach to the issue was passed. Neither Act 
achieved what had been asked for, but the overall result 
provided a substantial improvement and a certain degree 
of equality. In 1870 it became law that a married woman 
could keep and administer her earnings, certain investments 
and to some degree inherited property, as her separate 
property. In 1882 this limited rule was extended as a 
general principle to all property which a married woman 
acquired after the passing of the Act. 
There was a strong professional opposition, especially 
to the 1870 Act( 68 ), which can be contrasted with the pre-
vailing approach of the legal profession in 1857. In 
1857, reform in their eyes had only meant straightening 
out an extremely cumbersome procedure and making a legal 
remedy which had existed only for the rich accessible to 
a larger part of the population. Now they felt the 
danger of upsetting age-old and well tried-out principles 
by introducing new concepts into English property law. 
The unwillingness of the lawyers to accept a revolu-
tionary development led to a peculiar feature in both 
Acts. Both of them really only extended the principles 
of equity so far applied in the Chancery Court in connection 
with the settlements of the rich to all matrimonial 
property. As Dicey pointed out, equity governed the time, 
the method and the nature of parliamentary reform. (69 ) 
67). 45 & 46 Viet., c.75. 
68). In the House of Lords, cf. Holcombe, op.cit., pp.l74-176. 
69). Dicey, Law and Public Opinion, p.384. 
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After the property law had been substantially amended, 
introduction of equal franchise for men and women was 
consequently delayed, as some of the ground had been 
cut from under the feet of the women's movement(?O). In 
1918 women were given the vote as a consequence of the 
First World War, but it was not until 1928 that it was 
given to them on equal terms with men(?l). 
3 Consequences 
The Married Women's Property Act 1882 provided "i~e.fred. e:very 
woman on her marriage with a settlement". (? 2 ) This intro-
duction of equitable rules rather than perfect equality in 
matrimonial property,law led to injustice in several 
aspects( 73 ) which were only removed by procedural amend-
ments in the course of subsequent years : it had not been 
set out clearly in how far husband and wife could now 
give evidence against each other ,soth.\.c; had to be changed by 
(73a) 
the Married Women's Property Act 1884. As all her prop-
erty was 'separate property' in the sense of the old 
equitable rules1 a married woman would not be liable per-
sonally but only to the extent of her separate property. 
When she entered a contract only that separate property 
which she held at that point of time would be liable to 






Ho.lcombe, op.cit., p.215 
By the Representation of People (Equal Franchise) Act, 18 & 
19 Geo. V. c.36. 
Dicey, Law and Public Opinion, p.391. 
Hol,dsworth, op.cit., Vol. III, p.533 "When the legislature adopted 
equitable rules and applied them with some modifications to married 
women, many curious legal rules, many doubtful problems, and some-
times injustice resulted from the imperfect ~fusion of these two 
antagonistic sets of legal principles". 
47 Viet., c 14 
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Married Women's Property Act 1893). (74 ) A married woman 
also would have only limited testament~ry capacity, e.g. 
if she made a will during mo.:rri.o..3e purporting to 
include all her property, this will would not extend to 
( 7 5) property which would come to her on her husband's death. 
It was not until 1949( 76 ) that complete legal equality 
was achieved and this ironically at a point of time when it 
dawned upon the judiciary that complete legal equality 
on the background of social inequality could lead to in-
justice and iniquity within marriage. As a consequence 
they started to introduce into the law certain principles 
vaguely resembling the notion of community of property at 
least as far as the matrimonial home was concerned, for 
example, if a wife was deserted by her husband, she was 
deemed to have a right (or rather : an equity) to remain 
in the matrimonial home. (77 ) 
The effects of the matrimonial property legislation 
in its final result of 1882 has to be seen from two 
angles, the practical and the psychological point of 
view. The immediate practical effect was in fact smaller 
than might be expected from the words of the Act. For 
the rich it meant no decisive change as they had had the 
benefits of the rules of equity before the Acts. For the 
74). 56 & 57 Vict.p. 50, The heaviest blunder, however, had perhaps 
been made with the 1870 Act which provided that though only 
some of the wife's property became her own and her husband would 
still take the rest, he was no longer liable for her ante-
nuptual debts. This was changed quickly by the 1874 Married 
Women's Property Act 37 & 38 Vict.p.50 where it was provided 
that husband and wife should be sued jointly for her ante-
nuptual debts and he should be liable to the extent to which he 
had acquired property from her on marriage. 
75). cf Dicey, Law and Public Opinion, pp.392 ff. 
76). Married Women (Restraint upon Anticipation) Act 1949,12,13 & 14, 
Geo.VI, c.78. 
77). cf Lord Denning, The Due Process of Law pp.211-219 see also pp.217-
233;finally, the Matrimonial Homes Act 1967 acknowledged the 
social needs and tidied up the judicial development. 
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working classes its effect was limited insofar as the 
earnings were often only sufficient to keep the family 
alive and the necessity of protecting accumulated property 
often could not arise. Though it should not be forgotten 
that the extreme cases which had been adduced as evidence 
for the necessity of reform( 78 ) could no longer occur under 
the new law. In order to consider the effect the 1882 
Act had on the middle class it is important to distinguish 
between holding and acquiring property. Concerning the 
holding of property the Act was a decisive achievement 
as women did not lose their property on marriage any 
longer. However, the effect of the Act on property 
acquired during marriage can be viewed as minimal for 
middle class women, as they could not stay in or enter 
socially respectable employment (i.e. nursing) once they 
were married. Some help, however, was provided for 
married women by the judiciary by means of the presump-
tion of advancement. This equitable presumption first 
occurred in 1688( 79 ) but did not come into frequent use 
before the second half of the 19th century(BO). The 
principle established that in contrast to the general 
presumption that, as nothing would normally be given with-
out consideration, and accordingly, if some property was 
given by one person to the other, the latter was deemed to 
78). Holcombe, op.cit., pp.l6lf. 
79). Kingdon v Bridges (1688) 2 Vern. 67 
80). In Re Eykyn 1 s Trust (1877) c Ch. D.ll5 widened the presumption in scope; 
Thornley v Thornley [1893] 2 Ch. 22S; until into the 20th 
century Dunbar v Dunbar (1909) 54 Sol.J. 32 McNaught v McNaught 
(1909) 54 Sol. J. 135, Gascoigne v Gascoigne-[1918] 1~.15,223 
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hold the property in trust for the former, if a husband 
gave property to his wife without consideration, he was 
presumed to make a gift to her. (8 l) This presumption 
then fell into disuse until it was again found useful 
after the second World War( 82 ) to meet new social needs. 
As will be seen later( 83 ), however, it finally lost its 
importance in 1969. (S 4 ) 
As the judicial reaction in supporting married 
women's property rights can only be seen as having a long-
term effect, it cannot be surprising that the ·immediate 
reaction of contemporary observers, who mostly belonged 
to the middle class themselves, was to emphasize the 
psychological( 8 S) rather than the practical effect 
of the Act as it comprised the real importance of the 
reform at least for their own social class. To be 
entitled to their own property meant independence for 
women and it meant especially that they could insist on 
their rights as they need not refrain from insisting for 
fear of consequences. 
F'. Custody 
In the shadow of these more spectacular developments 
the law of custody of children had also changed. The common 
law right of the father though in theory (and sometimes with 
81). E.H.T. Snell, Principles of Equity, pp.l76-178. 
82). Starting with Lord Denning in H v H (1947) 63 T.L.R. 645. 
83). See below II. J.2 
84). Pettitt v Pettitt [1969] 2 All ER 385 
85). cf. Holcombe, op.cit., p.218. 
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practical consequences) not abolished before the Guardian-
ship Act 1973, (86 ) had gradually been eroded. After 1839 
custody of children under 7 and access to older children 
could be given to an impeccable mother and in 1873 the age 
limit for custody was raised to 16 and in 1866 to 21. The 
1873 and 1886 Acts also contained provisions for separa-
tion deeds and appointment of guardians, giving further, 
limited, rights to the mother. 
Joint guardianship was already discussed as a feminist 
aim in connection with the 1886 Act, (87 ) but although the 
feminist movement can be seen as having had some influe-
ence on the 1886 and later on the 1925 Act, the central 
question which gains increasing importance is the welfare 
of the child. The welfare of the child is finally enacted 
as the paramount consideration in proceedings dealing with 
children by the Guardianship of Infants Act 1925, which 
also provided for equality of mother and father in the face 
of the court. 
G Divorce Reform 1909 - 1937 
1 The Preparation 
As could be seen already by the parliamentary pro-
ceedings around the 1857 Matrimonial Causes Act with the 
demand for equal grounds for divorce there was already a 
86 } • s . 1. ( 1} 
87}. Maidment, Child Custody and Divorce, pp.l27f. 
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certain social basis for further reform going beyond the 
1857 Act. Also as divorces could only be granted by one 
court based in London and as the proceedings were still 
very costly, a dissolution of marriage was still only 
obtainable by a fraction of the population. (88 ) 
In 1909 the Second Royal (Gorell) Commission on 
Divorce was formed under the chairmanship of Lord Gorell. 
Their report was issued in 1912 and proposed inter alia to 
expand the grounds for divorce and to grant divorces to 
men and women on equal grounds. They had received over-
whelming evidence that such propositions would be in 
accordance with public opinion. <89 ) There was, however, 
also sufficient proof of strong church opposition, 
especially against the widening of grounds( 90). In the 
eyes of the church the marriage was sacred and indissoluble 
except for adultery committed by one of the spouses - the 
only ground allo\>.Ted by the Bible. (gl) The protagonists 
of reform bn the other hand showed a new view of marriage 
as they paid regard to the personal misery of the individual( 92 ) 
rather than upholding the Victorian ideal of general morality 
which, besides other insufficiencies, by having two moral 
standards for men and women demanded an attitude from women 
which came close to self-sacrifice. Morality in itself 
though was still a strong argument on both sides throughout 
88). Finer and McGregor in the Finer Report! op.cit., Vol.II, p.l04 
89). Stetson, op.cit., p.l02 
90). Stetson, op.cit., p.l02 
91). See S.Matthew 19,9 cited above, at p.S,. 
92) . "The present law both encourages immorality and leads to much 
individual hardship" •.. , National Union of Societies for 
Equal Citizenship, Annual Report (1931), quoted from Stetson,op.cit., 
p.ll3. 
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the prolonged struggle for reform. It was maintained that 
equal grounds would enhance rather than erode general 
morals( 93 ) but equally that as the present law led to , 
perjury and collusion(; 4 > widened grounds would buttress 
rather than v.reaken the institution of marriage and thus 
also uphold morality( 95 ). 
2 The Acts of 1923 and 1937( 96 ) and Their Implications 
Though there was a widespread support for reform, at 
least for the introduction of equal grounds, nothing could 
be achieved until 1923. This was due to the strong oppo-
sition against widened grounds for divorce so that only 
after the two issues were separated, the less objection-
able of them could be introduced into the law! 97 ) In 
1923 a Matrimonial Causes Act was passed without major 
difficulties introducing equal grounds for divorce. It 
was not until 14 years later that widened grounds could 
be achieved. In 1936 an independent ~mber of Parliament, 
A.P. Herbert, took it upon himself to finally bring about 
reform. Besides being a member of Parliament, he was also 
a writer and he had already pointed out the absurdities 
of the existing law in his noveluHoly Deadlockij (1934). 
The success of his Bill was probably partly due to his 
determination and his varied and prudent tactics( 98 ). 
93). Stetson, op.cit., p.l02 
94). Stetson, op.cit., p.lOO 
95). Stetson, op.cit., p.ll4 
96). Matrimonial Causes Act 1923; 13 & 14 Geo.V,c 19; Matrimonial 
Causes Act 1937, 1 Edw.VIII 2 &·lGeo VI, c 57. 
97). cf. Stetson, op.cit., p.l03. 
98). cf. Stetson, op.cit,, p.l25 
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But also the social climate had changed and the Church 
had indicated some slackening of its stern opposition. 
The new Matrimonial Causes Act 1937 amongst other pro-
visions introduced cruelty, three years>desertion, and 
incurable insanity, as additional grounds for divorce. 
Although the Act treated men and women indiscrimi-
nately,it is to a certain extent, a women's Act as 
especially cruelty and even to a certain degree deser-
tion(99) seem to be predominantly male offences. 
After the Act, the judiciary carefully developed 
definitions within the framework of the Act which made 
possible a broad understanding especially of cruelty and 
desertion(lOO) and thus provided a certain degree of 
adaptation to social needs(lOl) and kept the Act abreast 
with social development at least for some time. 
H Divorce Reform 1950 - 1969 
1 Preparation 
However, gradual judicial adaption proved insufficient 
in the aftermath of the Second World War with~tseffect on 
society in general and on individual marriages. In 1951 
the Third Royal (Morton) Commission on Divorce was 
appointed to find out whether it might be time for a 
further change of the divorce law. The Commission issued 
99). This is true today1 cf. statistics in Stetson, p.234, which show 
a highly over-proportional percentage of cruelty petitions by 
women, and a slightly over-proporational percentage of deser-
tion petitions by women; however, the statistics in Finer Report 
Vol.I, p.73, suggests an increase of men's petitions after the 
Act, the explanation for this lies in war-time divorces by hus-
bands for adultery. 
100). cf. C.E.P. Davies, Matrimonial Relief in English Law, in : 
Graveson and Crane, pp.322, 324-332. 
101). P.M. Bromley, Family Law, p.l89. 
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its report in 1956 and did not recommend a change. There 
is, however, some doubt whether their report was a true 
mirror of the social attitude of their time. Already the 
courts had started preparing for reform by forming rules 
which strongly favoured the 'breakdown' 
principle(l02 ) when they had to decide whether to grant a 
divorce to somebody who had him or herself committed a 
matrimonial offence. Also the big number of undefended 
petitions and of cross-petitions blurred the distinction 
between 'guilty' and 'not guilty'. (l03 ) However, it was 
again the Church 1 and the conservative establishrnent,who 
opposed reform 1 as they did not approve of the shift seen 
in public opinion from marriage being something close to a 
sacrament (as in 1857) or a moral institution 1which should 
not lead to personal misery (as in 1937), to marriage 
being a union which was to create and further personal 
happiness (deemed to be everybody's right), and therefore 
dissolvable when personal happiness could no longer be 
attained within its bond. (l04 ) 
2 The Act and its Impact 
It was not before the Church had relaxed its opposi-
tion by 1966( 105 ) and before the Law Commission was institu-
ted in 1965 that reform could be achieved. In 1971 at least 
102) . Esp. after the 1963 Matrimonial Causes Act which made adultery 
of the petitioner a discretionary bar. 
103). Cretney, op.cit., pp.l02f. 
104). cf also, Cretney, op.cit., p.lo5. 
105). The Church set up a Committee, which published a report in 
1966 called 'Putting Asunder' where the doctrine of irretrievable 
breakdown was favoured as the lesser of two evils - cf Cretney, 
op.cit., p.l04. 
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the Divorce Reform Act(l06 ) became law. It substituted 
the principle of the irretrievable breakdown of the 
marriage for the matrimonial offence though the matri-
monial offence was not completely eliminated as it could 
still be a proof for the breakdown of the marriage. 
The Divorce Reform Act had important consequences 
for the proceeding ancillary to a divorce. Before the 
Act there was still at least on the surface the guilty 
spouse and the following proceedings could rely on that in 
re-distributing matrimonial property and awarding main-
tenance. After the Act new guidelines had to be found to 
contrive a just solution in every case. 
Also another development had by then come to an end. 
In 1969( 107 ) the revival of the presumption of advance-
ment was brought to an end. This doctrine, revived by 
Lord Denning in 1947( 108 ) had often been used also in 
connection with sl7 of the Married Women's Property Act 
1882 to help the non-earning wife to obtain a share in 
the matrimonial property, usually the home. (l09 ) Putting 
the last nail into the coffin of the presumption, Lord 
Reid declared 
"These considerations have legally lost their force, 
and, unless the law has lost all flexibility so that 
the courts can no longer adapt it to changing condi-
tions, the strength of the presumption must have been 
much diminished."(llO) 
106). 1969, 17 & 18 Eliz. II, c 55 
107). Pettitt v Pettitt [1969] 2 All ER 385 
108). H v H (1947) 63 T.L.R. 645. 
109). cf Lord Denning, op.cit., pp.228-233. 
110). Pettitt v Pettitt [1969] 2 All ER 385 at 389. 
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Thus the courts were deprived of an instrument which 
had so far been helpful to reach socially just solutions 
in conflicts on matrimonial property, and so also from 
this quarter a need for reform arose. 
This need gave rise to the 1970 Matrimonial Proceedings 
and Property Act(lll) which gave a wide ranging discretion 
to the courts to redistribute the assets of the marriage. 
They could now take into account income of the parties as 
well as their financial needs, their standard of living, 
their contributions towards the family income including 
contributions made by looking after the house and child-
ren, effects of loss of pension benefits, age of the par-
ties and duration of the marriage. As these criteria 
enable a multitude of different orders to be made, the 
courts in the years after the Act strove to fill this 
discretion with further rules which were not always con-
sistent with each other. There was, for example, the 
(llla) 
one-third rule, meaning that a non-earning wife would get 
a third of her husband's income, which proved inapplicable 
in cases where the husband was a low wage-earner, or the 
different types of orders made in connection with the 
t . . 1 h ( lllb) rna r1mon1a orne. These attempts did not find 
universal approval, and it has been maintained that the 
doctrine of precedent no longer applied in this area of 
1 (112). aw. 
111). 18 & 19 Eliz. II, c 45. 
llla) .cf Wachtel v Wachtel [193n Fam. 72. 
lllb) . eg. Mesher v Mesher [ 1980 J 1 All ER 126, Harvey v Harvey [ 1982] 
2 W.L.R.283, c~for evaluation of these strands of cases: 
Ruth Deech, Financial Relief, the Retreat from Precedent and 
Principle198 I4:2R. pp .621-655. 
112). Deech , op.cit., p.639. 
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I conclusion 
The beginning of the period here described saw a 
status of the married women and mother which only endowed 
her with a number of legal incapacities, the unimportance 
of the child and the indissolubility of the 'sacred' 
marriage tie. 
There was some mitigation provided for the upper 
classes via Chancery proceedings and Parliamentary divorce, 
but this only helped to delay necessary reform. With 
increasing industrialization and the consequential growth 
of an educated middle class the social pressure for re-
form grew. It was first of all directed towards the legal 
equality of women and as the most striking examples of 
inequality were found in the fate of married women a con-
siderable part of the impetus was directed towards this 
particular point. 
By the first quarter of this century legal equality 
had been achieved in all major points and after some 
further time had elapsed, it became apparent that legal 
equality could still mean actual injustice. As already 
mentioned, the courts started to develop the law espec-
ially covering matrimonial property, showing a growing 
concern for the position of the married women. As divorce 
became easier to obtain and marriage was considered a joint 
venture with shared responsibilities, also matrimonial 
property had to be viewed differently and it became im-
portant to re-distribute it, if the necessity arose, 
according to the contribution towards it and according to 
the needs of the partners and the children, rather than 
according to personal conduct within marriage. It is in 
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this light that the provisions of the above mentioned 
1970 Matrimonial Property and Proceedings Act have to 
be seen with their guidelines for the courts as to what 
they should take into account in their reasoning and in 
parts these guidelines take only up what the courts had 
already favoured before the Act. 
The law concerning children developed in a less spec-
tacular way partly because it was easier to agree on the 
I 
question of welfare as soon as the father's common law 
right had been eroded, whereas concerning the women's 
movement a lot of antagonistic feeling was involved on 
both sides and also many men felt much more immediately 
attacked and endangered by this direct struggle for power 
in domestic and public life. 
After equal guardianship has been achieved in 1973 
the strand of development in child law which is directly 
linked with the relationship between father and mother 
at least came to an end. So the end of the period des-
cribed sees marriage as a joint venture which can be 
terminated on failure, with equal rights for both part-
ners in every respect, including property and guardian-
ship, and it also sees the overall importance of the wel-
fare of the child as no longer subject to the rights of 
its parents. The impetus for change during this period 
has not always come from the same corner of the triangle 
Parliament, judiciary, society. The standard procedure, 
however, would mostly be that a social need arose, was 
brought to Parliament, enacted and then tackled by the 
judiciary. But there are two main periods where the 
judges were well ahead of Parliament and maybe even ahead 
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of or at least abreast with the social development. One 
of them is the line of cases on matrimonial property after 
the Second World War 1 and the other which will be 
treated later in more detail,is the evolution of the wel-
fare principle as 'paramount' consideration in children's 
proceedings. 
Finally, at the beginning of the 19th Century 
legal reform was often influenced by individuals, whereas 
after the middle of the century interest groups (women's 
interest groups in the area here concerned) and parties 
found their way of influencing the legislative process. 
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CHAPTER III 
THE LAW OF PARENTAL STATUS IN STATUTE 
AND IN JUDICIAL LJl .. ~'1 
A Outline and Purpose 
After having described in some detail the social 
and legal development concerning family life \n. En~L~And du.Yittj 
roughly the last 180 years I shall in this chapter con-
sider the law of parental status as it evolves against 
and from this general background. I shall pay special 
attention to the influence of legislation on the courts 
and vice versa. In viewing and tracing such an influence 
I shall consider the concrete legal provisions rather 
than aspects of method which are dealt with in a later 
chapter. 
B Cases and Statutes - The Sample 
I shall work from the statutes concerned with parental 
status directly which includes all Guardianship or Cus-
tody Acts from 1839 until 1973, with the exception of the 
Guardianship of Minors Act 1971 as this Act only consoli-
dates the law concerning guardianship and is not likely to 
have an independent impact on the court decisions. It 
provides, however, an interesting phenomenon by its mere 
occurrence and will in this respect be dealt with later. 
There are also statutes which do not directly treat an 
issue but have a decisive impact on the law concerning 
it and sometimes a statute is enacted for a different 
purpose but proves to provide the courts with a tool which 
enables them to develop the law in the relevant area. In 
order to include such legislative provisions I have 
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also chosen the 1873 Judicature Act, the 1958 Adoption Act 
and the 1959 Legitimacy Act for my sample. Other enact-
ments may be mentioned to make the survey comprehensive 
but they are not landmarks as far as the joint develop-
ment by parliament and judiciary in the area of parental 
status law is concerned. 
The sample of cases consists of more than 100 
decisions based mainly on the Acts mentioned above or on 
principles of common law and equity which deal with the 
law of parental status. Besides that I have included 
certain side-cases beyond this scope which are particu-
larly interesting from a social or methodological point 
fore 
of view and thereAshed additional light on the narrow 
thread of the main-body of cases. 
C The 1839 Custody of Infants (Talfourd's) Act(l) 
l Preparation in Society, the Courts and 
Parliament. 
Before Talfourd's Act the mother, a common-law non-
entity, had no claim in law to her children, as could be 
seen in De Manneville( 2 ), and there was also no possibility 
open to the courts to do anything about it. It can, how-
ever, be assumed that the social reality did not always 
conform to the rigidity of law. Especially in the poorer 
classes of society small children were taken care of by 
1). 2 & 3 Viet., c 54. 
2). cited and summarized above, Chapter II, fnts 16 & 17, see 
also Blackstone, op.cit., Vol.I, p.441 
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the mother and often accordingly taken into a new union 
rather than left with the father who could not and did 
not want to be encumbered by the care of small children.()) 
Even after the father's death, a guardian appointed 
by him in his will would take priority over the mother. 
Only if no testamentary guardian was appointed, would the 
mother be considered guardian by nature until the child 
fourteen. ( 4 ) was 
There were, moreover, wardship proceedings in 
Chancery, and in equity the mother's position would always 
be considered. However, in those days equity followed the 
law(S) and accordingly the Chancery judges would be loath 
to interfere with the father's common law right. There 
was also still the difficulty which a married woman experi-
enced in going to court,as she could not sue without next 
friend and wardship proceedings could only be invoked 
if property was settled on the ward. (6 ) 
However, finally demand for reform arose. By 1837 
several cases had occurred where the courts had felt 
obliged, though unwillingly to enforce the common law 
right of the father despite humanitarian considerations(?) .Against 
this background a member of the legal profession, 
Sergeant-at-Law Talfourd, took it upon himself to change 
the law of custody. He had himself acted as barrister 
3) • 
4) • 
Maidment, op.cit., p.ll6. 
P.H.Pettit, Parental Control and Guardianship, in 
and Crane, op.cit., p.60. 
5). Pettit, in Graveson and Crane, op.cit., p.56. 
Grave son 
6). However, the amount required lessened considerably and reached 
little more than a nominal amount by the middle of the 19th 
Century, Lee Holcombe, op.cit., p.44. 
7). The unwillingness is openly avowed in Ball v Ball (1827) 2.Sim, 
33 1 57 ER 703, for this case see also below, Chapter IV. c.3.al 
82 
for the mother in several custody cases and especially 
I 
the last case before the Act, R v Greenhill, (B), had made 
it clear to him how necessary reform had become. In this 
case a mother of three small girls had separated herself 
from a husband who lived in adultery with a woman who was 
even occasionally known as 'Mrs.Greenhill'. The Court 
however, obliged the mother to give up the children to the 
father, stating, "there is in the first place, no doubt 
that when a father has the custody of his children, he 
is not to be deprived of it except under particular 
circumstances". (g) Mrs. Greenhill evaded this judgment by 
fleeing abroad with her daughters. On Talfourd's side in 
the quest for reform was Mrs. Caroline Norton who had 
herself experienced the effect of the existing law and who 
had by her talents as a writer and by her personal connec-
tions the opportunity of making herself listened to and 
influencing the course of reform(lO). This setting is a 
good example for showing that in those days the political 
development was very much influenced by individual person-
alities and also that reforms in law can be more easily 
achieved when members of the profession dedicate them-
selves to the cause. 
8) • (1836) 4 AJ.g.- E,624, lll ER 922. 
9) • 
10). 
Lord Denman C.J. at p.927. 
cf. Forster, op.cit., pp.34f; 
Mrs. Norton's private affairs 
c:& p.39f~the direct influence of 
on the progress of the Bill. 
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As a member of Parliament Talfourd launched a first 
attempt to change the custody law by bringing in a Bill 
in 1837. The debates centred around the plight of an 
innocent mother aggrieved by her husband's conduct and 
even deprived of her children. (ll) It should be noted, 
however, that the so-called adultery bar, namely a pro-
vision that a mother against whom adultery had been judi-
cially established cound not be awarded custody or access 
was only inserted after considerable debate. (l2 ) It be-
comes obvious from the debates that the adultery bar was 
not deemed necessary because the courts in their dis-
cretion would normally only award custody to an inno-
cent mother(l 3 ). But in the face of the great concern 
on this issue the clause asked for was inserted. 
The cases that led up to the Act are discussed 
and evaluated in great detail during the debates in order 
to prove the necessity for reform(l 4 ). After the adul-
tery bar had been inserted, the main argument against the 
Act was that it might encourage separation. This in 
connection with the adultery bar shows the already great 
concern for the sanctity of marriage and the position of 
the wife as the submissive(lS) partner which becomes even 
more pronounced during the debates on the 1857 Matrimonial 
11). Hansard, 3rd series, Vol. 39, cc l088f 
12). cf Hansard, 3rd series, Vol. 42, c 1055; this was a first 
version of it, the clause in its final shape was only inserted 
into the second Bill, cf~Vol 47, c 551. 
13). cf. Talfourd himself, Hansard, 3rd series, Vol.42, c.l054. 
14) . Often in connection with cases not long before the Act, members 
of Parliament who had then been involved in the cases as lawyers, 
added their comments and voiced the regret they had felt about 
the outcome of the cases concerned: Hansard, 3rd series, Vol.39, 
c 1086, as to Ball v Ball (1827) 2 Sim.33, 57 ER 703; Vol.49, 
c 492 as to R v Greenhill (1836) 4 Ad.& E.624, 111 ER 922. 
15). Hansard, 3rd series, Vol. 43, c 144, Sir E.Sugden, "A Woman's 
strength lies in her submissiveness". 
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Causes Act(l 6 ). As Sir E. Sugden stated "A wife was, in 
general, glad to have that excuse that she has to stay with 
the children for submitting to the temper of a capricious 
husband". (l 7 ) Though the first attempt to reform the 
custody law ended with the Bill being thrown out in the 
second reading of the Lords, the second Bill - which was 
right from the start endowed with the adultery clause -
proceeded through both Houses quickly and not much con-
tested. In the second reading in the Lords, Lord Denman 
gives voice to the regret felt by the bench in the Green-
hill case(l 8 ), a regret which cannot be necessarily in-
ferred by reading the report of the case, but which 
clearly indicates that the professional support for the 
Bill went beyond the person of Sergeant Talfourd. 
Finally in 1839 the Custody of Children Act based 
on the second Bill came into force. It gave the Lord 
Chancellor and the Master of the Rolls the discretionary 
power to award custody of children under 7 and access of 
children up to 21 who were in the custody of the father to 
an impeccable mother. 
2 Judicial Reaction. 
The Act gave rise to a varied response in the judi-
ciary from being narrowed down in Ex parte Young l855(l 9), 
via treating it approvingly even if not applying it in Re 
16). cf above II D.I. 
17). Hansard, 3rd series, Vo1.40, c 1115 
18). Hansard, 3rd series, Vo1.49, c 492. 
19). (1855) 19 J.P. 777 
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Fynn 1848( 20) and widening its scope by using its 'equity' 
in Re Tomlinson 1849( 2l). Ex parte Young was a case of 
habeas corpus proceedin~instituted by a father of two 
children under seven who were living with the mother, who 
had separated herself from her husband. The court held that 
notwithstanding the 1839 Act a father was legally entitled 
to the custody of his children under seven years of age. 
As these were habeas corpus proceedings 1 the court was not 
obliged to apply the Act but the court did not take into 
account, as it could have done,that the mother, after she 
had handed the children to their father, could apply to 
t.he Lord ''Chancellor to grant her custody under the Act, 
and would thus possibly get the children back. In Re Fynn 
the mother had custody of two small boys and the father 
wanted them back. The court held that it: could not interfere 
with the father's right on common law grounds,even if it 
took the effects of the 1839 Act into account, and it did 
not apply the Act as the children were not with the father 
as prescribed by the Act. However, in Re Tomlinson the same 
court held that it was within the equity of the Act to grant 
custody to a mother who did already have custody of the child. 
Even as late as 1861( 22 ), long after the enactment, the 
adultery bar was still considered as good law, the 1839 Act 
was quoted as a precedent for not giving access to an 
20). (1848) 2 De G.& Sm.457, 64 ER 205 
21). (1849) 3 De G, & Sm.371, 64 ER 52o 
22). Clout v Clout & Hollebone (1861) 2 Sw,& T~ 391, 164 ER 1047. 
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adulterous mother, although in the meantime there had been 
the 1857 Matrimonial Causes Act which within its own 
sections did not provide an adultery bar. However, from 
the debates on the 1857 Act and from its later treatment 
by the courts as to the guilty wife's maintenance it is 
clear that adultery was considered such criminal conduct 
in a wife that it was simply not deemed necessary to affirm 
that she had not got any rights. The 1857 Act itself, 
though it contained a section which enabled the court to 
make orders as to the custody, maintenance and education 
of children whose parents were involved in proceedings 
under the Act, mainly dealt with divorce and had no im-
pact on the law of parental status. (23 ) 
D Legislation in 1873 
1 Custody of Infants Act 1873( 24 ) 
a) . Separation Deeds Before and After 
The next Act of importance is the 1873 Custody of 
Infants Act. It provides inter alia that articles of 
separation dealing with the custody of the children of the 
marriage should not be held void for the sole reason that 
thereby the father would divest himself of his right. It 
also provided that th~ deed of Separation should not be 
enforced when the court was convinced that it would not be 
23). cf Maidment, op.cit., p.96. 
24) • 36 Viet., c 12 
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for the benefit of the infant. Thus, through the back-
door of a proviso, the child's welfare entered the custody 
legislation. 
The need for the implantation of this section had 
become clear by preceding cases. There is for example 
Vansittart v Vansittart (1858) (25 ) where the parents had 
agreed that the mother should have custody of two of four 
children, a girl of nine and a boy of five. The court 
held that this separation deed was against public policy,as the fa-
ther thereby divested himself of the rights and duties 
which he had in respect of his children. As a consequence 
the court would not enforce the deed. Another :important 
case is Hamilton v Hector (1873) (26 ), where the parents had 
agreed that the wife should have custody of the younger 
and access to the elder children. The parties did not 
contest the custody provision, but the mother applied for 
enforcement of the access provision. The court gave a 
very careful judgment doubting the validity of the custody 
provision of the deed, but it enforced the access pro-
vision as by such a provision the father had not waived his 
rights so that it was not considered to be against public 
policy. This latter case is considered to have influenced 
directly the introduction 
the Act. (27 ) 
25). 2 De G.& J.251, 44 ER 984 
26). 13 I.R. Eq. 511. 
27). M2idment , op.cit., p.98. 
of the relevant section into 
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Afterwards there seemed to have been some doubts 
as to how far the rights of the mother reached, even if 
the children were given to her upon such an agreement, 
especially as to how far she was free to direct her chil-
dren's religious upbringing. In Re Besant( 28 ) in 1878 
the child, a daughter1 was taken from an otherwise impec-
cable mother who had embraced atheist convictions and 
had published writings to that purpose and also a book 
on birth control. In Condon v Vollum( 29 ) in 1887 the 
mother was to retain custody and it was left to her dis-
cretion in which religion she wanted to educate the child. 
In the latter case the court states explicitly that 
articles of separation confer all parental rights which 
were normally vested in the father onto the mother, in-
cluding the right to direct the religious upbringing of 
the child. This sounds broad-minded 1 especially if com-
pared with cases on religious upbringing yet to be dealt 
with. 
As Re Besant was a special case with unusual facts 
and as the concern of the court for the welfare of the 
child which might be endangered by an atheist and radical 
mother can be considered genuine on the background of 
the morals of the time and perhaps even justified to a 
certain extent, Condon v Vollum can be seen as the usual 
28). ll Ch. D. 508 
29). 57 L.T.R. 154. 
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judicial approach to the provision of the Act. Thus 
the conclusion can be drawn that this part of the 1873 
Custody Act was all in all well received by the judiciary 
and not much contested. 
b) The Adultery Bar 
A different fate was waiting for the abolition of the 
adultery bar, which was also brought about by the Act in 
not re-enacting it and repealing the 1839, Custody of In-
fants Act which had contained it. 
It was not until 1897 in ReA & B(JO) that a guilty 
mother was awarded custody of her children for six months 
of the yea~. In Re A & B both parents had been guilty of 
marital misconduct though the mother was all in all more 
to blame. There were three children, the youngest was 
with the mother anyway, the other two 6 and 10 years old. 
Upon application of the mother for custody of these two 
children the court split the custody as described. It 
might be worth noting that though the mother would not be 
of 
granted custody~or access to children if she had committed 
adultery, the courts showed also increasing reluctance to 
give custody to an adulterous father even though there 
was never a question of not giving him access (cf. Hyde v 
Hyde 1859( 3 l) andRe Taylor 1876( 32 ) ) . The adultery bar 
persisted until B v Bin 1924( 33 ) when the abolition or 
30). [1897] 1 Ch. D. 786 
31). 23 J.P. 471. 
32). 4 Ch. D. 157. 
33). p.176 
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invalidity of any adultery bar was finally confirmed. 
There was, however, a predecessor to this case B v B 
(Stark v Stark & Hitchin 1910( 34 ) ) , where the court 
already showed a lenient attitude towards an adulterous 
mother. In conclusion, it may be said that the aboli-
tion of the adultery bar was not fully accepted into the 
case-law before it was in accordance with general judi-
cial - and probably also public - moral opinion. The 
same development took place in the law of maintenance con-
cerning the guilty wife's maintenance( 3S). 
c) Age-Limit 
The 1873 Act also raised the upper age-limit from 7 
to 16, under which custody of a child could be given to a 
mother~ but there are no cases on this issue. This may 
demonstrate that the provision was socially uncontroversial 
and could thus slip into the law without litigation. 
2 The 1873 Judicature Act 
There was a second important Act in 1873, namely 
the Judicature Act, which merged the two separate court 
systems in England, the common-law and the equity courts. 
It also expressely enacted that from then on in cases 
regarding custody and education of infants the rules of 
equity should prevail. 
34) • p .190 
35). see above, II D.2. 
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The impact of this Act on the law of parental status 
might even be greater than the impact of the Custody Act 
of the same year, because it enabled the judges to spread 
the moderately progressive principles of equity into all 
branches of the law. They were, however, reluctant to 
accept the change irrmediately. The first two cases out 
of the sample after the Act- both in 1883( 36 ) -state 
completely opposite views on the effects of the Act. The 
court in Re A2ar-Ellis( 3?) still speaks of two separate, 
independent sets of law. As a consequence the court re-
fused to interfere with the decision of a father who had 
declined to allow his 17-year old daughter unsupervised 
contact with her mother. However, the parties in this 
case had been involved in a long and bitter contest on the 
religious upbringing of their children. During the second 
half of the last century, religious feelings were of 
particular importance and the right to decide the chil-
dren's religous education was constantly emphasized by 
the courts. During that time it was considered an im-
portant part of the father's common law right and seldom 
interfered with. (38 ) It is likely that the question of 
religious education in the background of the case influenced 
the court's decision and possibly even the view on the rela-
tionship between rules of law and rules of equity. <39 ) 
36). Re Agar-Ellis, Agar-Ellis v Lascelles (1883) 24 Ch.D. 317; ~ 
~(an infant) (1883) 10 Q.B.D. 454. 
37) • at p. 330 
38) . cf. below, P'P Sb-f· 
39). For further analysis of this case see Chapter IV c.3. (b.) 
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In R v Nash the court stated explicitly that the court of 
law was now governed by equitable rules and accordingly, 
orderd on illegitimate child to be handed to his mother 
who had instituted habeas corpus proceedings against the 
foster parents with whom she had placed the child before. 
At common law the mother was not considered to be related 
with her illegitimate child( 40 ) though in equity she was 
entitled to guardianship. (40a). Thus in applying the rules 
of equity the court found that the mother in this case had 
a claim to the custody of her child. This latter view 
eventually prevailed in subsequent years and was finally 
confirmed to apply in general in Thomasset v Thomasset in 
1894 (4 l) 
E (4la) The Guardianship of Infants Act 1886 
1 The Act and Its Preparation 
In 1886 the Guardianship of Infants Act was enacted. 
It raised the age-limit for children who could now be 
when under 
given to their mother A the age of 21. It also settled 
the criteria which should guide the courts in custody 
cases, namely the welfare of the child and both conduct 
and wishes of both parents. Another section provided that 
the mother was to be statutory guardian after the death 
of the father, if he had not appointed anybody, and she 





Blackstone, op.cit., Vol.!. p.447. 
As Jessel M.R. stated in R v Nash at p.456. 
P.295, at p.3oo. 
49 & 50 Viet., c 27. 
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These provisions did not abrogate the father's absolute 
common law right, but as soon as court proceedings, for 
custody or access were invoked they made equal treatment 
of mother and father possible. The strong common law 
position of the father persevered especially after his 
death, as long as he had appointed a guardian. From this 
it can be seen again that reform catered for the most 
obvious evils of the existing law rather than bring about 
a comprehensive change, although the latter had been 
demanded by the women's movement by pleading for joint 
equal guardianship. 
There were cases before the Act which io1 e,Jfec..t led ~o iwc a(' 
its major provisions. 
In Re Kaye (1866) (42 ) a court took into account, 
and complied with, the mother's wishes as to the guardian-
ship for her children. The father had died first and 
appointed no guardian but the mother kept the children. 
She herself then appointed two guardians. After her death 
the court followed her wishes, appointing the guardians she 
had named herself , without denying, however, that she 
had no legal right to appoint a guardian. 
There are also two cases< 43 ) where rules for 
• awarding custody were laid down by the courts ~ 
terms similar to those in s.S. of the Act which provided 
that in custody cases the child's welfare and conduct and 
42). (1866) 1 Ch. App 387. 
43). Re Halliday's Estate, Ex parte Woodward (1852) 2 L.T.O.s .17, 
In R~ Elderton (infants) (1883) 25 Ch. D. 220. 
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wishes of both parents are to be taken into account : 
The first case, Re Halliday is a case on the 1839 Talfourd's 
Act, and though neither parent's conduct was blameless, 
the court granted access to the mother and threatened 
the father with granting custody to her, if he did not com-
ply with the court order. The court stated that since the 
1839 Act the paternal right was qualified by his duty 
towards his wife and by the welfare of the child. The 
child's welfare as a criterion for determining custody 
or access was inferred from the age-limit in the Act, as 
small children in particular, were known to need their 
mother's care, for if the Act had only been intended to 
console a mother who had to live separate from a tyrannous 
husband, it should have given discretion to award custody 
of children of every age to the mother. Though this case 
still regarded, according to its time, the paternal 
right highly, it shows a very 'modern' social attitude and 
a particularly enlightened and non-common-law way of 
reasoning. 
In line with this, three criteria are expressedly 
stated in the second example, Re Elderton, as to be con-
sidered in custody questions : the paternal right, the 
marital duty and the interest of the infants. Though this 
selection sill gives priority to the paternal right, 
the welfare of the children is already an independent 
criterion. The Court already mentioned the mother's 
right to the custody of her children, and it provided an 
interesting definition of marital duty : ~arital duty 
involves that the partners behave towards each other in a 
way that they can provide a home together where the children 
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have the love and care of both. And if by the sole fault 
of one parent the other cannot be expected to live with 
him or her and the children are thus deprived of the 
joint parental affection, that parent is at first sight 
not entitled to the custody of the children. - This was 
said against the background of the facts of the case, where 
the wife had failed to obtain a divorce, but was living 
apart from the husband due to his intemperance. 
2 Consequences 
After the Act the courts adapted quickly to the new 
provisions. Already in 1889 ( Re Steel) (44 ) it was stated 
that although the Act did not abrogate the father's common-
law right the court had now the power to modify it. This 
statement was further strengthened and widened in 1897 
(Re A & B) (4S) and not contested thereafter. Both these 
cases involved misconduct of both parents. In Re Steel 
this still led to awarding custody of a very young girl 
to the father for the reason that the mother was more 
blameworthy. The court also emphasized that it had only 
the discretion to modify the paternal right, implying that 
it need not do so. In contrast to this the court in Re 
A & B greatly stressed the welfare of the children (it is 
here for the first time called paramount) and as both 
44} • Re Grace Steel (an infant) Steel v Steel (1889) 33 SokJ. 659 , . 
45). [1897] l Ch,D. 786. 
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parents could provide equally well for it, the court 
awarded custody to each parent for half a year. 
It also stated that the Act gave discretion to set aside 
(rather than just modify) common law. 
As to the provision which makes the mother statutory 
guardian after the father's death, this had a peculiar 
consequence for the development of law by subsequent 
court decisions : even if the mother was guardian, she 
had, as any testamentary guardian, to comply with the 
wishes of the deceased father in respect of the religious 
upbringing of the children - even if the wishes of the 
father were not expressly uttered. This looks peculiar, 
if one remembers Condon v Vollum( 46 ) where it was 
expressively stated that by the means of articles of 
separation the mother would gain the right to direct her 
children's religious education- why should she not 
acquire it as a statutory guardian? But this must be 
understood against the background of the function of a 
guardian. A guardian would figure in the place ( like an 
agent) of the deceased parent and in general had to stick 
faithfully to the wishes of that deceased parent whereas 
by articles of separation the father would confer all his 
rights voluntarily ~pon the mother. 
As the 1886 Act did not abrogate the father's common-
law right it is thus not particularly surprising that 
there were still some cases after 1886 which referred to 
it in connection with the Act. It can be noticed, however, 
46). (1887) 57 L.T.R. 154 
97 
that the welfare of the child gains increasing import-
ance and also that there is an increasing reluctance of 
the courts to interfere with the mother's position and 
both these developments find their epitome in the case 
of Ward v Laverty in 1924( 47 ) where both parents were dead 
and the court refused to enforce paternal directions for 
the religious education and left the children with the 
maternal relatives because that would be for their 
benefit. 
F The Custody of Children Act 1891< 47 a) 
1. The Act and Its Cause. 
In accordance with a general feeling for the im-
portance of religious upbringing and the parental right 
to direct it, several cases arose by the end of last 
century where children had been left with charitable 
institutions of one Christian denomination, only to be 
reclaimed by habeas corpus more or lessarbitrarily in 
order to be placed with an institution of another 
Christian denomination. 
Several of these cases occurred in connection with 
Dr. Barnardo's Homes and are therefore commonly known as 
Barnardo's cases< 48 ). In order to prevent parents< 49 ) 
from abandoning their children or having them otherwise 
47). [1925] A.C. 101. 
47a). 54 Viet., c 3 
48). e.g. R v Barnardo (No.2) (1889) 58 L.J.Q.B.D. 522, R v Barnardo, 
Jones' Case [1891] 1 Q.B.D. 194. 
49). As to cases being the immediate cause for the Act, Cretney, 
op.cit., p.30l. 
98 
brought up at other people's expense and then arbitrarily 
reclaiming them the 1891 Custody of Children Act was 
passed. It provided that parents who had abandoned their 
children within the definition of the Act could not re-
claim them when it would not be for the child's welfare. 
The Act, although it might be considered as weakening 
parental status in general, preserved one then import-
ant parental right. Even when by virtue of the Act a 
parent could not reclaim his or her child, he or she 
could still determine its religious education. It should 
also not be forgotten that there are examples of long 
standing where the court had refused to deliver up 
children to their parents when they had originally con-
sented to somebody else paying for them (Ex parte Hopkins 
1732) (SO). Thus overall it may even be said that the 
Act clarified the law(Sl) rather than enforced a 8om-
pletely new principle. 
2 Consequences 
As it can be shown by the subsequent development 
the courts tended to narrow down the scope of the Act 
rather than widen it so that its impact on the overall 
legal development is not very important, as can be seen 
in Re O'Hara( 52 ), even more strikingly in R v New< 53 ). 
Whereas in Re O'Hara the widowed mother had not seen 
50). 3 P Wms 152, 24 ER 1009 
51). cf. also to this effect the court in Re O'Hara [1900] I.R. 233 
at 251 
52). [1900] 2 I.R. 233, 
53). (1904) 20 T.L.R. 583. 
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any other way to provide for her child than agreeing to 
a de facto adoption, there were also in fact doubts as how 
the child had been treated by the foster-parents (more 
like a servant) and the mother now had re-married and 
wanted to have the child with her, in R v New the 
illegitimate-mother just wanted her child to leave foster-
parents who had cared for her 10 years and with whom she 
was settled, and enter an institution where the children 
were for the first two years not allowed to have anybody 
visiting them, just to ensure a certain kind of religious 
upbringing. 
I ' So,WhLLQ. both cases have the same result, i.e. that 
the child is to be handed to the mother, they are in 
fact quite different, and whereas the reasoning is in 
parts already quite enlightened in Re O'Hara, there is 
obviously a relapse in that the court relied on the 
common law right rather than the welfare in R v New. How-
ever,it should be noted that the child in the latter case 
is illegitimate which may have had some bearing on the 
outcome. 
G The Guardianship of Infants Act 1925( 54 ) 
l The Law Before and After the Act 
The next Act of importance, the Guardianship of Infants 
Act 1925, provides a peculiar feature in the development 
of the law of parental status. It is a major comprehen-
sive enactment : first it provides that in any proceedings 
54). 15 & 16 Geo. V, c 45 
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in any court the mother shall be in a position equal to 
that of the father, and it secondly describes the child's 
welfare as paramount consideration for the court. This 
gives the impression of providing a major change on the 
background of previous statutes and it seems surprising 
that there are in this branch of law only 7 reported 
cases within the 20 years both before and after the Act. 
2 Implications 
This picture is, however deceptive. 
First, the new statute partly only enacts principles 
of equity and thus only completes the work of the 1873 
(55' Judicature Act J • There are unreported cases in 
Chancery, enforcing and pre-empting the principles of 
this statute( 56 ). One reported example is ReA & B 
(1897) (57 ) which already terms the child's welfare as 
'paramount' and another is Ward v Laverty( 58 ) which 
gives a judgment shortly before the enactment and already 
relies in full on the principles which are thereafter 
provisions of the written law; it does, however, only 
give judgment between relatives on both sides with the 
parents being dead and thus does not yet as fully imple-
ment the principles mentioned as the Act itself does 
hereafter. Hence the Act does in fact go beyond the case 
law. 
55). 36 & 37 Viet., c 12; Thus it is also seen by the judges of the 
time, cf. In re Thain, Thain v Taylor [1916J 1 Ch.D. 676 at 691. 
56). Maidment, op.cit., p.l05. 
57) . 1 Ch. D. 786 
58). 1925 A.C. (H.L.IR) 101 
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Secondly, the Act embodies general principles of 
women's emancipation into family law, which are by 1925 
comparatively well recognised in society and introduced 
into the law by the election laws and by the Sex D;<..~~AoJ.i{lcn:hot't._ 
~1-1.-tc\fC\.l)Act 1919. The issues which are finally settled in 
this Act had been looked after and fought for elsewhere 
and before its coming into force. Its enforcement had a 
symbolic importance as can also be inferred from the 
preamble and it in fact achieves less than the women's 
movement asked for. (Sg) It has in this connection even 
been maintained that the welfare priYlL-•pL.e wo.s. "'-Si?d..tit. ov-oler to get 
the Act out of the feminist fighting line, and also to 
defeat directly the feminists' claims( 60). 
This explains the unspectacular appearance of a 
seemingly spectacular enactment. The 1925 Act may be 
considered as a kind of codifying Act( 6 l) which, as can 
be inferred from the further development of the law, in 
itself provided one step within a constant development of 
the law. 
H The Adoption Act 1958 
l Legal Adoption and Social Situation 
Legal Qdoption was first introduced into English 
Law by the 1926 Adoption Act, (62 ) and with increasing 
59). Maidment, op.cit., p.l05. 
60). ibid. 
61). Maidment 1 loc. cit, also cf below, Chapter IV, B and C 3~. 
62). 16 & 17 Geo. V, c 29 
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social demand further developed by the Adoption Acts 
1950( 63 ) and 1958. (64 ) Adoption makes possible a more 
or less complete severance of child and natural parent( 65 ) 
and thus weakens the status of the latter, especially 
when it becomes possible to dispense with the consent of 
a parent. Adoption, however, does itself rely on the con-
cept of parental status in general as it puts the adop-
tive parents in the position of the natural parents. 
The 1958 Act even retains one feature of enhancing the 
status of the natural parent: s.4(2) provides that con-
ditions as to religious upbringing of the adopted child 
may be inserted into the adoption order. (66 ) 
As the 1926 Act already puts mother and (legitimate) 
father of the child in equal position as to their con-
sent, the English adoption laws do not deal with the par-
ental status as between mother and father - the branch 
with which this study is mostly concerned. However, 
subsequently to the 1958 Adoption Act a line of cases 
evolved which may be considered as linked with this 
particular aspect of parental status. Though not 
originally designed for it, the Act has been used as a 
legal basis for the so-called step-parent adoption( 6?), 
where after divorce the partner with custody tries to 
adopt the children jointly with his or her new spouse. 
63). 14 & 15 Geo. VI, c 26. 
64). 7 Eliz. II, c 5 
65). T.E. James, The Illegitimate and the Deprived Child, in : 
Graveson and Crane, op.cit., p.46f. 
66). s.l3 Children Act, 1975 (23 & 24 Eliz. II 1 c 30 now only allows 
for the parents' wishes to be regarded if appropriate, and 
according to s8(7) conditions may be inserted into an order 
at the court's discretion. 
67). 1961:9,7% 1971: 25.5%, 1976: 44.5% of all adoption orders were 
made in favour of a parent and step-parent of legitimate children 
Alastair Bissett-Johnson, Children in Subsequent Marriages, in 
J.N.Eekelaar and S.N.Katz, Marriage and Cohabitation,(l980), p.429. 
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As far as can be seen from the reported cases it is invari-
ably the mother who seeks this kind of adoption order. 
The reason for this lies partly in the fact that fathers 
are less often awarded custody than mothers, (6 S) but 
this can hardly account for the current degree of prev-
alence of step-father adoptions. There is in particular 
even one case where the new husband also has children of 
his own, but step-parent adoption is only sought for 
the children of the wife( 69 ). In this connection it 
might be interesting to consider what the mbtives 
behind these adoptions are and infer from them why they 
are mostly sought by the step-father rather than the step-
mother. The most obvious argument brought forward in 
favour of these adoptions is the merging of a new and 
secure family unit(?O). This argument, though it gives 
a valid reason for step-parent adoptions in general, does 
not explain why these adoptions happen mostly one way 
and not the other. The other argument is that the chil-
dren should be integrated into the new family and given 
more security(?l). This argument poses a similar problem. 
68). John M. Eekelaar and Eric Clive, Custody after Divorce 
(1977), speak of 10.3% of the cases where the husband gets sole 
custody. If one takes into account the cases of splitted 
siblings and only considers cases where one parent has sole 
custody of children, the percentage of fathers with custody 
of children amounts to 13.1% 
69). ReD. (Minors), The Times, 16th June(l981}. 2 FLR. 102 
70). cf. Jacqueline Priest, Step-Parent Adoptions: What is the Law? 
(1982) p.289. 
71). ~ (infants) [l977J 3 All ER 671, ~ (a minor) [1975] 2 All 
ER 449, the court, however, maintains in this case that 
security for the child has already been achieved by a change 
of name into that of the step-father, and accordingly refuses 
to make an adoption order. 
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First it may be asked, why only children with step-
fathers have to be integrated and need security and 
secondly why children have to be merged into a family 
when they in fact have one of their parents with them 
and the other partner is the 'newcomer'. 
This question leads to the last main arg~~ment in 
adoption cases, namely, that the father has to be 
integrated and needs security as much in relation to the 
children by having a certain authority< 72 ), as in relation 
to the natural father who always provides a disturbance 
factor for him. This argument seems to me the most logical 
against the background of the fact that there are so far 
no reported step-mother adoption cases in England. It 
may, however, be left open whether this argument shows 
a real need for the integration of the father or whether 
it is just generally felt necessary to buttress links 
between step-fathers and children rather than between 
step-mothers and children. Whichever is the more realistic 
interpretation, one may perhaps assume from this that the 
head and most important element of the family is still 
the father< 73 ) and that the mother's children are out-
siders and have to be formally linked with him whereas 
his children if he takes them with him are automatically 
part of every family unit he enters. This gives overall 
72) . Re S (infants) [1977]3 All ER 671 
73) . It seems at least important that he is not inferior to the 
mother, cf. Priest,op.cit. , p.293. 
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the impression that the status of the father is still of 
special social (if not legal) importance( 74 ) 
2 Conse~uences 
The number of step-parent adoptions has increased 
considerably( 7 S) since in the wake of increasing divorce 
figures there is an increasing social demand for forming 
new families. Nevertheless, as can be seen from the 
reported cases, the courts are very careful and restric-
tive in developing the law of adoption. They mostly 
prefer not to dispense with parental consent( 76 ) and 
they do not encourage step-parent adoption. As Cumming-
Bruce J. put it rather strongly : 
"The court should not encourage the idea that after 
divorce the children of the family can be re-
shuffled and dealt out like a pack of cards in a 
second rubber of bridge," 
he also spoke of "the use of the statutory guillotine". (77 ) 
This attitude might be considered as upholding parental 
status, but this is not the only possible conclusion. 
With increasing divorce figures and high figures for 
step-parent adoption the likelihood of children being 're-
shuffled' into new families several times in their life 
increases as well. Such a development would undermine the 
argument that adoption would give the children more 
security. (7S). On the background of serial unions it may 
74). cf. Also Brenda M. Hoggett and David S. Pearl, The Family, Law 
and Society, where a case is cited, where the psychological 
need of the father to have the child as 'his' is brought 
forward, 
75). cf. fnt. 67. 
76). e.g. Re D(minors) [1973] 3 All ER 1001, In Re H (minors), 
The Times 26th November 1974, ~(a minor) [1975] 2 All ER 449 
77). ReB (a minor) Cl975J 2 ALLER 449 at 462 
78). Priest, op.cit., at p.287 speaks of a possible devaluation 
of the concept of adoption. 
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provide more security for the child and thus be for its 
benefit, when it knows and keeps contact with both its 
parents. It is in this vein that most of the arguments 
in judicial reasoning run, and also the Houghton (Stock-
dale) Committee on Adoption emphasized in their report 
(1972) that it was important for a child to know its 
true parentage and accordingly they recommended that 
step-parent adoptions should be discouraged. (79 ) 
Thus the refusal to grant step-parent adoption does 
not necessarily mean strengthening of parental status 
but consideration for the child, and as the cases on 
step-parent adoption are mostly where the mother wants to 
adopt the children together with the step-father the 
courts' attitude ~lso means that they do not encourage 
the possibly still lingering social view about the 
importance of the father's status within the family. (80) 
The reluctance of the courts to dispense with 
parental consent has to be seen from a different angle. 
8.5 of the 1958 Adoption Act specifies certain grounds 
on which the parental consent might be dispensed with, the 
widest of which is unreasonable withholding of the con-
sent. This latter provision has been employed in con-
nection with the welfare-principle to dispense with con-
sent to a certain extent with the argument that a reasonable 
79) . Report of the Departmental Committee on the Adoption of Chil-
dren 1972 (Houghton/Stockdale Committee) Cmnd.5107, para. 105. 
80). cf. above, text at fnt. 74. 
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parent would pay great regard to the welfare of the child(Sl). 
But it has been emphasized in Re H(S 2 ) that consent is not 
necessarily dispensed with because adoption would be the 
best for the child's welfare, the latter can only be 
done if the welfare of the child in a particular case 
would overrule all other considerations in such a way 
that a reasonable parent could do nothing but consent to 
adoption( 83 ). It has also been acknowledged(S 4 )regret-
fully (SS) that in adoption cases the welfare o1, 1he d,,Ld. h~ ~rt-o{ ike 
paramount consideration. From this it may be inferred 
that a considerable part of the judiciary feel inclined 
to go further in dismantling parental status than the 
statute but do not see a way to follow this inclination 
against the word of the statute, whereas: there are also 
judges who are otherwise inclined. 
81). in Re D [1977] 1 All ER 145 
82). (Minors) The Times, 26th November 1974. This was a case of two 
children of 11 and 14 whose mother wanted to adopt them jointly 
with her new husband. The father was an artist of unstable 
character and irregular lifestyle, he had also not always 
contributed to the children's maintenance. His consent was 
not dispensed with, as it was not held to be sufficient that 
the adoption would be better for the children. 
83). Re B (a minor) [1975] 2 All ER 449, also a case of step-parent 
adoption, the father had not seen the child for several years 
because he had not wanted to disturb the child. The court 
laid down the test for unreasonably withheld consent! it has to 
be determined how honest and reasonable the father's desire is to 
remain the father. The court found in this case that the 
father's desire to remain the father was honest and reasonable 
and, accordingly, did not dispense with his consent. 
84). In re H. cf fnt. 82. 
85). ~(an infant) The Times 2.Bth January, 1972, cf.also below 
Chapter IV C 3d) • 
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In conclusion it may be said that there are two 
areas in adoption law concerned with parental status. 
One is the question of parental consent where the 
statute upholds the principle of a parental status. 
The other is the question of status as between the 
parents where the social reality still seems to cling to 
a certain pattern of sex-dependent parental status, 
whereas the judiciary sticks to principles independent 
of this particular social pattern. 
There were until 1975 no statutory provisions to 
cope with the particular problem of step-parent adop-
tion. The Children Act of that year, however, a compre-
hensive enactment on child law - took up the recommenda-
tion of the Houghton (Stockdale) Committee to discourage 
step-parent adoption and to suggest joint custody for 
step-parent and natural parent if that seems the more 
appropriate solution (s 10(3) ) . When the section came 
into force it had an immediate effect on the statistics. 
Step-parent adoptions dropped from 44.5% of all adoptions 
in 1976 to 35.6% in 1977( 86 ). It is yet early to decide 
on the effect of this provision on the law but it may 
be stated that the courts have certainly not grown 
more disposed towards granting step-parent adoption. (8?) 
86). cf. Cretney, op.cit., p.433. 
87). ReS (infants) [1977] 3 AllER 671, Re LA (minors) The Times 
27th April,l978, however, to the opposite effect Re D (minors) 
(1981) 2 F.L.R. l02 
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I The 1959 Legitimacy Act( 8?a) 
l Before the Act 
Alongside the inroad into the strong common-law 
position of the legitimate father which directly amelior-
ated the position of the legitimate mother and that of 
the child, the position of the illegitimate mother and 
more recently that of the natural father has gained 
importance. 
The position of the illegitimate mother already 
started to improve in the last century as can be seen in 
R v Nash, Re Carey in 1883( 88 ) as against Re Ann Lloyd in 
1841( 89 ). In Re Lloyd it is stated that where the mother 
instituted habeas corpus proceedings to regain custody of 
her illegitimate daughter the mother is at law not con-
sidered to be related to her illegitimate child, (90) 
accordingly the girl is left to go where she pleases and 
not handed over to the mother. In contrast in R v Nash an 
illegitimate child is delivered up to the mother in habeas 
corpus proceedings,( 9 l) as under the influence of the 1873 
Judicature Act equitable rules now apply in these pro-
ceedings. In equity the courts had always regarded the 
claim of the mother to her illegitimate child. But it 
was not before the 1926 Legitimacy Act( 9 la) that her 





7 & 8Eliz.II, c 72 
10 Q.B.D. 454 
2 Man.& G.5461 133 ER 1259 
Maule J. "how does the mother of an illegitimate child differ 
from a stranger?" ibid., 1260 
91) . cf. also fnt 36 and text at fnt. 40 
9la). 16 & 17 Geo.v, c.6o 
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1 1 . ( 92 ) h . t. t 1 t 1 t 93 ln Re Carroll er posl lOn was a eas equa o 
that of the legitimate father in relationship to strangers. 
In this case a Catholic mother had placed her child with a 
Protestant adoption society. Later she claimed it back to 
have it brought up in a Catholic childreds home. The court 
granted her petition for custody. (93 ) It even appears 
not unlikely that her position was less fettered by the 
welfare principle than that of the legitimate father as 
legislation had at first mainly striven to qualify this 
right by the welfare of the child and the law as to the 
position of the illegitimate mother could for some time 
develop in the shadow of and thus slightly differently 
from that concerning the position of the legitimate 
father. 
After the Second World War the position of the puta-
tive father gains strength. In 1955 (Re Aster) (94 ) the 
mother wanted to have the child adopted, she was therefore 
deemed to have given up her rights. Thus the father's 
suggestions were considered independently and accordingly 
given legal effect. Though the judges profess the 
decision to be according to the welfare of the child, they 
only pay lip-service to it by saying that the 'tie of 
blood' should be given legal effect to. 
There was also a practice in the magistrateS) courts 
92). [1931] 1 K.B. 317 
93). for further analysis of this case, cf. Chapter IV. C 3.d). 
94). [1955]2 All ER 202 
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to give custody to the putative father when he applied 
for it under the Guardianship of Infants Ac~l886 and 
1925. This development found its end in 1956 when 
Roxburgh J. stated that it could not be inferred from the 
letter of the statutes that they meant to include the 
putative father when they spoke of 'father' and that he 
thus had to bar such a development as had so far taken 
place in the magistrate~ courts (Re C.T., re J.T. (infants) (95 ) 
As a consequence of this decision the 1959 Legitimacy Act 
passed< 96 ) which enabled the putative father to apply was 
for custody or access under the Guardianship Acts. 
2 Consequences 
After the Act the courts have developed the law and 
the pendulum has swung back slightly in order not to 
give the putative father undue weight, e.g. it is stated 
in Re Adoption Application 41; 61 (
9?) that the single judge 
had paid too much attention to the position of the natural 
father and thus been in danger of establishing a new 
'common-law' right. Also, in that case, S.3 of the 1959 
Act is seen as a procedural position to hear the putative 
father in order to see what he can contribute to the child's 
welfare( 9B). Thus, eventually, the 'tie of blood' argu-
ment loses its independent position and is integrated into 
95). [1956] 3 All ER 500 
96). cf Re Adoption Application No. 41/61 [1962] 3 All E~ 553, at 563 
97). cf fnt. 96. 
9P). This is developed later further inS v ~1978) 8 Fam. Law, ll 
M v J (1978) 8 Fam. Law,l2. 
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the welfare principle. 
There are two cases which give very strong weight to 
the natural father inasmuch as they order conditions for 
access to be put into an adoption order for which the 
mother had applied. It is not quite clear what the main 
concern of the court was in those two cases (~ 1973( 99 ) 
andReS l976(lOO) ) . In both cases the father could 
offer special guidance to the child as member of a dif-
ferent culture or race, in Re J the father was Jewish in 
Re S the father was Singaporian. This was considered to 
be important for the child's welfare. In both cases the 
court may also have been influenced by the fact that the 
natural father in each case had known the child for some 
time (the children were 6 and 7 years resr~diveLy), 
and wu..c very attached to the child. But it could have been 
maintained with equal ease that an undisturbed family 
life would be better than openness about parenthood. In 
a way those two cases are most closely in line with the 
step-parent adoption cases in that the parents had a close 
contact with each other, the father had established a 
close relationship to the child and the mother wanted to 
adopt the child together with her new husband. The only 
difference between natural and legitimate father as viewed 
by the courts here is probably that had the fathers in Re S 
99) . (a minor) [1973] 2 All ER 410 
100). (a minor) [1976] Fam,l. 
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and Re J been legitimate, adoption orders would probably 
not have been granted at all. But whether an adoption 
order with inserted conditions can in such a case fulfil 
the purpose of a full adoption order remains an open 
question. Concluding, it can be noted that with the 
weakening of the status of the legitimate father the status 
of not only the mother (whether married to the father or 
unmarried) but also of the natural father has been 
strengthened. But in general the mother's as well as 
the father's status has been dwindling gradually at least 
since the beginning of this century, While the welfare 
of the child has gained an overall priority. 
As to the status of the parents of an illegitimate 
child a recent development should be mentioned briefly. 
In the belif that they would meet current social 
demands the Law Commission in their Working Paper on 
Illegitimacy suggested that the concept of illegitimacy 
should be abolished entirely(lOl~ This meant besides 
other points that a parental position should be automa-
tically conferred upon the natural father, thus giving 
him full parental status(}02 ) However, the public res-
ponse to this suggestion was overwhelmingly negative. 
Although the majority agreed that discrimination against 
101). Working Paper No. ~4, Illegitimacy, (1979), paras. 3.14 -
3.22 
102). Paras. 3.15, 3.16. 
114 
illegitimate persons of any kind should be abolished, they 
were strongly opposed to the idea that the illegitimate 
father should have full parental status(l03 ). The 
reasons given were inter alia that mothers might refuse 
to identify the father for fear of interference and thus 
the child could draw no benefit from its father at all, 
and that such a step would encourage step-parent adoption 
of illegitimate children (also in order to avoid inter-
ference) and thus deprive the child of its natural father(l0 4 ) 
altogether. 
As a consequence the Law Commission finally suggested 
in their Report that every other distinction between 
illegitimate and legitimate children should be abolished 
but they refrained from suggesting automatic parental 
rights for the natural father} 105 ) 
J The Guardianship Act 1973(l06 ) 
1 Remnants of Inequality:The Father's Name 
Another interesting strand of cases starts after the 
Second World War, ~e., the name-cases. These are cases 
where the mother who has the custody of the children tries 
to or actually does change the childreds names after her 
re-marriage to a new partner. These cases are related to 
the cases of step-parent adoption(lO?) which have, as stated 
103). Law Commission Report, No. 118, (1982), para. 4.15. 
104). Para. 4.26 (a), (b) 
105 ) • para. 4.50. 
106). 21 & 22 Eliz. II, c 29. 
107). Bissett-Johnson, op.cit., p.389. 
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above, so far only arisen when the mother wanted to adopt 
her own children together with her new partner. There is, 
however, one interesting difference between the two groups 
of cases. Whereas the adoption cases can be decided with 
the help of the Adoption Act 1958 there is no authority 
for the name-cases before the first of them in 1962 (Re 
T. orse H) . (l08 ) · 
The fact that the name cases occur at all seems to me 
particularly interesting, first because in English Law 
the name in itself has no significance, since it can be 
altered easily by deed-poll, and secondly, because the 
name of a child and what it says about the relationship 
to the adults with whom it lives, is closely related to the 
question of its status as a legitimate child of one or 
the other party to the marriage
1
or as an illegitimate child. 
So it appears as somewhat surprising that the name gains 
such an importance when parental status in general is 
being constantly weakened. In Re T (orse H) the courts 
states that the right to determine a child's name rests 
with the father as guardian of the child and can there-
fore not be changed by the custodian mother, and accordingly 
orders the name of the child to be rechanged. In Y v Y 
(1969) (l09 ) although the right is still said to rest in the 
father it is stated obiter that as the mother was custo-
dian he could not unilaterally alter the child's name. 
Moreover based on the welfare of the children concerned, 
108). [1962] 3 All ER 970 
109). [1973] 2 All ER 574 
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the court refuses here to order a rechange of name. This 
points to a concept of joint equal guardianship which is 
favoured by the court in a way that comes close to assuming 
legislative power. 
2 The Act and Its General Impact 
The 1973 Guardianship Act, however, did not take up 
this thread but introduced equal but separate guardianship 
for both parents probably for practical reasons. It was also 
avowedly for practical reasons(llO) that several Bills(lll) 
before the Act, which suggested joint guardianship, were 
rejected by Parliament. But by 1973 it was considered a 
matter of a prevailing principle which should be intro-
duced into English Law - separate rather than joint 
guardianship then being the more practical solution(ll2 ) 
against this background. 
The impact of the Act has to be seen in three dif-
ferent ways : practical, psychological and legal. In 
practical respects the Act is important for the cases 
where the mother is left with the children without any 
court order and the father does not take an active part 
in the children's life. e.g. because he has deserted his 
family. Before the Act the mother in such a situation 
could not act freely in some resp-ects e.g. she could 
not get a passport issued for her children, which is 
now possible for her. The Act is of less importance when 
110). cf Maidment, op.cit., p.141. 
111). in 1962, 1963, 1964, cf. Maidment 1oc. cit. 
112). Maidment, op.cit., p.142. 
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the parents live in harmony, because they would now, as 
before the Act, solve any conflicts peacefully. This way 
of regulating social conduct is a new feature in this 
branch of law, its particular significance will be con-
sidered in the next chapter. 
3 The Effect of the Act on the Law 
The effect of the Act on the development of the law 
is not easy to judge, partly because insufficient time 
has elapsed and(ll 3 ) partly because the law is not very 
clear either before or after the Act. 
As to the name-cases it can be said that the judges 
are not too ready to consent to a name change, not, after 
the Act, because the mother as opposed to the father 
does not have any guardianship rights, but because it is 
often deemed necessary for the welfare of the child to 
maintain a link with the father by keeping his name(ll 4 ). 
In fact,regulations have been issued which make a formal 
name-change without the consent of the parent who has not 
got the custody of the child or leave of the court impos-
sible(llS). This is reminiscent of the caseY v Y(ll 6 ) 
with its favouring of something close to joint rather 
than separate equal guardianship. This may hint that the 
effects of seperate equal guardianship are not really always 
desirable, but it provides a practical compromise. 
113) . Also there is so far no record of any cases have been brought 
under s l (3) of the Act. 
114). e.g. ~' The Times, lst. August,l978. 
115). ~atrimonial Causes Rules 1977, r. 92 (8) 
116) . [1973] 2 All ER 574 
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However in some cases name changes have been granted 
generously and the latest tendency seems to be to allow 
an informal change of name rather than a formal one( 117 ~ 
It remains to be seen which attitude will prevail in the 
long run. But after what has been said in connection with 
step-parent adoption on the background of changing 
family units it may also be suggested here that the stab-
ility of a child would be better preserved by leaving its 
name unchanged and that it would be less unsettling to 
have a different name from the rest of the family than 
having to change its name and thus part of its identity 
possibly several times. Especially from this point of view 
the case of W v A(llS) seems to peculiarly preserve a 
feature of status law, as for the child the practical 
consequences are not much different whether its change 
of name is authorized by deed-poll or not, but for the 
father it might be of symbolic importance for his posi-
tion as a father that the legal name of his child is 
still identical with his own. Overall it cannot be clearly 
determined whether the latest development in the name-
cases favours parental - and, because they are name-cases, 
mostly paternal-status, as similarly to step-parent adop-
tion, a refusal by the courts to consent to a name-change 
does not necessarily mean strengthening of the father's 
position but possibily granting stability to the child. 
117). W v A [1981] Fam.14, erich v Crich (1977) 7 Fam. Law 239 
118) • [ 1981JFam ,14. 
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The other branch where the legal effect of the Act 
might be seen is the law of custody. However, before the 
Act there were no clear and overall consistent rules 
and cases for the settling of custody disputes. There 
were and still are a number of possible court orders, 
which often overlap in their concepts(ll 9 ). The 1975 
Children Act was an attempt to clarify the concept of 
parental rights and custody and was as such partly sue-
cessful. But as it is not applicable to all proceedings 
concerning child custody, there is still a considerable 
amount of confusion. Thus also the effect of the 1973 
Guardianship Act is not easily to be discerned. Perhaps 
most clearly it can be traced in connection with split 
custody orders. These orders were judicially invented in 
1954( 120) and further affirmed in 1963( 121 ) where it 
was maintained that authority for this kind of order 
was in fact provided by the 1886 Guardianship of Infants 
Act. Split custody order means that one parent gets 
care and control, the other custody. As the latter was 
mostly the father and the former the mother, who was not 
guardian of her legitimate children, the same effect 
could probably be achieved by just awarding care and con-
trol to the mother and leaving the father to exercise 
his guardianship. After the Act a split custody order 
means that the mother has not only care and control but 
119). cf. Mrs. Justice Booth, Child Legislation, Custody:Its Judicial 
Inte;pretation and Statutory Definition (1982) , Statute Law 
Review pp 71-77; and Maidment, The Fragmentation of Parental 
Rights, 1981, C.L.J. pp.l35ff. 
120). Wakeham v Wakeham [1954] 1 W.L.R. 366 
121). Re W (J.C.) (an infant) [1963] 3 All ER 459 
- 120 -
also the rights of a guardian, and as she has, according to 
the concept of the 1973 Act, separate guardianship, she can 
in theory exercise her rights and duties independently of 
the father. The father can also exercise his guardianship 
independently of the mother, as far as he finds opportunity 
to do so, e.g. he can have a passport issued for his children 
and take them abroad, while they stay with him for a holiday. 
However, if conflicts arise, the parents have to invoke the 
jurisdiction of the courts. 
As separate guardianship, as opposed to joint guardian-
ship, enables each parent to exercise his or her parental righ 
and duties independently of the other, there is no legal 
necessity for the parents to consult each other in respect 
of their children's education. In case of divorce, and if 
the mother has care and control, it is only by awarding 
custody to the father that he gains (among other, not clear-
ly definable rights( 122 )) the right to be consulted regular-
ly in respect of his children's education. Thereby it does 
not make much of a difference whether he is given sole 
custody or custody jointly with the mother. Giving him 
custody jointly with the mother only means that he has to 
consult her, when exercising his parental rights and duties. 
But if the mother has the daily care of the children, he 
will have few opportunities to actually try to exercise his 
rights: If he tries to do so while the children are with the 
mother, she can contradict as an equal guardian. According-
ly, the parents have to find a solution or ask for a court 
order. Only if the children are staying with the father, 
e.g. for a holiday, a joint custody order could differ 
significantly from a sole custody order. 
~22). cf. Maidment, Child Custody and Divorce, p. 27. 
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It follows that before tbe 1973 Act a split custody order 
was similar to having no custody order with care and control 
to the mother, whereas after the Act a split custody order is 
similar to a joint custody order with care and control to the 
mother. After the Act, a custody order - whether "split" or 
jointly with the mother - in fact grants more to a father than 
it would have done before the Act when the father used to be 
the sole guardian of his children. 
So much on the legal effect of the Act,as might have been 
inferred from its words and concepts. However, in 1980 
Dipper v Dipper( 123 ) was decided, and split custody orders 
were treated disapprovingly. Ormrod L. J. stated that "the 
basis of the judge's order ... was ... unsound", and goes on 
that split orders are "not really desirable"( 124 ). Cumming-
Bruce L. J. chooses even stronger language, referring to: 
"a fallacy which continues to raise its ugly head that, 
on making a custody order, the custodial parent has a 
right to take all the decisions about the education of 
the children in spite of the disagreements of the other 
parent" (125) 
It is also emphasized that by these orders the parent who 
has not the burden of the day to day care is given too much 
importance, and that this would be an affront to the parent 
with care and control. Apart from the fact that this is a 
sound psychological argument, it is not a very convincing 
one, if one considers that now by the new Act the mother 
with care and control is in any case guardian of her 
children. Whatever her custodial status, she cannot be 
superseded by the father in her decisions. As said above, 
giving the father (eVeD: sole) custody only means that he 
123). [1980JAA11 ER 722. 
124). At 731. 
125). At 733. 
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has a right to be consulted regularly in respect of his 
children's education. Thus, in a way, disapproving of split 
custody orders, 1 ike the.. cou...Yt. in Dipper v Dipper, would 
have made more sense before the 1973 Act, when the affront 
and the practical problems for a mother with care and control 
were in fact grave. Then the father could simply decide 
in matters of education without asking the mother who, in 
her turn had to cope with the practical consequences of the 
father's decisions. Thus the reasoning of Dipper v Dipper 
is not easy to understand. ( 126 ) 
Some light, however, will be cast on the matter, if one 
looks at the following aspect: The judges state that now 
both parents have equal rights, quite in accordance with the 
Act. But they do not fully consider its legal effect on split 
custody orders which has just been set out. ( 126a) 
Their true object can be seen from their further reasoning. 
Cununing-Bruce L. J. states, "The parent is always entitled, 
whatever his custodial status, to know and to b~ consulted 
about the future education of the children and any other 
major matters ..... ( 126b) Strictly speaking, this statement 
is only true in relation to parent and stranger and not 
between both parents as equal but separate guardians. As 
stated above, when the parents live separate, a right to be 
constantly consulted and informed, actually arises from 
custodianship and not from guardianship( 126c). Thus in fact 
the reasoning of the judges 1 though practical and reasonable, 
is not quite in accordance with the legal concept of the 
Act but rather favours the concept of joint guardianship 
126). cf. also, Maidment, Child Custody and Divorce, p. 27. 
126a).pp. 120£. 
126b).at p. 733. 
126c). cf. above pp. 120 f. 
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which the judiciary had already favoured before 1973. ( 126d). 
However, tt.e judges act in accordance with their ideas by 
using conventional means, by awarding joint custody to the 
parents, not noticing that compared to the single judges 
order their order has a different psychological rather than 
a different legal effect. 
K Conclusion 
The development of the law of parental status shows a 
change from the strong common-law position of the father via 
quasi-equality of the mother (since 1925) to equal but 
generally weakened status of both parents, facing an in-
creasing importance of the consideration for the child's 
welfare( 127 ). With the weakening of the status of the 
126d). Y v Y [1973] 2 AllER 574, cf. above p. 116. 
127). cf. J. c. Hall, The Waning of Parental Rights (1972) 
3 1 ( 1 ) C • L • J . , pp . 2 4 8- 2 6 5 . 
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legitimate father not only the legitimate mother but also 
the illegitimate parents first the mother and more recently 
the father gained a stronger position. 
Throughout the whole development a srrong mutual 
dependence of judicial and legislative law cru1 be seen. 
Within this the impact of judicial law on statutory 
reform takes different shapes. 
First one can distinguish the immediate and quick 
influence of single cases as can be seen in connection 
with the separation deed provision o~ the 1873 Guardian-
ship of Infants Act, and the p~ovisj0~ to give custody to 
the natural father in the 1959 Legitimacy Act. This 
latter example already leads to the next category as in 
fact there had already been a long standing pr~ctise in 
the lower courts pre-empting and thus preparing this 
provision. 
There are then secondly Acts prepared by longer 
development in the Courts, either in that the Courts 
created a socially unbearable situation which made 
parliamentary intervention necessary, as before the 
1839 Talfourd's Act, or in that they evolved principles 
that were just transposed into the statute, as before 
the 1925 Guardianship of Infants Act, or in that they 
favoured certain trends which were also enforced by the 
statute but not taken directly from the case law, as the 
favouring of joint equal guardianship before the 1973 
Guardianship Act. Judicial response to the statutes 
proved to be often more advanced that it is given credit 
for. 
The third and last category is characterized by a 
hostile attit~de of the judiciary to legislative law. 
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There is one Act - the 1891 Custody of Children Act -
which had virtually no influence on the development of law 
because of the narrow interpretation it suffered from the 
courts. 
Particular judicial hostility was shown towards the 
abolition of the adultery bar by the 1873 Act, but it 
may well be that the judges were in fact more in accor-
dance with the public opinion based on 'Victorian' morals 
and convictions than the enactment. 
Otherwise the judicial reaction is often careful and 
just aightly conservative and thus perhaps provides a 




STATUTORY DRAFTING AND JUDICIAL 
REASONING IN THE LAW OF PARENTAL STATUS 
This chapter will seek to demonstrate how the 
method and structure of statutory drafting and judicial 
reasoning developed over the relevant period and how the 
English common law system thereby acquires some new 
characteristics and changes into something which,in parts, 
resembles a civil law system. 
As pointed out in Chapter I, the main difference 
between a traditional common law system and a traditional 
civil law system lies in the form and function of legal 
sources and the approach which the judges take to them. 
A civil law system is mainly based on broadly 
termed and well organized codes which each cover a large 
area of the law comprehensively. The codes contain 
general principles which are guidelines for the judges. 
Academic writers as well as judges provide a gloss on 
the code provisions. The judges reason freely from the 
principles of the code, they are open to philosophical 
ideas and public policy notions. They are not bound 
by a doctrine of precedent, but in their turn they 
reason by analogy from the code provisions, thus making 
law under the cover of the code which may be (but seldom 
is) overruled by subsequent judges. 
In contrast to this the traditional common law con-
sists of detailed legal rules derived from the holdings 
of cases, and more recently, from statutory provisions. 
Statutes are traditionally casuistic and brief amend-
ments of the common Law. They are construed literally by 
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the judges. Common law judges are bound by a doctrine 
of precedent which is mostly extended to cases that 
d l l l · h t · t · ( la) Th ea so e y wlt sta utory lnterpreta lOn . ey 
are sceptical of philosophical ideas and notions of public 
policy and in this adhere to an empirical tradition 
and an individualistic outlook on law as well as on 
society. (lb) They may make law when a new situation, 
for which there is no precedent, is brought before them 
in an area of law which is still only covered by cases, 
but they will not make law when they are concerned with 
the interpretation of statutes. 
It is the object of this chapter to show how far 
the English legal system has in fact moved away from 
this common law approach; how statutes have lost their 
singular character and have taken a shape which in 
some parts resembles continental codes; how the judges 
to some extent relax in this liberal construction of 
statutory provision and become open to general princi-
ples and notions of public policy. 
B. Statutory Drafting 
l. Sample 
In order to look into the methods of statutory 
drafting I have chosen the seven Acts between 1839 and 
1973 solely concerned with parental guardianship or 
la) . I,.J~.-e4o.fto... · cf. Cross, Statuto~pp~ 0, 42, ~owever t a precedent on 
interpretation of o ~ statute can normally not form a 
dent for the interpretation of another. 




custody(l). This choice was influenced by the fact that 
in order to evaluate statutory drafting it is essential to 
look at a statute as a whole, so I had to choose Acts 
which deal with subject matters that are entirely covered 
by my topic of parental status, a conditions which is 
fulfilled by the Acts in question. 
I have included the 1971 Guardianship of Minors Act 
although it is only a consolidating Act, rather clarifying 
than developing the law. This is, because a consolidating 
Act though not changing the law can nevertheless show a 
change in drafting method. Also the fact that there is a 
consolidating Act 3.t all is a phenomenon to be looked into. 
It is to be expected that the character of the Acts 
changes as they serve different functions at different 
periods. At the outset of the examined period, a statute 
was an exception in the legal system and it was employed 
to amend a socially unbearable flaw in the common law. 
Today nearly every area of family law in general and 
law of parental status in particular is governed by 
statutes which no longer refer to the common law but 
mainly to other statute law so that there is,at least in 
parts, a comprehensive coverage of the law by statutes. 
l). Custody of Infants Act 1839, 2 & 3 Viet., c.54. (Ti:llfourd's Act). 
Custody of Infants Act 1873, 36 Viet., c. 12 
Guardianship of Infants Act 1886, 49 & 50 Viet., c.27. 
Custody of Children Act 1891, 54 Viet., c. 3. 
Guardianship of Infants Act 1925, 15 & 16 Geo.V., c.45. 
Guardianship of Minors Act 1971, 19 & 20 E1iz.II., c. 3. 
Guardianship Act 1973, 21 & 22 E1iz. II, c. 29. 
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2. Method 
In order to determine how the statutes change their 
shape and character over the relevant period, I shall look 
into the following aspects: 
(l) Compass and length of statutes 
The compass and length of a statute will show how 
large an area of the law it covers. The traditional common 
law statute normally governs a few situations,whereas a 
civil law code, and even a civil law statute, covers a 
whole area or branch of the law comprehensively. Thus, 
with the increase ,in length and compass of statutes the 
common law system loses one of its common law characteris-
tics. 
(2) Lay-out and structure of the statutes, use of 
general provisions, degree of speciality in 
other provisions. 
Under this heading I will show how far the statutes 
cover an area of law systematically rather than casuistically 
As described abovJ 2 ) civil law codes are divided into 
books, titles and sub-titles, each headed by some pro-
visions which will lay down the general principles which 
govern the area of law to follow. In a code,sections of 
one type will be put together, and if there are procedural 
provisions, they will be separated from the provisions of 
substantive law( 2 a~ A traditional common law statute sets 
2) .tp.29J 
2a). A civil law code, however, will normally only contain either 
procedural law or substantive law, it is only in a civil law 
statute where there may be procedural as well as substantive 
provisions, and they will be set out separately. 
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out the cases it is meant to to govern one after the other 
usually in great detail, without paying heed to syste-
matic organization. 
(3)How far the provisions are court-centred or on 
the other hand how far they state the law in 
general, 
This will demonstate how far the English legal system 
remains a court-centred system. The traditional function 
of the law in a common law system is to settle diputes in 
court according to the rules developed by the same court 
when settling earlier disputes. Thus, also the traditional 
common law statute will only provide some other rules for 
the courts to settle disputes. Civilian legislation is 
often meant to implant certain social goals into the law 
to provide rules for conduct so that disputes will not 
even arise. Such rules will not refer to the courts. 
Looking at it the other way round, the more English 
statutes contain provisions which do not refer to the 
courts, the more the English law loses its common law 
characteristics and moves towards a civil law system. 
Under this heading I will also consider whether the 
reference to the court is direct or indirect, eg. "no 
order shall be made," or "the order may contain". A 
direct reference puts emphasis on the court, the pro-
vision is in the true sense of the word 'court-centred'. 
An indirect reference emphasizes the law which the court 
is to administer, it is therefore not 'court-centred' in 
a narrow sense but 'court-based'. Though the court is 
still there, it is no longer so important. In this 
context attention will be paid as to how 1 and how much, 
discretion the statutes give to the courts. 
129 
(4) What guidance the statutes provide for con-
struction of statutory provisions. 
The guidance for construction as provided within the 
statutes themselves as well as by the Interpretation Acts 
will be considered at the end of this sub-chapter in order 
to find out whether changes have also taken place in this 
area and what conclusions can be drawn from such changes. 
3. Analysis 
a) Custody of Infants Act 1839 (Talfourd's Act) 
This Act covers less that a page in the statute book 
and consists of five sections, it is solely concerned with 
the case of a mother whose children are in the sole cus-
tody of their father and provides for the Lord Chancellor 
to grant her access to them and custody when they are under 
2 years old (2 b). 
The new substantive law can be found in sections l 
and 4, the former is printed as one with the preamble and 
contains the main provision, the latter contains the adul-
tery bar. Sections 2 and 3 are procedural provisions and 
section 5 caters for repeals and amendment during the 
session of Parliament in which the enactment was passed. 
The Act contains no general provisions. It shows no 
systematic organization, thus retaining common law features. 
All Sections with the exception of section 5 deal with the 
'courts' (2c) that are to administer the new law, they 
2b). cf. Chapter III, pp. BDW 
2c). 'Court' is taken to mean every judge or judicial body vested 
with the power to deal with the law covered by the statute. 
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describe the new law solely in relation to the court. 
Thereby sections l, 2 and 3 expressedly name the court 
concerned whereas only the proviso, is worded in the 
passive voice, "that no order shall be made ... ". Thus, 
this section is not court-centred in the narrow sense of 
the word, but as it is the only section so worded,no 
further inference can be drawn from this. (2d) 
As sections 2 & 3 are procedural provisions, which 
normally do not give discretion to the courts concerned, 
and section 4 contains an absolute proviso, consequently 
section 1 is the only provision to grant discretion to the 
court, Three terms of discretion appear in this section, 
twice "as we shall deem convenient and just", and once 
"if he shall see fit.", they refer to the orders the 
court may make and to the conditions it may insert into 
the orders. 
All in all this Act fits entirely into the picture 
of a traditional common law statute : it is brief, 
and court-centred. It does not show any signs of organi-
zation as there would be in a code : the provisions follow 
one after the other as they might in a speech of a member 
of Parliament 1 rather than presenting a systematic descrip-
tion of the law. The lack of systematic approach can also 
be seen from the wording of section l which contains three 
terms of discretion 1where one at the beginning or at the 
end might have been sufficient. 
2cD . cf. above 1 p J 2 g 1 this phenomenon of indirect reference to the 
courts gains importance in later Acts. 
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b) Custody of Infants Act 1873. 
This Act is as short as its predecessor and it only 
consists of three sections. However, it has a larger 
compass : it deals with the material of the 1839 Act -
extending it - as well as with the case of a separation 
deed between mother and father which provides for the 
custody of their children. 
The preamble is printed separately here. The new 
substantive law is contained in sections 1 and 2, section 
three being a legislative provision, repealing the 1839 
Act. 
This Act, like its predecessor, contains a proviso. 
However this time the proviso immediately follows the 
statement of law,to which it is applicable, not in a 
section of its own, apart from the other substantive law 
in the Act. This has become necessary, because the Act 
treats two 'cases' (3 ) and the proviso only applies to one 
of them. 
Also, there are no procedural provisions in this Act 
which could havetemptedthe draftsman to put them so as to 
separate the proviso as he did in the 1839 Act. Accordingly 
the structure of this very short Act is not sufficient 
evidence for it being systematically organized. 
The proviso is also interesting for another reason 
3). In fact it covers more than two cases, as section 1 now - as 
opposed to the 1839 Act - includes the case where the mother has 
already custody of the children. 
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"Provided always, that no court shall enforce any such 
agreement if the Court shall be of the opinion that it will 
not be for the benefit of the infant or infants to give 
effect thereto." Here, for the first time, the legis-
lator introduces a general principle into the law of 
parental status, even though it is only by a proviso. 
Nevertheless, as in the 1839 Act all but the legislative 
provision are court-centred. This can in particular be 
seen by the wording of the proviso. The 'benefit of the 
infant' is in itself a broad term which gives a certain 
discretion to the court, so it would have been sufficient 
to say "no agreement shall be enforced that will not be 
for the benefit of the infant"; instead it says, "no 
Court shall enforce ... if the Court shall be of the 
opinion ... ". By this wording the court is very much 
put into the foreground( 3a), it is also given express 
discretion 'shall be of the opinion'in spite of the fact 
that the welfare-principle already itself embodies dis-
cretion given to the court indirectly. In section 1 
there are two identical terms of discretion "as the Court 
shall deem proper" where there had been three terms in the 
1839 Act. (4 ) 
Seen as a whole, the 1873 Act is still very much a 
common-law amendment Act. However, it has increased in 
compassand it contains a general principle. The lay-out 
3a). cf. above, p. 12~ 
4). cf. above, p 130 
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12 which applies to tutors according to Scots law and 
is worded in a most complicated way. It moreover con-
tains elements of definition rather than just substantive 
law, : 
"In Scotland tutors being administrators-in-law ... who 
shall, by virtue of this office ... shall be deemed to 
be tutors within the meaning of an Act ... and shall be 
subject to the provisions thereof ... " 
It can be easily perceived that the section was placed 
towards the end of the statute as it did not properly fit 
anywhere else. Sections for construction (sections 8 and 
9) as welL:as procedural provisions (sections 10 and 11) 
are kept together within the Act and follow the substantive 
law. This shows an organized structure, not traditionally 
found in a common law statute. 
There are three sections which contain broad, general 
terms, s 3(3) "welfare of an infant", s 5"welfare of the 
infant", "conduct of the parents", "wishes as well of 
the mother as of the father" and s b "welfare of the infant" 
(twice) (4a) . Thereby "welfare of the infant" and "conduct 
introduce 
of the parents',:( a general principle into the Act. They 
give discretion to the court indirectly, as a general 
principle never tells the court exactly what to do,but 
provides it with a guideline only,and the court can decide 
for itself how to put this guideline into practice. (The 
only "wishes of the parents" though listed with the other 
two terms and apparently as indeterminable do not quite 
4a). These terms are to apply to ordeiSof custody or access, the 
removal and appointment of guardians, and to general orders by 
the court on matters upon which the guardians disagree. 
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seems more organized, as the preamble is printed separately, 
but this on its own is not very strong evidence of a 
different approach of legislator or draftsman to statutes 
and it is difficult to draw any inference from the struc-
ture of the statute as it only contains 3 sections,which 
did not give the draftsman much choice as to their order. 
c) Guardianship of InfantsAct 1886 
This Act shows a picture quite different to that of 
its predecessors. 
It consists of 13 sections and covers three pages in 
the statute book. It also covers an increased area of the 
law : the guardianship of children in all possible cases 
when one or both parents are dead, including the removal 
of guardians, the custody of children in general,and the 
more particular case of declaration in a decree of divorce 
or separation to the extent that one parent is unfit to 
have the custody of the children of the marriage. 
The lay-out of the Act does not differ from that of 
the 1873 Act with one exception, normally that one of the 
sections, S.3, is divided into sub-sections and s.ll con-
tains sub-divisions 'a', 'b', 'c'. Both these sections 
are evidence of an attempt to systematize the law covered 
by them. Only 7 of the 13 sections of the Act contain 
substantive law; the rest are procedural provisions or 
provisions for construction (s.8 and 9) and other general 
provisions like s.l, setting out the short title of the 
statute. The Act shows a high degree of systematic organi-
zation in that, with one exception, all the provisions of 
substantive law are set out in successive sections, from 
section 2 to section 7. 'I'he exception to this is section 
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fit into the notion of a general principle. Once the 
parents have voiced them they are clear as they are and 
not open to a judgment of the court, the court can only 
decide to regard them or to disregard them) . 
For the first time with this Act a statute contains 
provisions of substantive law that state the law as it is 
or should be outside the courts : "On the death of the 
father of an infant, ... the mother, if surviving shall be 
the guardian of such infant ..• ". (5 ) The same applies to 
s3(1), s4 and the first part of sl2. Section 3(1) confers 
certain powers on the mother to appoint a guardian, 
Section 4 states the powers of the guardian in general 
ans Section 12 applies to Tutors in Scotland. 
Even among the provisions which do not contain sub-
stantive law there are three, namely sections 1, 8 and 9, 
which do not refer to the court as being vested with 
power to administer the law of the Act, though sections 
8 and 9 deal with construction which is normally done by 
the courts. However, for instance, counsel could construe 
a word of the statute in argument, whereas he could not 
entertain an application. Thus these sections cannot be 
considered as being court-centered. In this context sl3 
proves interesting. It is a provision saving the juris-
diction of certain courts to appoint and remove guardians. 
It shows the increasing impact of statute law in general 
in 1839 Parliament did not think it necessary to state 
that the jurisdiction of the Lord Chancellor on children 
was not impaired by the new Act. 
Wherever the court appears in this Act in provisions 
of substantive law(G} it is vested with discretion. There 
5). First part of section 2. 
6). With the exception of the second part of sl2, which is, as 
pointed out, an unusual provision. 
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is also one procedural provision - s.lO - with a term of 
discretion. It may be interesting to note that there are 
ll different terms of discretion in the statute and only 
one of them appears twice. 
In summary, it may be stated that the 1886 Act has 
moved away to some extent from the common-law amendment 
statute. It has a comparatively wide compass, it states -
in some parts- the law as it is or should be,outside the 
courts, it contains other provisions which are not court-
centred(6a) and it assumes an organized structure in so far 
as sections of the same category (substantive law, 
procedure, construction) are put together. 
d) Custody of Children Act 1891 
This Act is just over a page long and consists of 6 
sections. It is concerned with cases where parents have 
abandoned their children or have left them to other 
people to be brought up at the latters' expense and it 
deals with custody, religious education and cost of up-
bringing of such children. In compass it is therefore 
comparable with the 1873 Act with the only difference that 
(6b) 
the law covered by the latter Act is more diverse than the 
law covered by the 1891 Act. 
The lay-out of this Act is basically the same as the 
one seen in the 1886 Act, except that this time :one of the 
6a). cf above, prll~, this new phenomenon shows perhaps most signifi-
cantly a shift towards a civil law system. 
6b) • The 1873 Act dealt with custody and access on one side and 
separation deeds on the other side. 
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sections is divided into sub-sections, s.3 has sub-divisions 
of 1 a 1 and 1 b 1 • 
The Act contains 4 provisions of substantiv~ law, 
sections l to 4, s.5 is a provision for construction and 
s.6 sets out the short title of the Act. Thus again, like 
in the Act before, provisions of substantive law and other 
provisions are kept separately, and especially here the 
short title is placed towards the end of the Act with the 
other general provisions and not, like in the 1886 Act, 
at the beginning. Thus the Act shows an organized struc-
ture not typical of a common law statute. 
There are two general broad terms in the statute, 
"all circumstances of the case" in s.2 and "welfare of the 
child" in s.3 both embodying general principles, which are 
more typical of a code than of a statute. All the 
sections on substantive law refer to the court and all of 
them give discretion to the court - with five different 
terms of discretion, two of which are used twice. The 
former shows that the law is still seen as centered around the 
courts. The latter, the variety of forms of discretion, 
shows a low degree of systematic organization in statutory 
drafting. Both are typical common law features. 
This Act taken as a whole resembles the 1839 and 1873 
Acts more than its immediate predecessor especially in 
compass and length) and insofar as all its sections on 
substantive law are court centered. It is, however, 
drafted in a slightly more systematic manner, if one 
considers the sub-divisions of s.3 and the fact that the 
general provisions and the provisions of substantive law 
are not mingled. Also, this Act contains more general 
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principles than even the 1873 Act by using two different 
broad general terms. 
e) Guardianship of Infants Act 1925 
This Act only consists of 11 sections, but it 
spreads over as much as 8 pages in the statute book, one 
schedule included. The Act covers most of the law of 
custody and guardianship of legitimate children. 
Most of the sections of the Act are divided into 
(7) 
sub-sections and s.7(1) and s.9(1) and (4) have further 
sub-divisions into 'a' 'b' and 'c'. There is also some-
thing completely new in the lay-out of the Act; it has a 
schedule, setting out the persons whose consent is 
required to an infant's marriage. 
Several of the sub-sections are longer than most of 
the sections in the Acts before and their wording is very 
intricate and shows a high degree of specialization.thus 
retaining the casuistic, detailed piecemeal interference 
1 
(7a) 
with common aw. 
"If the mother or father so objects, or if the guardian 
so appointed as aforesaid ,considers that the mother 
or father is unfit to have the custody of the infant, 
the guardian may apply to the court, and the court 
may either refuse to make any order (in which case 
the mother or father shall remain sole guardian) or 
make an order that the guardian so appointed shall act 
jointly with the mother or father, or that he shall 
be sole guardian of the infant, and in the latter case 
may make such order regarding the custody of the infant 
and the right of access thereto of its mother or 
father as, having regard to the welfare of the infant, 
7). Not: sections 1,2,6 and 10. 
7a) • This very detailed way of drafting 
by the literal constfucti~ of the 
cf. Cross, Statutoo/ lp'p:11':"''' 
has also been encouraged 
statutes by the courts, 
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the court may think fit, and may further order that 
the mother or father shall pay to the guardian 
towards the maintenance of the infant such weekly 
or other periodical sum as, having regard to the 
means of the mother or father, the court may 
consider reasonable." (8) 
This detailed form of drafting stands for the traditional 
common law approach and would not be found in a civilian 
code. However, there is something to balance such 
particularity. The Act is headed - also a new phenomenon-
by two sections which contain general principles applic-
able to the entire law of custody : s.l. orders that any 
court dealing with any proceedings concerning custody 
and administration or property of an infant shall regard 
Chl.ld(g) as f1'rst the welfare of the and paramount, and 
s.2 put mother and father on an equal footing in respect 
of their right to apply to court. S .1 is a provision with 
a general principle for two reasons, because first it 
introduces the welfare as being a paramount consideration 
and then it extends these principles to any proceedings 
before any court dealing with the matters of law here 
concerned. This general provision signifies a further 
move away from a traditional common law approach. If it 
were not for its references to the courts, which show that 
the law is basically seen as centred round the court and 
not as setting out general rules for social conduct, this 
provision might easily be found in a code. 
8). s.5{4); S.7(1) and (5), s.8(2) and s.9(1) are of a comparable 
quality. 
9). Apart from s.l, the welfare of the child occurs in s.5(4) and 
s.6 
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Apart from these new features, the schedule at the 
end and the two general principle provisions at the 
beginning of the Act, the structure of the Act is not very 
clear. Procedural provisions are only found in s.7, but 
legislative provision£ 1~~ well as provisions which deal 
with the meaning of certain terms(ll) are strewn all 
over the statute. Accordingly, pure substantive law is 
laid down in sections 1 to 3, s.4 except (3), s.5 except 
( 7) , s. 6 , s. 8 except ( 3) , and s. 9 ( 1) to ( 3) . 
Among the provisions on substantive law the following 
do not refer to the courts at all : first sentence of 4(1) 
first sentence of 4 (2), 5 (1) to (3) and (5), (6), 8 (1), first 
sentence of 9(1), 9(2) and (3). Compared with the 1886 
Act, the 1925 Act states more of the law as it should be 
outside the court than the older statute. (l2 ) 
The sections containing substantive law which refer 
to the court, however, with the exception of s.l (which 
however gives indirect discretion), s.2 and s.3(3) and (4), 
also grant discretion to the court. The variety of dif-
ferent terms of discretion has declined in comparison 
with the 1886 Act : there are only 6 different terms and 
ona of them, the simple 'may' occurs as often as five 
times. 
Concluding, it is noticeable that in this Act, 
10) • Sections 4 (3) , 5 (7), 9 (5) and 11 (3) • 
11). Sections 7(1), 8(3), 9(4) and 11(2), I hesitate to call all 
of them provisions or construction. S7(1) says "'the court' 
shall include a court of summary jurisdiction : Provided that 
••• (n) ••• shall not be competent- ••.• "So this section although 
it takes the shape of a provision or construction is really a 
provision to extend the jurisdiction of certain courts. 
Similarly s.9(4) mainly deals with questions of court rules 
and procedure, thou(lJh it starts with "For the purpose of this 
section 'the court' has the same meaning as •••.• ". 
12) • There were four provisions in the 1886 Act which stated the 
law outside the courts, cf. above, p.l35 
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compared with all its predecessors the proportion of 
provisions on substantive law which vest the courts with 
a discretionary power has declined. All in all the 1925 
Act has moved still further away from the traditional 
common law amendment Act. The new occurrence of general 
principles is something which gives this Act a remote 
resemblance to a code. However, otherwise the structure 
(13) 
of the statute appears not to be very systematic1 
and some of its provisions are somehow ungainly. (l4 ) 
There is something I would like to add, which cannot 
be seen from the Act itself. In embodying the welfare as 
the paramount consideration to guide the court, this 
statute is in fact codifying(l5 ) the preceding case law(lG). 
In this respect it is probably the most "progressive" Act 
within the sample here considered. (l 7 ) 
f) Guardianship of Minors Act 197l(l7a) 
This Act consists of 20 sections and including its 
two schedules and a title page it covers 15 pages in the 
statute book. Its compass is that of the 1925 Act 
extended by provisions on the application of the Act to 
illegitimate children. The layout of the Act is quite 
different from that of its predecessors. First the 
reader is pleasantly surprised by two pages preceeding 
the Act, headed 'Arrangement of Sections'. According to 
13). cf. above, 
14). cf. above. 
15). Codifying is understood as settling the judge-made common law, 
whereas consolidating is settling statute law by moulding several 
old statutes into one new statute, cf. Bennion,op.cit., p.75, Allen, 
op.cit. pp.476. However, codification would normally imply that 
future courts are not allowed to take precedents before the Act 
into account. As will be seen below sub-chapter C, this is not 
what the courts do, pp. 
16). St~on v St~~on (1857)8 De G.~&G.260,44 ER 583; ReA & B [1897] 
1 Ch.D.786; see also Ward v Laverty [1925JA.C.l01, which was 
decided shortly before the Act came into force. 
(Footnotes contd.next page •• ) 
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this, the sections of the Act are sorted into 6 blocks 
with each a headline of its own - and these headlines 
appear in the statute itself. They read as follows: 
General Principles (sections l and 2) 
Appointment, removal and powers of guardians 
(sections 3 to 8) 
Orders for custody and maintenance (sections 
9 to 13). 
Illegitimate Children (s.l4) 
Jurisdiction and Procedure (sections 15 to 17) 
Supplementary (sections 18 to 20). 
The 'Arrangement of Sections' also gives a short descrip-
tion of the contents of every section, however, these 
descriptions do not reappear in the enactment itself. 
This structure shows that this statute is organized 
much like a code : the general provisions come first, 
procedural provisions last,and the provisions on substan-
tive law are arranged according to their contents in 
between. The 'Arrangement of Sections' reminds of a table 
of contents which usually precedes a code 6 and the different 
headings show subdivisions like the different titles of a 
code. All in all this statute is as the structure and 
lay-out of a code. 
17). More recently, there has been some doubt as to whether this 
Act not only codified but also changed the law i.e. by exten-
ding the principle to all proceedings before all courts, cf. 
J v C[l970J A.C.668, at pp.697, 709, 724f, 727. However, 
even if it also did change the law, it nevertheless also put 
something into the statute-book which was already treated by 
some courts as the law of the land. 
l7a) The gap of 46 years between this Act and its predecessor may be 
seen as evidence for a satisfactory development of the law by 
the courts, cf. sub-chapter on judicial reasoning. 
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As in the 1925 Act, most of the sections are divided 
into sub-sections(lS) and (a new phenomenon) all of the 
long and complicated sections or sub-sections are 
further split into sub-divisions, fieaded by letters. (l 9 ) 
Thereby the very detailed provisions are made palatable to 
the reader - and to the lawyer who has to apply the 
statute. 
The Act has two schedules, one on consequential 
amendments, the other on consequential repeals. Especially 
the latter is a change from the 1925 Act where the conse-
quential repeals were strewn over the whole statute. (20) 
As can be inferred from the list of headlines taken 
from the 'Arrangement of Sections', sections 1 to 14 
contain the substantive law( 2 l), and sections 1 and 2 
contain the general principles which are to govern the 
law of custody and guardianship, namely the welfare of 
the child and the equality of mother and father in all 
court proceedings. 
As the 1971 Act is a consolidating Act the latter 
provisions are nearly( 22 ) identical with the equivalent 
18). except sections, 1,2,6,7,11 and 19. 
19). sl, s3(1) and (2), s.4(4), s9(1) and (3), S.lO(l), s.ll, s.l2(2), 
s.l5 (1) to (3) and (5), s.l9 and s.20(4). 
20). cf. above, p. 
21). I would, however, include s.l3(1) and (3) under the head of 
procedural provisions. S.l3(1) provides for a copy of a court 
order to be served on certain persons and s.l3(3) orders a 
certain payment order to be enforced like affiliation orders. 
22). The difference lies in the arrangement, not in the words. 
144 
provisions of the 1925 Act. In addition to this, the 
"welfare of the child" occurs in s.6, s.7, s.9(l), s.lO(l) 
and s.ll. S.9(l) also contains the "conduct and wishes 
of the mother and father" as a further principle to guide 
the court, it thereby more or less repeats s.5 of the 1886 
Act. 
As in the 1925 Act, there is a number of provisions 
that do not refer to the court but state the law as it should 
be outside the courts : the first parts each of s.3(l) and 
(2), s.4(l)- (3) and (5), (6), s.8, s.l3(2), s.l4(l) and 
(3). There is no increase in provisions on substantive 
law which do not refer to the courts, but this is no 
surprising feature, in a consolidating Act. Out of the 
provisions of substantive law which do refer to the 
court, the following do not vest discretionary power in 
it: sections 1,2,12(3), 14(2) and (3). There are, however, 
several provisions which, though they give discretion to 
the court, do not mention the court itself but use words 
like "the order .• may contain, "these are sections 9(3) 
and (4), 10(2) (23 ), 12 (l) and (4) (24 ). 'l'hough this 
phenomenon does not change the fact that most of the 
statutory provisions are still court-based, it is 
evidence for a shift in approach : the court is still the 
'basis' but perhaps no longer so much of a 'centre' of 
the law. 
23). "the powers ..• may be exercised •.• " 
24) • The 1925 Act only contained one section on substantive law 
with such a wording,s 3(4). 
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et:re 
In addition to this there~a few different terms 
of discretion in the Act : six different terms are used 
in 17 places, whereby the weak "may" is used as often as 
six times. 
Taking the Act as a whole, there is only one feature 
left which is distinctly a feature of a common law 
statute system, namely the high degree of speciality of 
most of its sections. The other points, its clear struc-
ture, systematic arrangement and the general principles 
of its beginning show a shift from the traditional common 
law statute. Only a very slight shift in this direction 
can be seen by the fact that several of the provisions 
of substantive law are only court-based and no more court-
centred. 
g) Guardianship Act 1973 
This last Act of the sample consists of 15 sections, 
and including the title page and the five schedules, it 
spreads over 22 pages of the statute book. Its compass 
differs from that of the 1971 Act though it partly 
refers to it, the 1973 Act governs the law concerning 
parental rights and powers of guardians and parts of the 
law concerning local authorities. 
As the 1971 Act, this statute has a title-page headed 
"Arrangement of Sections" and the headlines given here, 
also appear in the Act itself. However, the structure of 
the Act is different, It is divided into three "parts" 
(24a) headed "England and Wales", "Scotland" and ,;General" 
respectively. And though all the miscellaneous provisions 
24a) . In accordance to the different legal systems in which the 
statute applies. 
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are bound into part III, the other two parts contain 
a mixture of legislative( 2 S) procedural (26 ) and substan-
t . 1 1 . . (2?) d . . t t' (28 ) 1ve ega prov1s1ons an prov1s1ons on cons rue 10n . 
However, most of the legislative provisions are set out 
in the different schedules (repeals, amendments). 
Because of this mixture of different types of 
sections, the structure of this Act, apart from the 
frame is not organized as well as the structure of its 
predecessor, it retains some common law features. 
are 
However, though most of the provisions of this Act 
very detailed and complicated( 29 ), there are also 
some provisions on substantive law which embody general 
principles. 
25). Sections : 2(1) and (7), 8,9,10(8) ,11(6) and 14; s.l(8) is a 
curious type of amending provision, substituting certain words 
in two other Acts not otherwise concerned with the area of law 
covered here. 
26). Sections: 1(6), 2(5), 4(2), 5(1) and (3), 6,11(4) and 12(2) (b). 
27). Sections l except (6) and (8) , 2 (2) to (4) 3, except (5) , 4 
except (2), 7, 10 except (8), ll except (4) and (6) and 12 
except (2) (b) • 
28). Sections : 2(6) and (8) and 13. 
29). e.g.S' 4(3) "In relation to an order under section 2(2) (b) above 
committing the care of a minor to a local authority or to an 
order under section 2(3) requring payments to be made to an 
authority to whom the care of a minor is so committed, the 
following provisions of the •.. (1971 Act) .,that is to say ••• 
(8 provisions) shall apply as if the order under section 2(2) 
(b) above were an order under section 9 of that Act giving 
custody of the minor to a person other than one of the parents 
(and the local authority were lawfully given that custody by the 
order) , and any order for payment to the local authority were an 
order under section 9(2) requiring payment to be made to them as 
a person so given that custody"; this sub-section is made 
particularly complicated by numerous references to other Acts 
and sections, a phenomenon widely spread in this Act, as can 
be seen from the following list (which does not contain legis-
lative provisions!) : s .l (6) ,s 2 (2), (4) to (6) and (8), 3 (3) to 
(5), 4(1) (6), 5, 6(1) and (3) 10(5), 7, 10(2) to (5), 11(1) and 
( 4) , 12 ( l) ( 2) (a) and ( 3) • 
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Besides the provisions which embody the "welfare 
of the child" ( 30) and the broad guideline of "exceptional" (3 l) 
or "special"( 32 ) circumstances, there are two provisions 
which introduce a new general principle into the law of 
guardianship, the principle of legal equality between 
father and mother for all purposes. 
This new principle is set out twice in this statute, 
each at the beginning of one of its "parts", namely in 
s.l(l) at the beginning of part I and in s.lO(l) at the 
beginning of part II( 33 ). 
There is an additional novelty in this principle, 
it is set out as applying generally, ie., independent 
of and outside the courts. In the 1925 and the 1971 
Act the sections which set out general principles of 
law, still referred to the courts. 
In addition to this, the following provisions on 
substantive law do not refer to the courts : s 1 (7), s 4 (6) 
s7(1), s 10(6) and (7), .sl2(3) this is a smaller number 
than in the 1971 Act. 
Among the provisions on substantive law which 
refer to the courts, the following do not vest discre-
tion in the courts : s 1 (4), .s 3 (1), {2) first part, s 4 
{1) (34 ), (3) to (5), s 7 {2) ,~ 10(4) ,~ 11{2) and (5) {b). 
30). s 1(3), s-10(3); 'benefit' 1 s 1(2) 1S.l0(2). 
31) . S- 2 (2) (a) and (b) 1 s :1 (1) (a) and (b). 
32). s 2. 4) (b) b 
33). Each of them has toJread together with the prov1s1onss 1(7) and 
s 10(6) respectively which each in their turn exclude the appli-
cation of the general principle to illegitimate children. 
34). Though this provision contains the words "in the opinion of 
the court", it does not give discretion to the court, the 
court has to decide where it thinks the minor lives and then 
act according to this knowledge 
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This shows a considerable increase compared to the 1971 
Act where only 5 of the provisions of substantive law 
do not grant disrection to the courts. (35 ) 
Among the provisions on substantive law which grant 
discretion to the courts, the following only refer to the 
courts indirectly, for example by referring to the order,: 
Sl(5), ;3(3) and (4),sl0(5) first part, andsl2(1). On 
the basis of this, there is a smaller proportion of 
provisionson substantive law which give discretion to 
the court than there is in the 1971 Act. (36 ) (If one 
considers that the 1973 Act partly treats a new area of 
the law, if seen in the line of Acts treated so far, and 
therefore has to determine afresh the jurisdiction of 
the courts, one could even have expected an increase of 
this particular type of section). 
Discretion given to the court is in 20 places, 
with six different terms of discretion. This shows a 
further decline of variety of discretion terms, especially 
as the weak term "may" appears seven times. This is a 
sign for systematic drafting, avoiding any superfluous 
variety of expression. The use of the weak "may" indicates 
a very matter of fact approach to the court's discretion 
and also draws the attention further from the court to the 
substantive law. The court is no longer requested to have 
an "opinion" as to "deem proper", it "may" administer the 
the law. 
35). cf. above, p.l~~, on the basis of one sub-section as one 
provision the 1971 Act contains 31 provisions on substantive 
law, the 1973 Act 33, cf. fnt.27. 
36) • Taking again one sub-section as one provision, there are ll 
provisions which fit into this category in either Act. 
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Viewing the 1973 Act as a whole it can be seen that 
in some respects it has moved further away from the 
traditional common law statute, namely insofar as it con-
tains general principles of law which apply outside the 
courts. In respect of the outer frame, including the 
statemen~ of principle at the head of two of the "parts", 
the Act can be compared with the 1971 Act. However, its 
overall structure is far less clear than in the 1971 Act 
and this shows some common law features. Apart from 
the set frame, provisions of different types mingle freely 
and the provisions also contain a high number of cross-
references to other Acts and other sections which, though 
they may shorten the Act as a whole, obscure their 
meanings, insofar as they present an unsuccessful attempt 
to set out the law systematically. 
h) Construction 
Guidesto the construction of certain words of 
statutes appear either in the statutes themselves or in the 
Interpretation Acts( 37 >. They take normally, either the 
shape of "X shall mean Y" or "X shall include Z". 
In the sample here concerned the first provisions 
on construction appear in the first comparatively compre-
hensive Act, the 1886 Act. The provisions are sections 8 
and 9 of this Act and they both belong to the category 
"X shall mean Y"( 38 ) 
37) . There have been three of them in the English Law: An Act for 
Shortening the Language Used in Acts of Parliament 1850, 13 & 
14 Viet. 1 c. 21. Interpretation Act 1 1889 1 52 & 53 Viet. , c. 63. 
Interpretation Act 1978 1 26 & 27 Eliz.II. 1 c.3o. 
38). s.8 "In the application of this Act to Scotland the word 
guardian shall mean tutor, and the word infant shall mean 
pupil". S.8 "In the construction of this Act the expression 
'the Court' shall mean; •••• " 
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There is also a provision on construction in the 
1891 Act, mamely ~5. This section is of the type "X 
shall include Z" and provides a definition for "parent" 
and "person" as used in this Act. The 1925 Act contains 
two provisions of the type "X shall mean Y'', namely s 8 ( 3) 
and 3(4) insofar as it states "For the purposes of this 
section, "the court" has the same meaning as in the 
Guardianship of Infants Act, 1886, as amended by this Act, 
and ... ", and a rather unusual one, s 11 (2) , "This Act shall 
(except ... )be construed as one with the Guardianship of 
Infants Act, 1886 and ..• ". This provision shows an early 
attempt to cover an area of law as then comprehensively 
as possible by construing two Acts as one. 
The 1971 Act contains two provisions on construction 
sl5(1) " ... The court' for the purpose of this Act means ... " 
and s 20(2) "In this Act 'maintenance' includes education. 
In the 1973 Act there are two provisions of the type 
"X shall mean Y", namely 9 2 ( 8) and s 13, both of them de-
fining local authority and ~ 13 stating in addition what 
"child" shall mean when the Act is applied in Scotland. 
There are also two sections not easily recognised as 
provisions on construction. One of them, s~(6) appears 
particularly obscure, "Where an application under section 
9 of the Guardianship of Minors Act 1971 relates to a minor 
who is illegitimate, references in sub-sections (2) and (4) 
above and in sections 3 and 4 below to the father or mother 
or parent of the minor shall be construed accordingly( ..• )" 
The last provision which possibly refers to construction 
is s 15 (1) (a) and (b). It sets out with which Act the 1973 
Act may be cited together and what a form this situation 
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should take. Comparing this provision with sll(2) of the 
1925 Act which contains similar words, albeit in addition 
to "This Act shall be construed as one with ... ", it seems 
as if sl5(1) of the 1973 Act relies on a construction of 
this Act as one with the 1971 Act in England or with the 
1886 and 1925 Act in Scotland respectively as being 
possible if so required. 
There is also a provision on construction for the 
area of law here concerned in Schedule 1 of The Inter-
pretation Act, 1978, which provides that "parental rights 
and duties", "legal custody" and "any reference to the 
person with whom a child (as so defined) as his horne" are 
to be construed in accordance with the Children Act 1975( 39 ). 
Concluding, it can be stated that devices for con-
struction only arise when statute law appears more fre-
quently in the English legal system. And, though all 
provisions on construction can be seen as devices of the 
draftsman to shorten the language of the statute, (40) 
there seems to be a move from the simple "x shall mean Y" 
to more complicated provisions " ... shall be construed ••. ". 
Provisions which, if they had to be spelt out within the 
other parts of the respective statute would probably 
lengthen the whole statute considerably. 
39). 23 & 24, Eliz.II, c. 72. 
40). cf. Bennion op.cit., p.79. 
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4. Conclusions 
This sub-chapter has shown a gradual shift of the 
statutes in the sample away from the traditional common-
law amendment statute, and in the process acquiring some 
features that would normally be found in codes of a civil 
law system. At the outset of the period concerned the 
statutes are short, casuistic and court-centred with a 
narrow scope and no recognisable structure. By the end 
they show a wide scope, a reasonably clear structure, they 
embody general principles of law and they also state the 
law as it should be outside the courts. However, one 
typical common-law feature often remains; the very 
detailed and specialized sections( 4l). 
It also became clear that there are different degrees 
of clarity in structure and that as in the 1973 Act it 
sometimes falls far short of that degree normally found in 
a code. There are also two features which the English 
statutes acquired on their development away froB the 
traditional common law statute that are not normally found 
(42} 
in codes, the schedules and the provision for construction. 
The provisions of construction would not fit into a civil 
law system as it traditionally relies on liberal methods 
of interpretation( 43 ), they only fit into a legal system 
41). Though by now, of course, sections embodying general principles, 
are added to the statutes. 
42). e.g. the German civil code has no schedule at all and the 
German code of civil procedure has only two schedules, one 
of them contains the limits of income for obtaining legal aid, 
the other the limits of what can be taken of somebody' s income 
when enforcing a payment order, 
43). cf above PP. 3lf 
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where a liberal understanding of parliamentary law is 
prevalent. 
Thus in respect of methods of statutory drafting, 
though the English system has moved towards somewhat 
closer to the civil law systems, it has at the same time 
uniquely developed along its own lines apart from the 
civil law systems. 
c. Judicial Reasoning 
After having looked at the methods of statutory draf-
ting and having seen a change from brief casuistic statutes 
which were meant to amend a flaw in the common law to com-
prehensive statutes with a well organized structure which 
contain general principles, I shall now turn to the methods 
of judicial reasoning to see whether a comparable change 
has taken place here. 
1. Sample 
In order to work out the development of judicial 
reasoning it was necessary to choose a small sample of cases 
to allow for a detailed analysis of each of them. 
To achieve this, I divided the relevant period into 
five sub-periods, each sub-period determined usually by 
two of the major enactments in the area of parental status 
law. These major enactments are the Custody of Infants 
Act 1839, the Guardianship of Infants Act 1886, the Guar-
dianship of Infants Act 1925 and the Guardianship Act 1973( 44 >. 
Compared with the sub-chapter on analysis of statutory 
drafting I have left out the Custody of Infants Act 1873, 
the Custody of Children Act 1891 and the Guardianship of 
Minors Act 1971. <45 ) This was partly because these Acts 
44). 2 & 3 Cit., c .54 (Ta1fourd's Act); 49 & 50 Viet., c.27; 
15 & 16 Geo.v., c.45; 21 & 22 E1iz. II. c.29. 
45). 36 Viet., c.12; 54 Viet., c.3; 19 & 20 E1iz., II, c.27. 
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would have provided for two short sub-periods, but mainly 
because their importance in the overall legal development 
is not equal to that of the other four statutes. The 1971 
Act is only a consolidating statute and its impact on judi-
cial reasoning is likely to be small. The 1873 Act 
besides its provision on separation deeds, only extended 
the scope of the 1839 Act, and the 1891 Act mainly covers 
conflicts between parents and strangers rather than be-
tween mother and father and thus stands outside the main 
strand of legal development. 
Out of each of the five( 4G) sub-periods thus found I 
took two cases providing landmarks in the legal develop-
ment of the time. However, from the period 1925 - 1973 I 
choose three cases. The 1925 Act provides for the father 
and the mother of a legitimate child to be treated equally 
in every court proceedings and to consider the child's 
welfare paramount, but it did not make explicit how a 
mother or father of an illegitimate child were to be 
treated in court and how - outside the narrow compass of 
the 1891 Act ; the parent~ position should be considered 
in disputes with strangers. It is for this reason that I 
selected a case each for the position of the mother of an 
illegitimate child, of the p~t~tive father and of parents 
as against strangers. 
From the period after the 1973 Act I only selected 
one case, as this period is considerably shorter than the 
periods before and as far as I can see, the method of 






judicial reasoning has not changed perceptibly within 
this short period. So I had finally chosen ten cases(4?) 
which I analysed in turn, but were necessary as appropriate 
to clarify and amplify certain sub-developments or ten-
dencies, I gave a short analysis of other cases within 
each sub-period, thereby mainly concentrating on cases 
between father and mother. 
2. Method 
In order to analyse the judicial reasoning, as it 
develops within the chosen sample, I looked at the following 
aspects in every single case : 
( 1) Social Concepts 
Considering the social concepts, I looked at how the 
judges view the position of the members of the family, 
father, mother and children. I also considered whether 
there is an emphasis on individual rights on the one hand, 
or on collective goals on the other hand, and in this 
connection the attitude of the judges to public inter-
ference with (private) family life. Hereby emphasis on 
individual rights - which will in this context mostly 
mean : the father's right - stands for a traditional 
common law attitude; and emphasis on collective goals -
like, in this context, the child's welfare - represents a 
47). Ex parte Warner (1792) 4 Bro. c.c. 101, 29ER 799; R v Green-
hill (1836) 4 Ad. & E.624, 111 ER 922; In re Fynn (1848) 2 De 
G. & Sm.457, 64 ER 205; In re Agar-Ellis, Agar-Ellis v 
Lascelles (1883) 24 Ch.D. 317; R v Gyngall [1893]2 Q.B.D. 232; 
ward v Laverty [1925J A.C. (H.L.JR) 101; Rect£roll [1931] 1 K.B. 317; 
Re C.T. (an Infant) 1 re J.T. (an Infant) [1956]3 AllER 500; 
~ (1970] A.C. 668; Dipper v Dipper [1980] 2 All ER 722 
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more civilian approach. 
(2) Approach to Legal Sourc-es 
The approach to legal sources includes the approach 
to precedent, to statutes and to living legal writers. 
The possible approaches to precedent reach from confirming 
the precedent_to the facts of the case to a 'loose view 
of precedent', which means in its extreme form that the 
judge only applies the language of the precedent without 
( 48 ) 
referring to the facts. A loose view of precedent, 
thus means a departure from the traditional common law 
doctrine. The approach to statutes includes the general 
attitude towards the construction of statutes, whether 
literal or according to the spirit, as well as the atti-
tude towards judicial law-making in connection with statute 
law. Hereby a move towards a civil law system can be 
seen in construction in accordance with the spirit rather 
than the letter of the law and in a positive attitude 
towards judicial law making. 
(3) Reasoning from Rules or Reasoning from 
Principles. 
The question whether a judge is reasoning from rules 
or from principles is closely linked with his approach to 
legal sources but still worth independent consideration. 
48). For both views of precedent see Llewellyn, op.cit., pp.66f. 
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A legal rule can either be applied or not applied, 
but otherwise it leaves no freedom of decision to the 
judge. When two rules contradict each other the judge has 
to declare one of them inapplicable to be able to 
decide a case. A principle is more broadly termed and 
leaves it to the judge how to comply with it in his 
d .. (48a) eClSlOn . When principles seem to contradict each 
other the judge will be able to solve the conflict by 
giving different weight to each of them or by finding 
aspects in each of them which will contradict each other 
eg when there is the principle that the welfare of the 
child is to be the paramount consideration in a custody 
question,and the principle that the state should inter-
fere as little as possible with family life, the judge can 
solve their conflict by stating that the welfare of the 
child is normally ensured by leaving him or her with the 
family and that the court will only interfere when it 
becomes evident that in a particular case it is not for 
the welfare of the child to be with him or her family. The 
judge can also solve the problem by stating that the 
principle of non-interference with family life has to be 
given small weight whenever questions of the child's 
welfare arise. Reasoning from rules stands for a common 
law attitude, whereas reasoning from general principles 
48a). cf. the aspect of "indirect discretion" given to the judge 
by broad principles embodied in legislative provision, above, 
p.l31 
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vrill denote a move towards continental reasoning . 
The three categories of analysis of judicial 
method just explained can be applied to every case. 
The two categories now to follow will be of use only in 
some of the cases. 
4) Philosophical Concepts. 
Under the heading 'philosophical concepts' I pay 
attention as to how far the judges are open to general 
ideas and possibly notions of public policy as a civilian 
judge would be, or in how far they strictly confine them-
selves to the legal issues at stake, and thereby show the 
legal positivism which is thought to be prevalent in 
49 English legal thinking( ) • 
5) Language and Consistency 
In order to determine how stable a legal concept or 
a social attitude is, how deeply rooted it is in the mind 
of the judge who decides a case (and this mostly means 
also in the minds of his colleagues) , it is useful to consi-
der how internally consistent his judgment is. A judge 
who is certain about the law and its underlying social or 
philosophical concepts is likely to write a straight-
forward judgment which is consistent in itself. A judge 
who is uneasy about his decision, either because he feels 
it is socially undesirable, or even objectionable, or 
because he presumes his approach to the law is not in 
line with the legal thinking of his time, can be expected 
to show his uneasiness in his judgment. Either he voices 
it directly or betrays strong feelings otherwise and thereby 
possibly implies that he is uneasy. The latter happens, 
49). Atiyah, Law and Modern Society, pp.lOO ff. 
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for example, when he emphasises that his decision is 
according to the law and at the same time describes the 
behaviour of the litigant, who is about to win his case, 
in an unfavourable way. The judge may also favour a 
certain social concept and still decide against it, 
according to the letter of the law, or he may set out a 
rule of law and may find a way around it by deviously 
inventing an exception, and thereby decide according to a 
social attitude he favours(SQ). This category can not 
help to show whether judicial reasoning in the common 
law has changed over the last century, but it contributed 
to the understanding of judicial attitudes in general and 




a) Cases Before Talfo.urd' s Act - Ex parte Warner -
This is the case of four infants, wards of court. 
The parents lived apart from each other and the father 
a bankrupt with no fixed abode, had been in prison for 
cruel behaviour towards the mother. The children had 
been placed in different schools and were maintained 
there by the mother and her relations, with the exception 
of the youngest who was with the mother. The father had 
50). All these ways of case solution, Paterson, op.cit., calls 
"Court solution" of a conflict of principles. (For him this 
approach is 'adaptive' and he contrasts it with an 'innovative' 
approach on the one hand and 'judicial withdrawal' on the other 
hand). cf. at pp. 
SOo-). l \ 1-q'l) 
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attempted to take the children away from these schools. 
There was a petition to restrain the father from inter-
fering with the children. The petition was granted. 
The argument was that the court had the power to 
interfere in such cases and that the father was a "very 
unfit and improper person to have the care and manage-
ment of his children" .. Two precedents are cited in 
argument, giving the facts of one of them, (Sl). The court 
gives no reasons for its decision. 
In this case there seems to have been no doubt 
about the rights and authorities of the father of common 
law, but equally the judges do not seem to have felt 
qualms in interfering with it,without wasting any words 
on the matter. The main argument of the petition centres 
around the property settled on mother and children,and the 
inability of the father to provide for them. There seems 
to be a practical approach lurking in the background : 
when somebody pays for somebody else's children, and the 
father lets him do so,the person who pays shall have a 
say when matters of custody or upbringing are decided. 
This thought also appears in Ex parte Hopkins, a case 
where three girls were separated from both parents and 
brought up on money bequeathed to them by a rich uncle(S 2 ), 
51). The case of Mr. Orby Hunter, Cruise v Hunter (1790), reported in the 
editor's note to Powel v Cleayer (1789)2 Bra C.C. 500 at 519, 29 ER 
274 at 283"Who was restrained taking his son , a ward of this court 
out of the care of his mother, who had been at the expense of his 
education, the father being abroad, and in embarrassed circumstances" 
52) • (1732)3 P Wms, 152, 24 ER 1009, it should be noted that in this 
case access is granted to both parents on equal terms. 
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and more than a hundred years later in Re Ann Lloyd 
where the judge was of the opinion that the proper 
person to have custody of an illegitimate daughter 
would be the mother's husband (who was not the child's 
father) for the very reason that he was obliged to 
1 (53) provide for her according to the (then) new poor aw . 
The welfare of the children is mentioned in the peti-
tion but not argued to any extent, it seems to be more 
important to decide whether the court has jurisdiction to 
interfere than to go into the merits of the case. The 
approach to precedent seems to be based on the holding of 
. (54) the prev1ous case, rather than on a principle derived 
from the previous case or on particular dicta. As there 
are no grounds for the decision given, there is also 
no reasoning given, but the court has obviously relied on 
a 'rule' (54 a) and not on a principle. 
All in all this case is a typical common-law case. 
It should be noted that the father's authority is taken 
for granted, but there does not seem to be any strict 
doctrine the law is not as fixed on this 
particular 
- R v 
point( 55 ) as it 
- 1)5. ) 
Greenhilll- o... 
is in later cases. 
This is a case of habeas corpus proceedings against 
a mother of three infant girls who had taken the children 
53). (1841) 2 Man&.G 546, 133 ER 1259, as these were, however, habeas 
corpus proceedings and the girl beyond the age of nurture, she 
was left to go where she chose. 
54). cf. fnt. 51 above. 
54a) • cf. above, pp. lSb.f.. 
55). Like in Ex parte Hopkins cf. fnt.52 above; also Eyre v Countess of 
Shaftesbury, (1722) 2 P Wms 103, 24 ER 659, where though the rights 
of the father are not doubted, the position of the mother as a 
guardian of nature and nnture is discussed freely and fairly. 
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away from the father and lived with them with her own family. 
The father had been committing adultery for years with 
another woman but he had never brought the children into 
contact with her. It was held then since this was a case 
of legitimate children under the age to exercise a dis-
cretion, the father had legal custody of them and they were 
to be delivered up to him. 
In this case the father's right is greatly stressed, 
it can only be interfered with when the exercise of it 
would bring danger to the children, eg. if the father were 
cruel or grossly profl~gate At one stage the argu-
ment takes a curious turn in respect of the well-being of 
the children, "But I think that the case ought to be 
decided on more general grounds; because any doubt left 
on the minds of the public as to the right to claim the 
custody of children might lead to dreadful disputes, and 
even endanger the lives of persons at the most helpless 
age"(SG). This quotation is evidence for the weight 
which is given to considerations of certainty of the law. 
Numerous cases are cited in argument, but only one 
appears in the judgment, but the court relies heavily on 
the father's right to his children and the rule that the 
court can only interfere with it on very narrow grounds. 
There is therefore no reasoning on principles. 
At several points of the judgement the judges empha-
size that they are bound by the law, "As unfortunately, the 
56). cf. p.927, Lord Denman, C.J. 
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attempts to reconcile ... have failed, we are bound to 
pronounce our judgment upon the application before us". (S?) 
"It may be that a modified order, if we made it, would be 
obeyed by Mrs .Greenhill; but I do not feel that we should 
be justified in making such an order~(SS) I think we 
have no right (and I do not say that we should have it 
in any case) to make an order about access to the child-
ren ..... <sg) "In this case, as it came before my brother 
Patteson he was bound to decide, in point of law ..... <6o) 
"and here the learned judge, having no doubt of the law 
(and I accede to his view of it), made the order in question 
.. (60) 
This appears somewhat repetitive and not quite con-
sistent - if the question was really so simple to decide, 
why make so many words of it? Though the judges do not 
openly voice any regret as to their decision, it becomes 
clear that they are somehow uneasy about it, which may 
also be inferred from the quotation above, and from this 
it is easy to believe( 6 l) that they were, in part, unhappy 
with the outcome( 62 ). This case was a cry for reform, <63 ) 
which duly ensued two years later. 
As can be seen from its reasoning from rules and 
faithful adherence to precedent this case is a traditional 
} 
common law case, it shows in comparison to older cases,< 64 ) 
57). Lord Denman C.J at p.927 
58). Lord Denman C.J.at p.928. 
59). Littledale J. at p.928. 
60). Williams J, at p.928. 
61). cf. above at fnt. 56. 
62). cf. above Chapter III, p. 
63). At stated in Re Taylor (1840) 11 Sim 178, 59 ER 842. 
64). Ex parte Warner;_Ex parte Hopkins, Eyre v Countess of Shaftesbury 
above fnts, 52, 55. 
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that unfortunately the common law by its rigid adherence 
to precedent had moved into a cul-de-sac and it is apparent 
that if reform proves necessary as it does here, it has to 
come from Parliament. 
- Other cases before the 1839 Act -
If one compares Ex parte Warner with R v Greenhill, 
it becomes apparent that a change in social attitude must 
have taken place in the meantime or at least a shift of 
consciousness in such matters. The turn really comes 
with De Manneville v De Manneville( 6S), where a child, less 
than a year old is left with the father, against whom the 
wife had laid charges if ill-treatment and heresy. The 
court sees itself paying regard to the benefit of the 
child " ..• the petition being presented upon the part of 
an infant, the Court will do what is for the benefit of 
the infant, without regard to the prayer ,"( 66 ) But the 
contents of the 'welfare' concept in those days is also 
made clear, " ... that the law imposed a duty upon parents, 
and in general gives them a credit for ability and 
inclination to execute it". (6?) There is also another 
point emphasized here. The mother had separated herself 
from her husband without obtaining a decree in an Eccle-
siastical Court to justify her to do so thus "living under 
65). (1804) 10 Ves. Jun. 52, 32 ER 762 
66) • at p. 765. 
67). at p.767. 
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circumstances, under which the law will not permit her 
t 1 , II (68) o 1ve . And it is avowedly one of the motives of 
the court not to encourage her to remain in this unlawful 
state by granting custody of the child, "This is an appli-
cation by a married woman, living in a state of actual 
unauthorised separation, to continue, as far as the 
removal of the child will have an influence to continue, 
that separation, which I must say is not permitted by law"( 69 ). 
Here moral censorship creeps into the judgment and influ-
ences the outcome. The position of the husband and father 
is no longer self-evident, (70) it has to be emphasized. 
( 71) There is also a different example'· , where the 
father's legal position is not doubted, but there is 
honest regret on the side of the court that this has to be 
so, "I do not know that I have any authority to interfere. 
I do not know of any one case similiar to this, which would 
authorize my making the ~ct~ sought (~e. access for the 
mother to her 14-year-old daughter), in either alternative. 
If any could be found, I would gladly adopt it, for in a 
moral point of view, I know of no act more harsh and cruel 
than depriving the mother of proper intercourse with her 
child". (emphasis supplied) 
Besides the strict adherence to precedent this 
quotation demonstrates another common law feature : the 
68). at. p. 765. 
69). at p.766. 
70)c£As it was in Ex parte Warner, ~f above, the father's right, 
however, is interfered with in case of gross abuse cf. Wellesley 
v Wellesley (1828) 2 Bli. NS 124, 4 ER 1078, but even here the 
common law right of the father is greatly stressed. 
71). Ball v Ball (1827) 2 Sim.33, 57 ER 703 at 704; The Vice-chan-
cellor then referredto two previous ~imilar cases where he had been 
counsel for the mother and had not been able to achieve some-
thing-for her in either case. This shows the beneficial effect 
of the work at the bar on the later work of the judge, cf.Ati~.h 
for other aspects, Law and Modern Society, pp.ll 
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stern refusal to take into account any extra-legal 
considerations, like philosophical, or as in this case 
moral1 considerations. It becomes clear also from this 
case : the thorough victory of the father's common law 
right in the face of social conditions beginning to 
change< 72 ) - is an uneasy one. 
b) Cases between 1839 and 1886 
('YS<>-) 
- In re Fynn -
This is a case of three children, two boys aged four 
and three years old and a one-year-old girl, whose parents 
separated on account of the father's profligate living. 
The children were in the custody of their mother! helped 
by her mother with their maintenance and upbringing, and 
the grandmother petitioned that a guardian might be 
appointed for them and the father stopped from inter-
fering. Besides several incidents of unkind or cruel 
conduct towards the mother, the father had also neglected 
his sons when in his custody as he was then in straitened 
financial circumstances. The father consented that the 
mother should have the· custody of the girl and daily access 
to the boys. The grandmother had given a personal under-
taking to provide means for maintenance and education for 
all three children. The court held that a personal under-
taking which ended with the life of the grantor was not 
sufficient for the court to interfere on behalf of the 
children. (? 3 ) The petition was dismissed in respect of the 
72) • cf, above1p.53 
73) • This reminds of the "who pays influences custody" -- attitude 
of Ex parte Hopkins andRe Ann Loyd 1cf. above, p. \b11 and foot-
notes, as it becomes clear at p.215 that the court had the 
jurisdiction to interfere even if there was no money, but because 
there was no money here, the Court thought it improper to 
exercise this jurisdiction. 
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parts the father had not consented to the order made. 
In this case the father's right, the mother's right 
and the child's welfare are each treated in turn and given 
their due position: 
"Cases, indeed, in which a father is sought to be 
deprived of the custody of his infant children, or 
to be controlled or checked with respect to the 
guardianship of them, can seldom be otherwise than 
painful". 
"Before this jurisdiction can be called into action ... 
(ie. to interfere with the father's right) •.. it must 
be satisfied, not only that it has the means of acting 
safely and sufficiently, but also that the father has 
so conducted himself ... as to render it not merely 
bet~er for the children, but essential to their safety 
as to their welfare, in some very serious and import-
ant"respect, that his rights should be treated as 
lost or suspended - should be superseded or inter-
fered with. If the word 'essential' is too strong 
an expression, it is not much too strong". 
"What I have said may, however, where there is a mother 
(and especially as to infants under seven years of 
age), be subject to qualification with referenGe 
to her rights (if I may use the expression), created 
by the statute called Mr. Serjeant Talfourd's Act .•. " 
(7 4) 
This clearly favours the father's right above all other 
consideration, but it should be noted that the Vice-Chan-
cellars personal opinion is somewhat different 
" ... were I at liberty, as I am not, to act on the view 
which out of Court I should, as a private person, take 
of course be likely to be most beneficial for the 
infant, I should have no doubt whatever upon the 
question of interfering with the father's power. 
Without any hesitation I should do so-"(75). 
These quotations show the priority given to the father's 
right, the narrow approach to authority and the refusal 
to consider questions of morals in legal argument. 
74). All three quotes from p.212. 
75) • ibid. 
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It becomes clear that as a matter of law the judge 
is extremely reluctant to interfere with the private 
affairs of a citizen, he shows a very individualistic 
outlook on society here. 
In this case, numerous cases are cited in argument. 
The Vice-Chancellor( 7Sa), in his judgment takes the law 
as a whole. 
I 
only referring to three cases when he 
discusses the problem of property to ensure the children's 
upbringing. (76 ) The case does not call for mention o{ 
Talfourd's Act, the court in fact recurs to it : 
"The present petition certainly is not a petition 
under that Act; but I ought not probably to deal 
with the prccedin~without bearing in mind that, 
were the three children or the two boys placed in 
the father's sole custody today, the mother would 
be entitled to present a petition under the statute 
tomorrow, and probably with effect". (77) 
Though the Vice-Chancellor thinks 'he ought to bear in 
mind', there is no sign throughout the judgment that he 
does so. It becomes very clear indeed that he does not 
want the father to have custody of the children,( 7 B) but 
he feels legally incapable of doing anything about it. He 
certainly does not feel tempted to indulge in judicial 
law-making, by mending the gap in the Act which fails to 
cover the case when the mother does already have custody 
of the children. His reasoning, though it seems in part, 
to be open to broader considerations, is clearly based on 
75a). Sir J.L.Knight-Bruce 
76). cf. p.214 it should be noted that for one of the cases he relies 
on a reference taken from a legal text-book, however, this can-
not be considered as a reference to a legal writer, as it is 
the case which is referred to and not any ideas of the author 
of the text book. 
77). p.212. 
78). p.213, commenting unfavourably on the father having escaped 
from a debtor's prison in France, p.214 he finds the modes 
of life the boys are likely to be consigned to, if with this 
father "adverse in the highest degree to culture, to discipline ••• " 
and he deems the father clearly unfit to be a guardian of children. 
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rules, which can also be seen by his strict compliance 
with the separation of the different types of court 
jurisdiction. 
This case represents the traditional type of common 
law reasoning, and it is a striking example for it. In 
spite of his sympathy for the new statute and for the social 
issues at stake, the Vice-Chancellor feels unable to solve 
the case to his personal satisfaction. However, within a 
year the Vice-Chancellor had found a way to avoid another 
decision which though complying with the law would dis-
please him as a man. 
In re Tomlinson(?g), a case of a sickly child of two, 
in the custody of the mother, the Vice-Chancellor, upon 
application by the mother, granted custody to her. He 
found that it was clearly for the welfare of the child, 
being very young and not very strong, to be with the 
mother. (This is, by the way, the first time when the 
well-being of a child is considered expressLy from the 
individual child's side and not from the point of view that 
the father was unfit to look after any children). The 
starting point for the judge's reasoning is the child's 
welfare and not the father's right. He found also that 
he could entertain the application 
at the time of the presentation of 
in the custody of its mother, the 
equity of the Act jurisdiction to 
79) • (1849) 3 D. e G. & Sm. 371 64 ER 520. 
80). at p.521. 
11 although the child was 
the petition and is still, 
court has withl:p the 
interfere". ( Bo) 
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-In Re Agar-Ellis, Agar-Ellis v Lascelles(Bl) -
This is the case of a sixteen year-old girl, daughter 
of separated parents, under the father's custody with only 
supervised access for mother and supervised correspondence 
with her. The deeper reason for litigation in this case 
lies in a long struggle for the religious upbringing of this 
girl and her two sisters, the mother being Catholic, the 
father Church of England. The father had promised 
before the marriage that the daughter should be brought 
up as a Catholic and later he had changed his mind and 
ordered that all three daughters should be brought up as 
Anglicans. The second daughter on whose behalf the present 
petition had been filed, had, upon application to the court 
been allowed to convert to the Catholic faith. The father 
now feared that unsupervised contact with the mother would 
alienate his daughters' feelings from him. The application 
of mother and daughter for unsupervised contact and stay-
ing access was dism~ssed. 
This judgment is full of the 'natural' or 'sacred' 
right of the father~ amd the sacred rights of the family 
life. The mother's right is not mentioned at all and the 
welfare of the child is stated as only to be adhered to in 
extreme cases "It is not in our power to go into the question 
as to what we think is for the benefit of this wat~~) The 
Court can only interfere in cases of gross mis-conduct as 
abdication of paternal rights. This relapse to the view of 
gl) (I&~~) Vt CJ.t.n, ~n-; 
· • See also the case before in this matter, with a similar treat-
ment of the law (1878) 10 Ch.D. 43. 
82). at p.334. 
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the father's right according to the old common law- so 
convincingly declared to be all but abolished by Jessel 
M.R. only 7 years before - is even defended by some lip-
service to the welfare of the child, "it is for the general 
interest of children, and really for the interest of the 
particular infant that the Court should not except in very 
extreme cases, interfere with the discretion of the father, 
but leave to him the responsibility of exercising that 
power which nature has given him by the birth of the child". (83 ) 
The reluctance to interfere is particularly remarkable when 
one considers that the court did not approve of the father's 
conduct, "this is a case in \vhich, if we were not in a 
Court of Law, but in a court of critics capable of being 
moved by feelings of favour or disfavour, we might be 
tempted to comment with more or less severity, upon the way 
in which, so far as we heard the story, the father has 
exercised his parental right."( 84 ) 
Numerous precedents were cited in argll/ment for both 
sides. The court only mentioned a few and more empha-
sized the rules of the common law in general, of none 
of the precedents mentioned, the court gave the facts, but 
only quoted from the words. (85 ) There is one mention 
of the 1873 Act which is singularly hostile, " .•• but it 
is admitted, and it is an undoubted fact, that the young 
83). Ibid., similar statements at pp.336, 337 as to the reluctance 
of the court to interfere with family life. 
84). Bowen L.J. at pp.334 f. 
85). Re Plomley (1882) 47 LTR 283, cited here at pp.328f. in fact a 
case where a father wanted to emigrate with his son and the uncle 
applied to the court to prevent him. another case at p.330, 
Cotton L.J. only quoted to show the difference between habeas 
corpus and custody proceedings, at p.333 he quoted the older 
Agar-Ellis case (cf above, fn 81) to enable himself to disregard 
another precedent which might have stood in the way of the 
judge, StCCI;ton v Stoutton (1857) 8 DeG M.'&.G1 760,44 ER 583 
(Footnote contd. overleaf ••. 
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lady is above the age of sixteen, and that Act, therefore, 
has no bearing at all upon the matter"( 86 ) It should be 
kept in mind that this case is only concerned with a 
petition for unlimited access, and that the 1839 Act 
gave the court full discretion to grant access to chil-
dren up to the age of 21. Though the 1873 Act in fact 
only enables the court to make custody orders of child-
ren under sixteen and repeals the Talfourd's Act, thus 
this limitation may in fact have been unintentional, if 
one considers the overall development. (87 ). 
There is a peculiar feature to this case considering 
the concepts of thought embodied in it. The marked 
reluctance of the court to interfere with the father's 
right shows a streak of individualism, but the recurrent 
reference to the 'sacred' rights of family life comes 
close to something like natural law thinking as being 
above the letter of the law. The suspicion that the 
judges are in fact guided by some extra-legal thoughts 
is buttressed by the fact that they only paid lip-service 
to precedent and did not approach it in the proper common 
law way of using the holding of the case rather than some 
of the dicta. The structure of this case seems the more 
astonishing when one considers that the judges did not 
Footnote85 Contd/ ••. - similar comments can be made on the citation of Ex parte 
Hopkin~ (cf evaluation above, at fnt- 52) at p.336, andRe Curtis 
(1859) 28 r.:r. Ch. 458 of p.337, the latter is the only case 
which might have supported the present decision on its facts. 
86) • cf. p.330 
87) • as described in Chapter III 
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approve of the actual outcome(88 ) and could have achieved 
what they wanted by the proper use of precedent. Because 
of this peculiar mixture this case can not be considered 
as purely rule-based, it has a leavening principle. 
Though in respect of its outcome and its attitude to 
status this case fits into the traditional common law 
approach, the same cannot be stated as to its treatment 
of precedent and its reference to 'sacred rights~ The 
somewhat unusual features of this case can partly be 
explained by the fact that it is a case on religious educa-
tion at a time when there was a high tide of religious 
feelings. The right to direct the child's religious 
upbringing was the most important aspect of the father's 
. ht ( 88a) . r1g . 
Other Cases between 1839 and 1886 -
There are twelve cases on custody or access between 
mother and father in this period, where no special ques-
tions, like religious upbringing or the enforcement of 
separation deeds, are involved( 89 ). In six of these 
cases the custody is granted to the mother. (90) 
88). cf. above, p.\'+L 
88a). cf. the remarks on cases of this type in Chapter III, above,P9.~1 q\,qb. 
89). Ex parte Bartlett (1896) 2 Coll. 661, 63 ER 960, Langston ~ 
Cozens (1847) 10 LTO. S.5o, Ex parte P~brook (1847) 11 JP.86,102, 
Warde v Warde (849) 2 Ph 786,41 ER 1147., Re Halliday's Estate, 
Ex parte Woodward (1852) L.T.O.S. 171. Hyde v Hyde (1859) 23 J.P. 
471, Re Curtis (1859) 28 L.J. Ch. 458, Re Wiscom (1865) 2 H & M. 
540, 71 ER 573.; Ex parte Young (1855) 19 J.P. '777,in.fuL 
Elderton (Infants) (1883) 25 Ch. D. 220, Constable v Constable (1886) 
34 W.R. 649, Re Taylor (an infant) (1876) 4 Ch. D. 157. 
90). Ex parte Bartlett, Hyde v Hyde, R~ Halliday's Estate, Warde v 
Warde, Lo.n~siol'.l... v Cozens, ln re Elderton, Re Taylor. 
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In habeas corpus proceedings the courts, without 
much ado, grant custody to the father, not considering 
the 1839 Act as having an effect on these cases. (9l) 
Ex parte Bartlett shows a change especially against the 
case of De Manneville( 92 ) and also shows a broad and 
open-minded approach to the statute. In this case the 
wife had separated herself from her husband without 
having obtained a decree of separation from bed and board 
in the Ecclesiastical Court and it was not clear whether 
she was in fact to live separate from him. The court 
found that the new statute gave jurisdiction to inter-
fe~and interfered accordingly, if not fully granting the 
petition~ 93 ) Forty years later, however, the courts 
seem to be more reluctant in this respect. In Constable v 
Constable, where the wife had separated herself from her 
husband, the court stated the prima-facie right of the 
father, and stated also that it was not for the wife to 
take the law into her own hands and separate herself from 
her husband taking the child with her. As the wife how-
ever, had also concealed the child's abode from her hus-
band and only left because of petty quarrels, the courts 
disapproval for such behaviour may have been the true 
reason for the decision. Re Halliday's Estate was the 
91). Ex parte Pulbrook, Ex parte Young, the latter is very 'common law' 
relying heavily on De Manneville and Greenhill though these cases 
were the reason for the 1839 Act to liberalise the law of cus-
tody, however this Act was only applicablein~Chancery pro-
ceedings. 
92). cf. above at fnt. 65. 
93). The mother had appliaJ for custody of two children under seven(a 
boy and a girl) and access to the other four children of the 
marriage. She was granted all but custody of the small boy. 
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first case to lay down a broad rule-or even as much as a narrow 
principle - how the court has to exercise its discretion 
under the 1839 Act, namely that the father's right had 
since then been qualified by his marital duties and the 
child s welfare. It should be noted that the welfare 
principle as inherent in the 1839 Act is deduced from the 
age-limit of 7 years, stating that the only reason for 
inserting this age-limit was that generally children under 
7 were better off in the custody of their mothers. 
Re Ta&lor followed in this line, "But the Act took 
away that right of the father in the most express terms ... 
which was formerly the absolute right of the father became, 
and is now, subject to the discretionary power of the judge, (94 ) 
as did re Elderton. However, the latter case though very 
distinctly pointing out the mother's right, put greater 
emphasis on the father's right than the former, "I ought to 
give effect to the paternal right unless there has been 
so grave a breach of marital duty."( 9S) 
Re Curtis is very much a 'common law' case.probably 
with a leavening of Victorian morals. In this case 
the parents were separated on the grounds of the husband's 
cruelty. Though the Divorce Court had by an interim 
order, granted custody of three children to the mother who 
had been with her 7 years, it was now granted to the father, 
94). Jessel M.R. at p.l59. 
95) • Pearson, J. at 222 Re Elderton (1885) 25 C.L.D. 220 11 I ought 
to give effect to the paternal right unless there has been so 
grave a breach of marital duty ... 11 
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the court dwelling at length on the father's right and 
the wife's duty to obey and to submit to her husband. 
But Victorian morals had another side to them. In Hyde v 
Hyde where there was a judicial separation on the grounds 
of the father's adultery it was held to be unjust that the 
adulterous father should have custody of a 13 year old 
b (96) oy. The case most sympathetic to the 1839 Act, and 
also interesting as to broad constriction of a statute, 
is probably Warde v Warde, In this case there were 4 
children; 2 under 7, a girl of 11 and a boy of 9. The 
Lord Chancellor found that the daughter was in danger of 
being 'contaminated' by the profligate father. He also 
stated that he had 'absol~te discretion'in respect of the 
youngest children. He then found that it would not be 
for the welfare of the 9 year old boy to be separated 
from his siblings. (97 ) He also hinted that even without 
the Act he might have been inclined to give the younger 
children to the mother, "I think that it is the true 
construction of the Act, but, whether it be so or not, 
the principle to which I have adverted with respect to 
the second child would apply equally to the other two, and, 
as I am obliged to remove one, I must remove all". (98 ) 
He discussed the 1839 Act at length and considered the 
motives of Parliament and stated "that was the object 
96). An order under the Divorce Act 1857, cf. above, Chapter II, p.6t1 Hyde v Hyde and Re Curtis are particularly difficult to 
reconcile with each other, for custodyforthe adulterous 
wife, see above, Chapter III, pp.8S~. . 
97). This aspect of the welfare concept appears for the first time. 
It also shows more concern for the child itself and does not 
view the situation merely from the point of the father's conduct. 
98). at p.llSO 
177 
with which the Act was introduced, and that is the con-
struction to be put upon it", (99 ) and he did not use the 
intention of Parliament to narrow down the statute's scope, 
"this is not .... , a question merely as to the general 
jurisdiction of this Court to interfere with the legal 
rights of the father; but that I have now an absolute 
authority over the children under seven years of age, and 
a larger power than the Court then had,with regard to 
children above that age". (lOO) 
It can be stated that there was considerable enthusi-
asm among the judiciary immediately after the passing of 
the 1839 Act, not only in respect of a liberal interpre~ 
tation of the statute but also in respect of readiness to 
interfere with the father's right, whereas towards the 
close of this sub-period the father's right was a fairly 
strong concept again. The impact of legislation was 
seen as being(lOl) small, if compared with the approach 
at the beginning of the period. All in all, when the 1886 
Act was passed, the judicial reasoning was still based on 
rules, careful with statutes,and in favour of individual 
rights rather than policy considerations.I~ spite of a 
different approach forty years earlier this typical common 
law reasoning was prevalent at that time. 
99 ) • at p.ll48. 
100) • ibid. 
101). cf. especially Re Agar-Ellis. 
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c) Cases between 1886 and 1925 
(_iOl..t.~) 
Reg v Gyngall -
This is the case of a 15-year old girl, daughter of 
a poor widow who is guardian under the 1886 Act. The 
mother, a Catholic, had placed the girl in the charge of 
different people. Eventually she came to stay in a 
Protestant convalescent home which was kept by the 
defendant. The girl had on her own account changed her 
denomination and she was learning to be a pupil teacher 
and would soon be able to earn her own living. The mother 
instituted habeas corpus proceedings, but the girl was 
left to go with the defendant; an appeal by the mother this 
decision was upheld. 
In this case the parental right still holds a strong 
position though distinctly, if only carefully, qualified by 
considerations of the child's welfare","the Court must 
exercise this jurisdiction (i.e. to interfere with a 
parent's custody) with great care, and can only act when 
it is shown that either the conduct of the parent, or the 
description of the person he is
1
or the position in which 
he is placed, is such as to render it not merely better, 
but •.. clearly right for the welfare of the child in some 
very serious and important respect that the parent's 
right should be suspended or superseded"(l02 ) 
102). Lord Esher M.R. at p.242. 
IOl"-)· [\&931 l o.."B.·D. 2..~1. 
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The welfare of the child is understood in a broad sense, 
. . . l d th h. ld' h . ( 103 ) 1t 1s seen to 1nc u e e c 1 s app1ness , "Again, 
the term 'welfare' in this connection must be read in 
its largest possible sense, that is to say, as meaning 
that every circumstance must be taken into consideration". (l04 ) 
The approach to precedent in this case varies according 
to a certain pattern. The old equity cases are treated 
faithfully, (l05 ) mostly stating the facts as well as 
quoting the language. Also Re McGrath(lOG), though a case 
of orphans where there was a dispute between the paternal 
relatives and the guardian appointed by the mother, is 
quoted in accordance with its general tendency, namely 
with emphasis on the welfare of the child. However, Re 
Agar-Ellis is only quoted on aspects of jurisdiction in 
habeas corpus proceedings(l07 ) and otherwise not discussed 
at all, though habeas corpus proceedings were of no signi-
ficance in the second Agar-Ellis case. The 1886 Act is of 
no importance in this case, as the mother's position as 
statutory guardian is clear. The case contains, however, 
a careful and fair evaluation of the impact of s 25 ss .10 
of the 1873 Judicature Act on habeas corpus proceedings, 
stating and applying the principle that since the passing 
of that statute in questions of custody and education the 
rules of equity are to prevail(l08 ). 
103). Lord Esher M.R. at p.242. 
104). atp.249. 
105). at pp,247, 249. 
106). [1891] 1 Ch.D. 143. 
107) • at p. 250~ 
108). at p.248, 
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In its approach to precedent the court is mainly 
still reasoning from rules. The interpretation of the 
statute is the only possible one, according to the words 
of the statute, so that it leaves no room to judge 
whether this stands for rule-based or principle-based 
reasoning. The court's attitude towards the parent's 
right and its reluctance to interfere(log) also shows 
an adherence to narrow legal rules, but the under-
standing of the child's welfare in "its largest possible 
sense" and dependant on "every circumstance" shows clearly 
a reasoning from principles. 
In conclusion this case still shows most of the 
typical common-law characteristics, but there is a clear 
inroad into the traditional form of reasoning. 
( 10qo.) 
-Ward v Laverty -
This is the case of three orphan girls of Catholic 
parents. Before the marriage the mother had been Pro-
testant. When the father had ceased to provide for his 
family, the mother had gone back to her parents. When 
the father had died he had left a will to the purpose that 
his daughters were to be brought up Catholic. After that 
the mother had became Protestant again and educated her 
children accordingly. When she had died the girls stayed 
with her parents. The eldest girl, then eleven years of 
age had formed distinctive Protestant convictions. The 
paternal aunt applied for custody with the expressed 
intention of ensuring a Catholic education for the girls. 
The petition was dismissed. 
109). cf. p.242 
(09~). C 1q:ts] A.C. (l·LL· l.~.) \0\. 
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The court still took the father's right into account, 
however, only to state that the father in this case had 
abandoned his right(llO). The father's wishes were men-
tioned, but they were only to prevail, "if there is no 
other matter to be taken into account". (lll) There was 
no doubt for the case of the importance of the welfare, 
"it is the welfare of the children, which, according to 
rules which are now well accepted, form the paramount 
consideration in these cases". (ll2 ) The welfare is 
influenced:~y fixed religious views,(llJ) by affections 
forrned(ll 4 ), by the notion that siblings should stay 
together(llS). 
Precedent is treated sweepingly, the court only 
refers to two cases, though these are both cases which 
also from their general tendency not only from single 
quotations support the present case. (llG) As to other 
precedents, the court only states that "the law in these 
110). cf. p.llO, 25 years later a final word is spoken in these 
matters. In re Collins (an infant) [1950] 1 Ch.D.498,that as 
the common law right had been abolished by the 1925 Act, it 
could not be revived after the father's death and prevail 
upon the religious upbringing. 
111) • at p.l08. 
112) • ibid. 
113) • p.l09. 
114). ibid. 
115) • p.111. 
116) .stourton v Stourton ( 185 7) 8 DeG. M .& G. 760, 44 ER 5 83 , where a convert 
P~testant mother is appointed sole.guardian of a 9 year old boy 
against the application of paternal relatives; andRe McGrath [1891] 
1 Ch.D.l43,a case where orphans were left to be educated by a guardian 
appointed by a convert Protestant mother, in both cases, the father 
had died before the mother's conversion and had left no distinct 
directions as to his children's religious education. 
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cases is well settled". (ll?) There is also a plea for 
an adaptive interpretation of precedent, "Some of the 
earlier judgments contain sentences in which perhaps greater 
stress is laid upon the father's wishes than would be 
placed upon them now ... " (ll 8 ) The 1886 Act is viewed 
sympathetically, "Since the passing of the Guardianship 
of Infants Act, 1886, s.5 of which Act shows the modern 
feeling in these matters, the greater stress is laid upon 
the welfare and happiness of the children". (ll 9 ) 
This latter quote refers to the 'modern feeling' 
apparently meaning the approach of s0ciety to the question 
of custody of children 1and therefore lies stress on a 
collective rather than an individual viewpoint in this 
matter. 
Considering the approach to precedent one can say 
that the reasoning in this case is mainly principle-
based. There are, however, remnants of rule-based reasoning. 
For example the welfare is considered for every aspect in 
turn making several rules out of one principle and only 
once there is a statement as to the "whole facts of the 
l•l..C>a.) 
case". (l20) In this respect Gyngall sh6wed more principle 
in its reasoning with its broadest possible understanding 
of the welfare concept. 
In comparison with Gyngall, however, this case has moved 
117) • p • lOB • 
118) • ibid. 
119) • ibid 
120) • ibid. 
12-0o} [\891) 1 O...'R 'D · 1.~1.. 
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further away from the traditional common law approach as 
can be seen in the 1 modern feeling
1 
shown in the Act, the 
welfare as a paramount consideration, the slight treat-
ment of the father's right, the generous treatment of prece-
dent in general, especially in connection with decisions 
on the new Act, which are not cited but broadly summarized. 
- Other Cases Between 1886 and 1925 ~ 
As for decisions settling disputes between parents, 
there are first of all four cases which deal with the still 
surviving "adultery bar"(l 2 l) illustrating a development 
which has already been treated elsewhere. 
In Re S.Witten( 122 ) the court is obviously guided 
by notions of material justice rather than by welfare 
considerations, when it gives the custody of a ten year 
old to the mother. The other cases dealing with disputes 
among parents seem to be somewhat more enlightened. 
Especially Smart v Smart, (123 ) though a Privy Council 
case on a Canadian appeal and therefore no binding author-
ity for the English lawyer , provides some interesting 
notions on the legislative and on the adaption of old 
law to modern times. The court mentioned that it had 
been a "tendency of legislative action and of judicial 
decision, as well as of general opinion ••• to give to 
121). Manders v Manders (1981) 63 L.T.R 627, Handley v Handley [1891] 
P.l24, Stark v StarkJHitchin cl910Jl:'>.l90, B v B Cl924J:P,.l76, other-
wise see treat:m:mt of this phenarenon above, Chap.III at pp.!H.f' 1 
Re Grace Steel (an Infant), Steel v Steel (1889)Sol.J. 659 also 
belongs into this category, here roth parents are guilty, though 
the rrother seems to be IIDre to blame, the court emphasizes the 
father's right, admitting only a modifying jurisdiction to inter-
fere with it. 
122), (1887) 57 L,T.R •• 336 
123). [1892] A.C. 425. 
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married women a higher status both as regards property 
and person"( 124 ). The children's welfare was viewed 
broadly, dependent on circumstances and its standards 
"can hardly be fixed for one age by the standard of 
another"( 125 ). There is also reference to the welfare 
of families. (126 ) It is worth noting that in this con-
text the court refers to the "sense of the community" 
which was "so satisfied of the benefit of the change, 
and also of its insufficiency that in 1873 the limit of 
seven years was raised to sixteen". (127) This is the 
first time that society as a whole is so openly referred 
to, and it goes hand in hand with the reference to public 
opinion. <128 ) It represents the notion of public control 
over private affairs and thus furthering collective 
goals rather than individual rights. 
ReA & B( 129 ) puts considerable emphasis 
mother's right( 130), stating that to enhance 




feeling for the mother leads to custody being awarded to 
year 
each parent for six months of theAthus considered to be 
"clearly for the benefit of the infants"( 132 ). (This latter 
assertion - it is respectfully submitted here - is open to 
some doubt). There is also with regard to the mother's 
124). at p.432. 
125) • ibid. 
126). pp.432,434, 
127). p.435. 
128). cf. above quotation at fnt. 124, and p.436. 
129). (infants ) [1897J 1 Ch. D. 786, a case with marital misconduct 
on both sides. 
130). pp.790,792 f. 
131) . p. 791 
132). p. 796. 
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right a very open-minded understanding of the 1886 Act, 
't h · " t 11 lt d the law". (1331 l was seen as avlng rna eria y a ere 
However, approach to legal sources changes with the social 
issues at stake. As in questions of custody for an adul-
terous mother, also in questions of religion the right of 
I 
the father is seen to be less affected by legislation. In 
Re Scanlan( 1341 two Protestant guardians we~ appointed 
alongside a Catholic widow, of a Protestant husband, mother 
of three girls, to ensure the religious upbringing in 
accordance with the father's wishes. The 1886 Act was 
seen to have had no impact on this question, " ..• nor can I 
suppose that in a matter of so much difficulty and deli-
cacy, the legislature intended to abolish a well-estab-
lished rule by a side-wind."( 135 ) In the case of an ille-
gitimate girl the court solved a dispute over religious 
upbringing by taking the 12-year-old infant out of the 
care of foster parents who had looked after her for ten 
years
1
and delivering it to her mother who intended to place 
her into an institution. (136 ) Only in ReX, X v Y, (l 37.) 
where the correct religious upbringing was not directly 
jeopardized 1 as the mother, a widow, had only married a 
man of a different denomination and not converted herself, 
could a court concede, "the Guardianship of Infants Act, 
133) . p. 791. 
134). (infants) (1880) 40 C.h.D. 200. 
135). at. p.214. 
136). R v New (1904) 20 T.L.R. 583. 
137). [1899] Ch.D. 526. 
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revolutionized the law and gave to a mother surviving 
her husband rights which were entirely new. Her legal 
position before the Act was ... most unfortunate, cruel and 
unjust. This state of things was brought to the attention 
of leg{slature. They saw that it should be altered, and 
... accordingly.~~ 138 ). And the court does not revive old 
common law, because the statute is silent to the point 
of what happens when a widowed mother remarries, " .. this 
is a statutory right which is not to be taken away from 
the mother without good cause". "That is the interpreta-
tion of the statute put shortly. It says nothing about 
the mother marrying again".( 139 ) The court in this case 
also reasons from principles 
"I do not think it (i.e. application of the old rules) 
is in accordance with the true construction of the 
Act. I think that wherever the Court is called upon 
to exercise the judicial discret~0n which is given 
to it by this Act, it must go upon the special 
circumstances of the case and not upon the general 
rule formerly existing ... " (140) 
Concluding one can say that during this sub-period 
the welfare concept was being truly established in cases 
on disputes between mother and father, (except in cases 
of the mother's adultery where this is only achieved at 
the very end of the period) • These same cases mostly show 
an open-minded approach to statute and reasoning from 
principle. When other issues are at stake like the mother's 
adultery as a breach of Victorian moral standards, the 
religious education and disputes after the father has 
died or when the mother of an illegitimate child is 
138). Lindley, MR., at p.530. 
139). at pp.533 f. 
140). p.534. 
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involved, the emphasis of the paternal, and in the latter 
case, the parental right is considerable,and this often 
goes hand in hand with reasoning from rules rather than 
from principles and a narrow approach to statutes. In 
all these areas traditional common law reasoning is still 
prevalent, whereas in the narrow area of disputes between 
two living parents a style of reasoning has developed 
which already resembles that of a civil law system. 
d). Cases Between 1925 and 1973 
(140~ 
- Re Carroll-
This is the case of a two year old girl, born to an 
unmarried woman. The mother was a Catholic, she arranged 
for adoption of the child via an institution which later 
turned out to be a Protestant organization only mediating 
adoptions by Protestant couples. The child was placed 
with prospective adopters. After the mother had learned 
that the institution was a Protestant institution, and 
under the influence of her spiritual adviseT,the mother 
became anxious that her child should be brought up accor-
ding to her own faith. She applied for the child being 
delivered up to her with a plan in view according to 
which the child would be placed with a Catholic home 
without being adopted. 
The parental right in general,and the special right 
of a parent to have his or her child brought up in his or 
her own religion was greatly emphasized in this case, (l4l) 
i'f()o.). L jq'li'J I 1'. · 'B>. ?.11-. 
141). pp.333,335,353-355, 357. 
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the mother has a natural right to its religious education 
and custody which will be regarded by the Court. (142 ) 
And as the mother in this case did not want custody her-
self, the court found another way to help her, : 
"though custody in the strict sense is not claimed by 
the mother, accessibility - a kind of constructive 
custody - is claimed here. There is no re~son to 
suppose that if the child remains with the adopters 
the mother will regain custody in this limited sense. 
Although the child may not find adopters through 
the Catholic society, the very fact that the Adop-
tion Act will not be used will preserve the legal 
right of the mother over her child wherever that 
child may be, and the evidence is that the Catholic 
society will allow the mother reasonable access to 
her child". ( 143) 
This concern for the mother's right led to a V"t-e~L~q~'---+ 
treatment of the child's welfare, going as far as claim-
ing that an institutional upbringing would r ehhance the 
independence of a child, "I may add that it is not 
universally accepted that a 'home' with no external educa-
tion is the best thing for a child. Many home-brought-up 
children are spoilt and deprived of independent initia-
tive ... "(144) The old thought that it must be essential 
for the welfare of the child that the parental right 
should be interfered with in order to give the court juris-
diction to do so was also revived in this case. (l 4S) 
Accordingly the court emphasizes that interference is to 
be conducted with great care and reluctance, "and the court 
142) • p. 356. 
143). at p.357. 
144). at p.332. 
145). at p.350. 
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will in my opinion be undertaking a dangerous and 
impossible task if it substitutes its own wishes and 
responsibility for the wishes and responsibility of the 
parent in the matter of religion". (146 ) The court, 
however, was not unanimous on this point. There is a 
strong and determined dissent by Greer L .J .who considered 
upbringing in a family the best for a child. (147 ) and 
commented on the right to determine the religious up-
bringing as follows, " But in my judgment it is not a 
separate and distinct right, but only one of the rights 
which are included in the parental rights of the parent 
who is the guardian, and has the custody of, his or her 
children."( 148 ) 
There is an interesting approach to sources in this 
case, The approach to precedent is different in each of 
the three judgments. Scrutton L.J. evaluated favourable 
precedent mostly on the facts and also quoted the language. (149 ) 
He only mentioned one unfavourable precedent, Gyngall, 
and there he confined himself meticulously to a few words 
quoted from the judgment. (l 50) One of the cases he used 
to help him determine how far the mother was sincere in her 
desire to have the child removed from her present situa-
t . (151) 1on 
146) • p. 337. 
147). p.346. 
148). p.347. 
(this, to me is a question of fact, not of law). 
149). R v New (1904) 20 T.L.R.5831 cf. above at fnt.l36 1 at p.332; 
Agar-Ellis at p.334. 
150). p.336. 
151). at p.33l. 
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This approach can all in all considered to be according to 
the tradition of common law reasoning . This goes hand 
in hand with a narrow approach to statute. For the 
judge stated that the 1886 Act was passed to improve the 
position of the mother, (152 ) then he viewed the 1925 Act 
as extending this principle further, which led him in 
due course to confine the scope of the 1925 Act , to 
disputes between mother and father( 153 ) - against the 
express words of sl of this statute which orders the 
welfare of the child to prevail in all proceedinqs on 
custody. 
Greer ~ in his turn treated Gyngall faithfully( 154 ). 
He carefully distinguished R v New andRe O'Hara( 155 ). 
Most boldly, in respect of Barnardo v McHugh( 156 ) he 
reg@rded "detrimental to the interest of the child" to 
adhere to the mother's wishes,as being equal to "advanta-
geous to the interest of the child" not to adhere to the 
mother's wishes. But the remarkable thing is that he 
actually quoted the precedent and then stated what he 
thought the words meant. Green L~'s approach to prece-
adherence 
dent also shows A to common law reasoning. He is, 
however, much more open in his argument, tackling unfav-
curable precedent rather than evading it. However, he 
152) • p. 335 
153). p.337. 
154) • pp. 343£. 
155). p.344, Re O'Hara [1900] 2 I.R. 233 is a case where a mother had 
placed her legitimate daughter with strangers when she could 
not maintain her, when she had a proper living again her-
self she desired the child back to bring her up herself. 
156). [1891] A.C.388, cited at p.345. 
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shows a broad minded understanding of statute, " .•. that 
actually the attitude of public opinion and the Courts 
towards the powers of a parent over his children had 
become modified, and that nowadays less importance was 
attached to the right of, and the wishes of, the parent, 
and more importance was attached to the welfare of the 
child, and the Act of 1925 was pointed to an illustra-
tl·on f th d'f' t' " (l57) o e mo 1 1ca 1on ...•. 
Slesser LJ. was decidedly hostile to any broad under-
standing of the 1925 Act. He set out the "whole legal 
history of parental rights" as being "not only justified 
but necessary" to determine the matters at stake, 
especially "having regard to the view ••. that recent legis-
lation has included the old principles of law which used 
to determine these matters". (l5 B) In his eyes, "neither 
of the statutes cited by the learned judge has modified 
the considerations of immemorial right of parents by nature 
and nurture which we have here to regard". (159 ) He used 
the preamble of the 1925 Act, which referred to the object 
of the Act as establishing equality between mother and 
father, to confine the scope of the Act - against the 
words of s.l -to disputes between parents( 160). Slesser 
LJ. cited abundant precedents( 161 ), but mostly he only 
157). at p.348. 
158). p.349. 
159). p.363 
160) . ibid. 
161). especially pp.353-356. 
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just cited the cases and in other instances he quoted 
from the language 1without referring to the facts (which 
might have defeated his object!), only in two places in 
his 16 pages long judgment did he set out the facts of the 
cases (162 ). By this t-ncde c\r-tc..scv .. i"'j the judge is not 
particularly faithful to precedent, but he shields his 
sweeping approach to case authorities under abundant 
citations. In order to further his view on the natural 
right of the parent he even invoked the help of the 
Canon Law and St. Thomas Aquinas and referred to the doc-
trine of natural justice. (163 ) He thereby reveals a 
reasoning which, though it derives social concepts from 
the old common law, is really based on extra-legal con-
siderations and principles and therefore not a common 
law reasoning at all. In contrast to this, Greer L.J. 
had relied on modern social concepts embedded in common 
law reasoning. The immense'effort employed by Slesser L.J. 
to achieve the result desired may be evidence that his 
social attitude was no longer in accordance with the 
spirit of the time and he had to employ a method of 
reasoning quite outside the common law and possibly ahead 
of his time to achieve this. 
Concluding one can say that this is a case full of 
162). p.351, as to Reg v Nash (1883) 10 Q.B.D.454 where an illegi-
timate child, on application of the mother was delivered out 
of the custody of foster parents to the mother's sister; pp. 
350, 352 Barnado v McHugh, a case very similar to the present 
case [1891] A.C.388. 
163). p.354. 
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tensions between traditional and progressive attitudes to 
social issues and questions of method and it may be only 
by the coincidence of a particular combination of the 
contrasting elements that the case came to a result which 
was considered unfavourably and out of time forty years 
later, "But in 193l ... the Court of Appeal, Scrutton and 
Slesser L.~ ... attempted to put back the clock forty 
years"( 164 ) or to put it even more strongly: ironically 
it was the general change in the method of judicial 
reasoning which was well on the way at least since the 
beginning of the century( 165 ) that enabled Slesser L.J. 
to adhere to an outmoded social concept. 
(!_I. )a,) 
R~ C.T., re J.T. -
This is the case of two illegitimate children whose 
putative father applied for custody under the Acts of 
1886 and 1925. The application was dismissed on a point 
of law though the judge expressedly stated he would also 
have dismissed it on the merits of the case. The judge 
found he had no jurisdiction under the Acts to award 
custody to a putative father. (l 66 ) 
The judge takes pains to set out law. Though there 
was the case of Re M( 167 ) where Denning L.J. had stated 
plainly, "In my opinion the word 'parent' in an Act of 
164). Lord Upjohn in J v Cat p.725, cf. below. 
165). cf. above, p. lgb 
166) 0 p. 502. 
167). (an infant) [1955] 2 AllER 911. 
f(p ta). Cl'tS"bJ .3 free ER 500. 
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Parliament does not include the father of an illegi-
timate child, unless the context otherwise requires, 11 (168) 
Roxburgh L.J. in the present case carefully reconsidered 
the whole law on this point. He set out numerous legis-
lative provisions( 169 ) and quoted several passages from 
Halsbury's Laws of England (l 70) and finally amplified 
what he had set out by references to cases. Thereby he 
mostly only quoted from the language of the cases with-
out referring to the facts, however, where he did so, he 
openly acknowledged that he only took the words, possibly 
out of context to throw some light on the question at 
hand, "although I am conscious that I am quoting from a 
minority speech, I adopt this reasoning in a quite dif-
ferent context". (l7 l) The judge was faithful in his 
approach to the statutory provisions when he concluded 
that the various provisions on the parents never meant to 
include the putative father When enacted. He obviously 
refused, however, to adopt the words of the statute to 
modern times by extending the scope of their words. 
Though viewing the statutes systematically and in their 
context, he confined himself to doing just this and not 
embarking on tasks that are for Parliament to fulfil," and 
it is, of course, trite knowledge that such alterations 
cannot be made by judicial decision, and that they are 
solely within the province of Parliament". (l? 2 ) · 
168) • at 912 .. 
169). p.So~ s 2 and s 3 of the 1886 Act, s 1 of the 1925 Act p.5061 
.s 3 (1) + (2) of the 1925 Act; p.S08, S 1 and S 5 of the 1925 Act; 
170). at pp.504, 5o6, 507. 
171). p.508, 
172). at p.512. 
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All in all this case though there is no residual 
hostility to statutes and an acknowledged'loose view' of 
precedent, it is well within the common law tradition of a 
strict separation of powers. Therefore it contains both 
characteristics of civil law as well as common law judi-
cial method. 
( IJ.,lo-.) 
- J v c -
This is the case of a nearly 11-year-old boy of 
Spanish parents, born in England. The parents had left 
him with an English family shortly after his birth as they 
were themselves incapable of looking after him. 
Wh:en he was two years old he returned with his 
parents to S~ain for 17 months, but they lived in such 
poor conditions that bis health suffered and he was brought 
back to the foster parents. They undertook ( though Pro-
testant themselves ) to educate him in the Catholic faith 
in knowledge and recognition of his parents and knowledge 
of the Spanish language. In 1967 the foster-parents 
applied for the boy to be brought up in the faith of the 
Church of England for educational reasons, and subse-
quently the parents applied for custody. The parents 
had in the meantime acquired a proper home and the father 
was in good employment. However, the boy had not seen 
much of his parents and was well integrated into the foster-
family. There was also evidence that the chances of sue-
cessful adjustment in Spain were slight,and were diminished 
by the impatient temperament of the boy's father who was 
not likely to understand the difficulties his son would 
have finding his way into completely new surroundings. 
There was, however, not the slightest reputation of misconduct 
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on the natural parents. 
The judgment is long and very thorough, Most of it 
deals with the legal history since Re Fynn and there is 
also some evaluation of the 1925 Act. The court does not 
have the slightest doubt that the child's welfare is now 
the paramount consideration to guide the court and it 
strives to demonstrate that this consideration is now 
also applied to disputes between parents and strangers. 
The parental right is only treated in passing as a 
historical phenomenon, "it is argued that united parents 
are prima facie entitled to the custody of their infant 
children.~, and that in the case of what has been des-
cribed as an unimpeachable parent the court must, unless 
in the very exceptional case, give the care and control 
to the parents. This argument for the appellants nec-
essitates a review of the authorities since 1848 when in 
Re Fynn was decided". (l? 3 ) • The wishes of the parent can 
only be considered in so far as they can contribute to 
the child's well being. 
The judgments of the court assess all the more 
important authorities on custody law, thereby demonstrating 
that the law and the general attitude to questions in this 
field has changed over the decades. The Law Lords in this 
case also do not refrain from severe or favourable critique 
where they find it appropriate, "at the turn of the century 
173). at p.694 
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(174) 
a more enlightened view appears to have been taken" , 
..u"t.L "Re Carroll. .. which I have found a difficult case ... r: (l 7 S) 
I 
''I consider the case was wrongly decided .•. the observations 
went far beyond what was necessary for the decision and 
they are, in my view not well founded''. (176 ) " .. in 1883 
we find the case which I can only describe as dreadful, 
of In re Agar-Ellis .•. where the Court of Appeal permitted 
a monstrously unreasonable father to impose upon his 
daughter of 17 much unnecessary hardship in the name of 
his religious faith". (177 ) The approach to precedent can 
be summed up by a quote from Lord MacDermott : 
" ... the course of both authority and legislation 
during the 120 years which have elapsed since Fynn's 
case shows a change in the law, and the question is, 
how far that change has gone. The authorities are 
not consistent, and the way along which they have 
moved towards a broader discretion, under the impact 
of changing social conditions and the weight ofopinion(!) 
has many twists and turns. In these circumstances no 
useful purpose would be served by an exhaustive 
citation. A few examples will suffice to indicate 
the trend which, it may be observed, was probably 
fashioned to a considerable degree by unreported 
cases heard mostly in chambers." (178). 
Though he speaks of authorities, the judge only views 
them as putting a gloss on the law of today. Obviously, 
when the authorities have twists and turns they are at 






The approach to statute is broad. Unanimously the 
p.695, referring to Re O'Hara cf. above fnt. 175. 
p.698 
p.699,cf.a1so p.725 quoted above at fnt.164. 
at p. 721. 
p. 703. 
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Law Lords in this case find that the 1925 Act applies to 
conflicts between mother and father as well as to conflicts 
between strangers and parent, (l? 9)even between strangers 
and strangers. (l 80) Thereby the judges rely on the words of 
the Act itself, and although invited to do so by counsel 
for the parents they refuse to take the preamble into 
account to narrow down the scope of the Act to disputes 
between parents(lSl) which the court had done in Re Carroll. 
Considering that the Legislature in 1925 probably mainly 
intended to put mother and father on the same footing, 
as the Act had been canvassed for by the women's move-
ments(182), this construction though relying on the words 
of the statute is also "adaptive" in that it transfers the 
Act into the present time. The judges consider the cases 
after the Act, but not wholly as authorities. Two of them 
rather state what the law is according to the statute and 
then view the authorities for confirmation of their views1 (
183 ) 
thereby getting rid of cumbersome cases like Re Carroll, 
"this view of the law is confirmed by the cases, apart from 
one exception, which followed the passing of the 1925 Act."( 184 ) 
Their Lordships disagree partly on the extent to which the 
statute had changed the law. Especially Lord Guest shows 
a marked belief in the strength of common law development, 
179). pp.697, 710f, 727, 715. 
180). p.715. 
181). pp.698,710. 
182). See above, Chapter III. 
183). Lord Guest at p.698, Lord MacDermott at p.711, Lord Upjohn, pp.723-
725 mainly considers the development before the Act. For the 
time thereafter he only mentions Re Thain, Thain v Taylor [1926] 
1 Ch.D.676, a case where a widowed father successfully claimed 
back his child from his sister-in-law after he had remarried and 
could provide a home; and Re Carroll of which case he disaproves. 
184). p.698. 
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11 It is clear to me that even prior to the 1925 Act the 
paramount consideration in regard to the custody of infant 
was the infant's welfare, .. (lS 5 ) as opposed to Lord 
Donovan, 11 it is incredible to me that Parliament would 
pass such an enactment as section 1 of the 1925 Act if 
the position were that it made no difference at all to the 
law as already expounded by the judges''. (lSG) If one 
views the cases before and after the Act, Lord Guest 
probably comes closer to the truth : Reg v Gyngall stands 
for a case where an infant was left with strangers for 
considerations of welfare before the enactment, as Re 
Carrollstands for a case where the right of an only parent 
was allowed to prevail against welfare consideration after 
the enactment. It seems more that the 1925 Act gathered 
up some loose ends of the law and tied them together and 
thereby made a step towards the law as it stands today. 
There is one reference to academic writers but only 
on a point of conflict of laws, quoting Dicey,Conflict of 
Laws, 8th ed. (1967) and also citing Cheshire1Private 
International Law, 7th ed. (1965). (lS 7 ) 
The reasoning in this case is according to the spirit 
of the law and is mainly based on principles, as 11 while 
there is no rule of law that the rights and wishes of 
unimpeachable parents must prevail over other considerations, 
such rights and wishes, recognised as they are by nature and 
185) • p.697. 
186). p. 727. 
187) . p. 700. 
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society, can be capable of ministering to the total wel-
f f ld . . 1 " ( 18 8) are o the chi 1n a spec1a way, .•. 
All in all this case has moved further away from the 
traditional common law reasoning. The main basis of 
reasoning is the welfare of the child, a general prin-
ciple. Their Lordships show a 'loose' but not unfaithful 
view of precedent, and in contrast to Slesser L.J. in 
Re Carroll, they admit it. They do not view previous 
decisions as strictly binding precedent, though they still 
speak of authorities. In this case there is no reference 
to general principles apart from the welfare principle and 
no reference to notions of public policy. This conforming 
to legal issues is well within the common law tradition. 
Other cases between 1925 and 1973 -
There are numerous cases between 1925 and 1973, or 
later between the end of the second world war and 1973, 
and they now mostly deal with side aspects of parental 
status : the position of the putative father, adoption 
proceedings, name cases. Here I should only like to point 
out certain tendencies which go along with the lines of 
cases. When a new type of case arises or a new idea gets 
hold of the judiciary, the first thing they do is to lay 
down a new rule. But almost immediately afterwards this 
rule is again abolished by reference to the welfare principle, 
it is turned into an aspect of the welfare principle. 
There is first the example of a rule for awarding 
188) . p. 715~ 
201 
custody among parents. W v w & c( 18 9 ) stated that other 
things being equal, a boy of 8 should be with his father. 
This is a tentative enough statement of a rule and this 
issue had already been stated otherwise some six years 
before in Re B. (lgo) However, after W v W & C it was 
three times that a court hastened to state that there were 
no fixed rules "as to which (of the two parents) the chil-
dren should go with~(l 9 l) 
Another example is the blood tie argument which, 
when it first appears in Re Aster, (192 ) has a strong 
impact on the decision of the case, "there is the further 
consideration which, I think quite properly, entered into 
the judge's mind, the consideration expressed by the 
ancient proverb that 'blood is thicker than water' ... (lgJ) 
In a later decision Re 0 (194 ) the blood tie is considered 
in how far it can _ontribute to the child's welfare. There 
ar~ther decisions where this is not so greatly stressed, (lgS) 
but the blood tie is not again considered nearly indepen-
dently from the welfare of the child as it had been in 
Re As.ter. 
The last line of cases where a rule was substituted by 
the welfare principle is formed by the name-cases. (lgG) In 
Re T (otherwise H) ' 197 > the court stated that if there was a 
189) • [1968] 1 W.L.R. 1310, 
190). (an infant) [1962] 1 All ER 872, that there was no hard and fast rule. 
191). H v H & C [1969] 1 W.L.R. In Re C(A) (an infant) Cl970J l W.L.R. 
288, B v B, The Times, November 29th 1972. 
192) • (an infant) [1955] 2 All ER 202~ 
193). at p.205. 
194) • (an infant) [1965] 1 Ch. D. 23. 
195). Re E(P) (an infant) [1969] 1 AllER 323, especially Re C(MA) (an 
infant) [1966] 1 W.L.R. 646. 
196) • cf above Chapter III, pt). 1\~t-{, l\). · 
197) • (an infant) [1962] 3 All ER 970 
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right to change the child's surname, this right rested 
with the father. A few years later, the welfare principle 
found its way into this branch of law via Y v Y. (198 ) 
There is then also a particularly bold understanding of 
the welfare principle. In Re W, (199 ) an adoption case, 
where the parental consent cannot be dispensed with on 
welfare considerations, the judge clearly felt this to be 
out-dated. After some sharp censuring of delay in chil-
dren's cases he opined that the child's welfare should 
really be the paramount consideration in adoption cases 
as it was in other proceedings. However, he refrained 
from acting according to his own suggestion, in conformity 
with the principle of separation of powers, "the Adoption 
Act, 1958, had presented serious difficulties. After 13 
years' experience it might be that time had come to change 
the law and to make the interest of the children the para-
mount consideration as it was in other disputes about 
childre:rl". 
e) Cases after 1973 
(!l:lqcx) 
Dipper v Dipper ~ 
This a divorce case with several legal issues 
involved, including custody. 
There were three children, aged 10, 7 and 5. The 
single judge had awarded sole custody to the father and care 
and control to the mother. There were cross-appeals, an 
order for joint custody was made. 
198). [1973] 2 All ER 579 (the case is in fact from 1969). 
199). (an infant), The Times, 28th January, 1972. 
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In this case neither parental rights nor the wel-
fare of the child are expressedly referred to, but it is 
safe to state that the latter was considered to be self-
evident and therefore had not to be asserted. There is, 
instead, a very practical attitude to social matters, "In 
day to day matters the parent with custody is naturally 
in control. To suggest that a parent with custody dom-
inates the situation as far as education or any other 
serious matter is concerned is quite wrong. So the basis 
of the judge's order giving custody to the father and care 
and control to the mother was, in my view, unsound 
any event, these split orders are not really desirable. 
There are cases where they serve a useful puil!'pose but 
care has to be taken not to affront the parent carrying 
the burden of the day to day looking after the child 1by 
giving custody to the absent parent. In this case a 
In 
joint custody order seems to me entirely right,because 
this is a case where the father has an intent to play an 
active part in his children's lives", (200) and, "The 
parent is always entitled, whatever his custodial status, 
to know and be consulted about the future education of 
the children and any other matter ... What is not prac-
ticable, when a judge is worried about the moral aspect of 
the parent who is going to have care and control, is to 
200). Ormrod L.J. at p.731. 
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try to resolve the problem by giving the other parent an 
apparent right to interfere in the day to day matters 
or in the general way in which the parent with care and 
control intends to lead his or her life. If anxiety is 
such as to call for an active control, the usual method 
is by making a supervision order. That would not be 
sensible in this case ... "( 20l) This latter quotation 
clearly shows the effect of the 1973 Act, it does not, 
however, refer to the statute. 
In respect of this custody question no authority 
is cited neither from statute nor from precedent. Never-
theless it shows an interesting feature of reasoning. 
Without much ado the court all but abolishes the split-
custody orders, for practical reasons. This type of 
order had been invented in 1954 Wakeham v Wakeham( 202 ) 
by Denning L.J. to give a father whose child had been 
taken to South Africa by the mother custody but so that 
he might have a basis to proceed from in a South African 
court of law. It was affirmed in Re W (JC) (203 ) that s 5 
of the 1886 Act indeed gave authority for this type of 
order. Normally such a case would have provided a pre-
cedent. If in the present case the single judge had had 
jurisdiction to make the order he made 1 and in his dis-
cretion 1considering the welfare of the children had done so, 
one would have expected that his decision was overruled 
either by ove~uling the precedent or by stating that the 
201). Cumming-Bruce LJ· at p.733. 
202). [1954] 1 W.L.R. 366. 
203). (an infant) [1963] 3 All ER 459~ 
.... 
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judge had exercised his discretion wrongly. A statement 
as made here by the court(204 ) is only understandable 
against a well established background of statute law with 
embodied principles, it stands for a minor form of law-
,.. 
making under the shelter of existing statutory provisions. 
In respect of the other legal issues at hand, two 
things are noticeable. First there are four references to 
public policy, public interest or public importance, (20S) 
emphasizing the importance of goals of the community for 
the law and their impact on judicial decisions. The 
other is a quote from Roskill L.J. 
"It seems to me that the right approach to the ques-
tion whether the judge had jurisdiction to make this 
order is first to look at the relevant statutory pro-
visions unguided by judicial decision". (206} 
(However thereafter he does evaluate cases on the matter} • 
Concluding, this case may be described as a case with 
civil law reasoning, the remnant of a common law approach 
being that there are in fact three judgments by a prom-
inent judge each
1
instead of one : The reasoning is based 
on principles, public policy plays an important role, 
statutory provisions are given primary importance,and the 
court very silently embarks on judicial law-making under 
cover of the statute. 
204). cf. Ormrod L.J. as quoted at fnt. 200. 
205). at pp.732, 737, 734(twice);at p.732 however, the judge states 
that the court has no jurisdiction for the decision the single 
judge made for public policy reasons, implying that only Parlia-
ment could give such a jurisdiction. The other references 
state that it is according to public policy that the court 
should not have this jurisdiction. 
206) • at p. 725 • 
lket"e ~ 1 "owevu-1 o. k.i~ c( OLio\. i""'e""-lio"'--.Ia l.e~loJe.. ~~~ -u...~ k.ue.r- c;f ~e ln.<.> . "R-<.1\Ld,e~ ~-Q ve_ry .(1-,- il-' ~vo~t-i., ~ CSI"Mt.ep/- t:lf joi"'-4 9tAC.~d.iOUAtl,..ip( O .. a)wWc:k 
l1CX..b) +t..~ j\Lcl4eJC.'o.~ ~ rJl...W?.a«y {h.voure.d. b~ -l-he 1<1~~ Ad-. 
2C4o.). S(e o.bc,..-f. I Pf· 110~. 
l.ti. b). $ee tl.boie 1 P· l { ~. 
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- other cases after l973 -
In this period the blood-tie rule is finally worked 
(208) 
into the welfare principle. In the two cases of M v J and 
s v o( 209 ) - in both cases the putative father applied 
for access - it is made finally clear that access is a 
right of the child and is only to be decided on welfare 
considerations. 
Also in adoption cases the welfare principle is worked 
deeper into the law. It is finally established that the 
welfare can be taken into account when the court has to 
decide whether to dispense with parental consent. The 
parental consent can be dispensed with as unreasonably 
witheld when a reasonable parent could come to the con-
elusion that it would be better for the child to be 
adopted. (2 lO) However, unreasonable witholding of con-
sent may only be presumed when the refusal of the parent 
falls outside the band of possible reasonable decisions. 
By going this far, the court stated at the same time that 
any step further in this direction had to be made by Parlia-
ment. This reluctance to trespass into the province of 
Parliament is in accordance with the common law doctrine 
of separation of powers. It should not be forgotten, 
however, that even in a civil law system the courts would 
not have been Gi-"'f ~.~·.-e.. likely to go so far as to ignore 
208). (1978) 8 Fam.Law 12. 
209) • ( 1978) 8 Fam. Law 11· 
210). Re H, Re W (adoption parental agreement) (1983) 4 F.L.R. 614. 
II 
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statute in such a case. Though it has to be conceded that 
it would have been easier for them to do so. 
There is an element in common in some of the cases 
which could also be seen in Dipper v Dipper, and this is 
a very practical approach to the social and sometimes the 
legal issues at stake. This approach goes often hand in 
hand with quite strong language, "one of the myths that 
the court has been trying to 
a fallacy which continues to 
( 211) 
explode for many years", 
raise its ugly head". (212 ) 
Other examples are, "nothing is more depressing than to 
have a mother brought back to the court over some infringe-
ment of this requirement, such as registering the child in 
a particular play group under the name of B when it ought 
to be D. Fortunately, at the end of the day, the father, 
I think, has realized that substantive issues are what 
matter to children and trivial issues can be left to look 
after themselves. If they are forgotten about nobody 
will worry about them.•.(213 ) 11 I remember that at the time 
it was directed to preventing parents with custody or care 
and control orders changing children's names by deed poll, 
or by some other formal means, but,unfortunately it now 
seems to be causing a great deal of trouble and diffi-
culty to school authorities and to children and the very 
last thing that any rule of this court is intended to do is 
211). Dipper v Dipper, Ormrod L.J. at p.730, referring to split 
custody orders. 
212). ibid. Cumming-Bruce L.J., at p.733, referring to the same 
issue. 
213). D v B (otherwise D), a name-case [1979J 1 All ER 92, Ormrod 
L.J. at 100, 
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to embarrass children. It should not be beyond our cap-
acity as adults to cope with the problem of dealing with 
children who naturally do not want to be picked out and 
distinguished by their friends and known by a surname 
other than their mother's ... "( 2 l 4 ) This attitude is very 
practical and unfettered by any consideration of legal 
rules. The judges, by making such personal statements and 
acting according to them interfere directly with 
the family life. They seem to see themselves as social 
engineers who "mend" the families coming before them in 
court disputes, rather than just applying the law. They 
thus represent the interference of the community with the 
private life of the citizen and there is accordingly no 
more room for individual rights in this branch of law. 
I should like to finish with two odd cases which each 
stand alone with their approach, one of them being archaic 
the other very progressive. In B v B( 2 lS), on an appli-
cation for custody by a mother who had left her husband,a clergyman 
I 
and children of 6 and 8, to live in adultery, the court 
found that it was still the law that where a mother had 
disrupted the home and committed adultery the wishes of the 
father could rightly be taken into account (the father 
had stated that he could not give the children the moral 
upbringing he wanted when they were delivered up to the 
mother). In the other(2 lG) case a judge applied s.l0(3) of 
214). Another name case R(BM) v R(DN) [1978]2 AllER 33, Ormrod L.J. at 
33; see also Re D(minors) (1981) 2 F.L.R. 102, Ormrod L.J. at 107. 
215). The Times, 15th May, 1975. 
216). ReS (infants) [1977] 3 AllER. 671. 
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the 1975 Children's Act which was not then in force, on 
the grounds that the provision though not in force repre-
sented the will of the legislature. The appellate court 
upheld this decision, Ormrod L.J. stating, "It is undoubtedly 
embarrassing to the exercise of a discretionary power to 
find on the statute book a provision which appears to be 
an expression of the views of Parliament on a relevant 
matter which is not to become effective until .some later 
and indeterminate date. In circumstances such as these the 
judge cannot be criticized for, at least bearing in mind 
the philosophy behind such an approac~( 2 l 7 ). This is 
taking the spirit of the law very far indeed and it also 
means the revoking of any ideas of certainty of the law 
which is traditionally a residual element in common law. 
To summarize, one can say that overall the judicial 
reasoning since 1973 has acquired so many features of 
civilian reasoning that it can no longer be considered as 
common law reasoning. There is a broad approach to statute 
and a 'loose' view of precedent, the reasoning is prin-
ciple based, the idea of certainty of law has lost its 
overall importance, state interference in private matters 
is viewed as being necessary and not in a hostile way, the 
implantation of collective goals into the law is accepted. 
What remains of the old common law reasoning is the scarcity 
of single judgments by a court of several judges and the 
impact of the individual 
judgments. 
217). at p.674. 
judge's personality on his 
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4. Conclusion 
The development of judicial reasoning proceeds in 
fits and starts. However, if one compares the method of 
reasoning in the first case of this sample with the 
reasoning in the last case, it becomes clear that the 
method has indeed changed and that it has become very 
much like civil law reasoning. However, there are periods 
and cases which stick out and do not comply with the 
general line of development. One example is the prin-
ciple-based reasoning in the cases after the 1839 Act, 
another is the time between about 1860 and 1925 when the 
methods of reasoning, like the attitudes towards social 
concepts, vaccilate strongly between very common-law-
like and more progressive approaches. With the exception 
of the these examples the judicial reasoning at the out-
set of the period is rule -based, faithful to precedent, 
usually not very broad in its approach to statute 1 pro-
tective of individual rights. Very gradually the approach 
to legal sources changes( 2 l 8 ), and only after the second 
World War the change in approach to legal sources becomes 
swifter. The attitude to certain social concepts, though 
with more vaccilation changelfall in all with the same pace 
over the period concerned, which is also true for the sub-
stitution of rule-based by principle-based reasoning. And 
218) • I have not been able to trace a significant change in approach 
to legal writers though. However,Paterson has found evi-
dence forincreased reference to living legal writers, op.cit., 
p.l6. 
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in due course by the end of the time considered the 
reasoning is based on principles, statutes are approached 
broadly and precedents loosely and public policy is no 
longer too unruly a horse. There are also examples of 
covertjudicial law-making under the shelter of statutory 
law1 though, when asked for too much in this respect, the 
English judge of today will still stoutly refuse to invade the 




This study has shown how the law of parental status 
has developed since about 1800, It has traced aspects of 
social development of the development of substantive law 
and of methods of statutory drafing and judicial rea-
soning. At the outset of the relevant period the father's 
right was the main feature of this branch of law. It 
could only be interfered with on narrow grounds. The 
father's right stood for the right of an individual as 
a residual right which was to be left alone by the 
state. (l) As according to the common law husband and 
wife became one person in law on marriage, the wife and 
mother had no status and no rights of her own. When 
deciding family disputes, the judges in their reasoning 
were guided by the following considerations . They had 
an individualistic outlook. Convinced that individual 
freedom was best protected by non-interference of the 
state, they were loath to interfere with the father's 
position( 2 ). They were sceptical of intangible ideas 
and extra legal considerations according to the empirical 
tradition of the common law, thus often against their 
better feeling they would not let aspects of morals or 
public policy or of idealistic philosophy enter their 
1). cf above, pp lSf, 
2). cf above, p. SO, 
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reasoning( 3 ). They favoured certainty of law as the pre-
dominant part of justice( 4 ~ and they were bred with the 
notion that only where there were legal remedies were 
there also rights to be protected by these remedies. (S) 
This made it impossible for them to depart from precedent 
(which had so far favoured the father's right) and to 
consider the position of mother and child beyond what 
had been laid down by earlier cases; there was no remedy 
for the mother, or the child, so the judges could not 
invent one. As in those days, at least in this area of 
law "equity too dutifully followed the law"{ 6 ). There 
was not much to choose between the two systems. 
This structure of law was then confronted by the 
rapid social changes which ensued during the industrial 
revolution. Large parts of the population emigrated to 
the towns, where neighbours were strangers, where the 
traditional family structure which included most of the 
more distant relatives proved cumbersome rather than vital 
for the survival of its members. The traditional division 
of labour which ensured economic dependence of small 
communities no longer held good. The individual lost his 
importance in the anonymous masses of city life , he 
would no longer he heard as an individual voicing his 
grievance but he had to form interest groups like trade 
3) . cf. above R v G•-~en.h;ll 1 "'P I fo 3 • 
4). cf above, p. lbl.. ("'51... 
5). Dice¥, Constitution p.l99. 
6). Lord Upjohn in J v C [1970JA.C. 668 at 7 21, cf. also 
observations on the De Manneville cases, above :pp. l(p~{. 
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unions in order to be listened to. Women increasingly 
entered gainful employment, male protection was no 
longer desirable as it might have been in the Middle 
Ages which had so decisively influenced the structure 
of English property and family law. In due course women 
strove for emancipation. The number of marriage break-
downs increased (and possibly also, if more in our 
century,the number of illegitimate births). 
As traditional values and attitudes no longer held 
true, traditional mechanisms of social control, workable 
in a small rural community and within large families, 
provided no solution for the problems arising from the 
social changes. Where formerly the village rector, the 
grandmother or the neighbour 'might have interfered 
when a man maltreated his wife and children, after 
they had moved to the slums of the big city 1 he was now 
left to do as he pleased. The situation of women and 
children was made even worse by the bad working and 
housing conditions in the towns. Some broad-scale 
intervention became necessary. 
Facing this upheaval of social values and structures 
the traditional judge-made common law proved unable to 
cope with the new situation. It emphasized the father's 
right, thus it was no fitting tool for interfering with 
it. It was inflexible with its narrow approach to pre-
cedent and its slow and piecemeal way of developing new 
law. The swift and more comprehensive change of the law 
which would take into account goals of thecommunity who 
could not afford to let larger parts of the population 
sink into depravity could only come from Parliament. 
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Parliament in its turn did intervene in the area of law 
which is relevant here, thou~h at first it did so ten-
tatively and piecemeal, amending the judge-made common 
law by giving the mother a remedy(?) and thereby some-
thing like an "equitable right". Changes in other 
branches of law followed. The law of divorce was 
secularized( 8 ). The property law was changed to ensure 
the independence women had gained by entering employ-
ment. (9 ) Eventually women were also given the vote(lO). 
However, the woman's or rather the mother's right to 
her children as granted to her by Parliament in 1839 did 
not enjoy an' independent existence for long. The concept 
of individual rights as represented by the father's right 
had proved unworkable in the face of novel social con-
ditions, thus protection by state interference had be-
come necessary which could not be achieved by giving the 
mother a right of her own. This could only be achieved 
by making inroads into any individual right whether 
the mother's or the father's on behalf of the welfare 
of the children. (ll) As early as 1852 one of the reasons 
for the enactment of the Talfour's Act was seen to be the 
welfare of the child. It was in Re Halliday that the Court 
stated that the only reason for the age limit of 7 years 
fixed by the statute was that it was generally better for 
-------------------- ---------·--
7). Talfourd's Act, 1839. 
8). Starting with the Matrimonial Causes Act 1857, cf. above, p~S1~-
9) • Starting with the Married Women • s Property Act, 1970, cf. 
above p. ~3. 
10) • cf. above p. 65; 
11). lt is interesting to note that the new legislation was often 
also viewed to protect the mother rather than to give her a 
right cf. e.~ In re Taylor (1976) 4 Ch.D. 157, Jessel M.R. 
at p.l60. 
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such young children to be with their mother~ 12 ) It is perhaps 
no wonder that the shift from the father's right to the 
child's welfare brought about a different perception of 
justice : ~ individual right can best be protected by 
not interfering with it and by providing a set of rules 
in case of disputes arising. It is important for the 
individual to know what these rules are, certainty of 
the law will ensure his or her freedom. Protection of the 
weak by state interference 1 which will have to assume a 
different shape in every individual case, needs flexibility 
rather than certainty{l3 ), substantive justice rather than 
formal justice. It also asks for substantive rather than 
procedural law. {l4 ) 
Flexibility was needed and provided by legislation. 
However, the traditional, casuistic statutes did no more 
than provide a few more narrow rules that strongly 
resembled judge-made rules. Thus, eventually, broad prin-
ciples were embodied in the law to ensure the flexibility 
needed for the protection of children, which had become a 
public interest. The broad principles, the increase in 
substantive law and the increase of legislative law in 
general made it necessary to cast the statutes into form, 
to give them a systematic structure. {lS) 
The judges, however, with their inborne narrow approach 
12). (1852) 2 L.T.O. S . 17. 
13). For the abandoning of certainty cf. especially the case of 
Re S (infants) [1977] 3 All ER 671 and the observations on 
it , p. lOc;J. 
14) • For the traditional predominance of procedural law in the 
sense of remedies provided for the aggrieved individual in 
English common law, cf. Dicey, Constitution, p.l99. 
15) • cf. above p.l<t-1 {-
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to legal sources, fostered by their belief in certainty 
of law as the primary aspect of justice and their belief 
in the individual's liberty showed themselves hostile to 
legislative interference (if not so much in the area of 
law which is relevant here). (l 6 ) They construed statutes 
narrowly which in turn led to exceedingly elaborate and 
detailed statutory drafting(l?), from which the English 
Statute has not yet recovered(lS). The recent develop-
(19) 
ment of judicial reasoning, however, shows a distinctive 
retreat from narrow construction of statutes and rule-
based reasoning to a principle-based reasoning and a 
(20) 
'contextual' and systematic interpretation of statutes. 
Two quotations from the recent case of .Gillick v 
( 21) 
West Norfolk may demonstrate the method of modern judicial 
reasoning as well as the different weight given to 
in judge-made law: 
"The House ... is to search the overfull and cluttered 
shelves of the law reports for a principle, or set 
and 
of principles recognized by the judges over the years 
but stripped of the detail which, however appropriate 
in their day, would, if applied today, lay the judges 
open to a justified criticism for failing to keep the 
law abreast of the society in which they live and 
work" . ( 2 2) . 
"If certainty be thought desirable it is better that 
the rigid demonstrations necessary to achieve it 
should l:>e laid down by legislation ..• unless and 
until Parliament should think fit to intervene, the 
16). cf.especially the cases immediately after the Talfourd's Act 
above, pp. , this promising start, however, subsided in 
later years1 cf. pp. (\).. 
17). Allen,op.cit., p.516,Bennion op.cit., p.43. Atiyah, Law and 
Modern Society, p.l28. 
18). cf. The statutory provision cited in Chapter IV B at. p. 14b , t"J 1'3. 
19). cf above p.109 
20) . Reading the words in context with the whole statute and possibly 
other statutes in pari materia not leaving out the social 
context of the statute, cf. E.A. Driedger, The construction of 
Statutes, (1974), at p.67. 
21). tl98~ 3 W.L.R. 830. This was a case where a mother alleged that 
(footnote contd/ •. overleaf •• 
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courts should establish a principle flexible enough 
to enable justice (he means substantive rather than 
formal justice!) to be achieved by its application .... (23) 
There is also no doubt today that children are no 
longer treated like their father's property but as persons 
in their own right, " ... parental rights are derived from 
parental duty and exist only so long as they are needed for 
the person and property of a child."( 24 ). If Sir Leslie 
Scarman (as he then was) had to advocate as recently as 
1967 : 
"We must get into the habit of looking first for our 
law in the statute book and turning to the case law 
only if the law cannot be found in the statute. 
There is nothing revolutionary in such a change. 
Indeed it is belated; for already the bulk of the 
English law that matters has found its way into the 
statute book," (25) 1 
there is now evidence for a change, when English judges 
start their reasoning by first looking at the statute and 
' (26) then viewing the cases which provide a gloss on 1t. As can be 
seen inter alia from the Practi~e Statement 1966, there 
is also evidence for a relaxing attitude towards the 
binding force of precedent. 
English judges are also no longer afraid to take 
extra legal considerations into their reasoning .. They 
no longer adhere to a strict separation of law and morals, 
Footnote 21). Contd/ •• 
the recommendation of the relevant Health Authority to doctors that in 
exceptional cases contraceptives and contraceptive advice might be 
given to young people under 16 without knowledge and consent of their 
ryarents. Mrs. Gillick wanted the Health Authority to withdraw the 
;~egulation and to give an undertaking that its doctors would not give 
contraceptive advice or contraceptives to Mrs. Gillick's own daughters 
while under 16, without her knowledge and consent. The petition failed. 
22). Lord Scarman, at p.853. 
23). at p.855. 
24). at p.854. 
25). Law Reform - The 1ilew Pattern 1p.67. 
1h). ll•pper v Diepe-r C 1 '&OJ l AU.. ~;;v._ 1-2l, o.~L~o;.,-s above., e-~cUc<LL/rf ?Oit f. 
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as can be seen from recent cases where the judges 
apparently see themselves as social engineers with the 
task of mending, as far as possible, the fates of broken 
families( 2?) rather than as stern administrators of the 
law applying a set of rules to disputes brought before 
them. It is to be hoped that draftsmen in their turn 
will acknowledge this change and adapt their drafting 
methods to this new form of judicial reasoning. 
There is one other less significant but nevertheless 
interesting feature to accompany the changes just des-
cribed : with the exception of divorce law reform( 2 B) 
it is only at the very beginning of the relevant period 
that law reform was influenced by individuals( 29 ). With 
the loss of importance of the individual and the rise of 
collectivism, interest groups, e.g. women's groups or 
parties took their share in reforming the law. 
It becomes clear that the common law system has 
moved towards something closely resembling a civil law 
system( 30), if one recalls the typical features of civil 
law methods of judicial reasoning and statutory drafting, 
with its overall importance of legislative law, the pre-
valence of broad principles rather than narrow rules in 
27). cf above, p. 20g, 
28). c:fAllan P. Herbert's influence on the Matrimonial Causes Act, p.l-f. 
29) • Sergeant· at-i.aw Talfourd, cf. above pp../?2 r Mrs. Caroline Norton 
cf. p. 81. 
30) • Though examples could not be found in the area of law which is 
relevant for this study, there is otherwise evidence that 
there has been relaxation of the rule against citing living 
academic writers, cf. Paterson, op.cit., p.l6. There have 
also been voices in favour of in part relaxation of the~~ule kJ 
against citing legislative history, cf. Cross, Statub:ryJ!P,-f...c lOA, 
132 ff, Allen, op.cit., p.527. 1\ 
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legislative and judicial law and the importance of extra-
legal consideration like philosophical ideas or 'good 
morals' being embodied in the law( 3l). Remaining common 
law features may be seen in some aspects of statutory 
drafting i.e. some very detailed provisions( 32 ), and in 
the strong impact of the judges' personalities on their 
reasoning. This change of the English system into an 
o.L~t civilian system can be explained by the fact that the 
continental legal systems were better suited for the 
chans'~ social conditions in the wake of the industrial 
revolution and thus retained their main features( 33 ); the 
emphasis on substantive rather than formal justice on 
collective goals rather than individual rights and on 
state intervention rather than individual freedom. How-
ever, changes have also taken place in civil law systems. (34 ) 
It would be mere speculation to suggest how much 
further the shift will go which has taken place in the 
English system. I would like to finish with the observa-
tion, that whereas it would probably alleviate the work 
of draftsmen as well as judges and barristers, if English 
31). cf. above, p.30 with reference to para.l'1 of the German civil 
code. 
32). cf above, l~b also the relatively small compass of statutes 
which is still far away from the broad coverage of a code. 
33). see David, op.cit., pp 24, 308 Friedmann, op.cit. p.55o 
34)- In respect of the Upproach to precedent, the function of the 
judges, the attitude towards judicial dissent, in respect of 
submissive law see a move of the French concepts of matrimonial 
property law towards the common law system cf. Friedmann, op.cit., 
pp.550, 524. 
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statutes were cleared of their more awkward provisions, 
it seems less desirable that the English judge should 
dwindle into something like his somewhat colourless 
continental counterpart. Legislative interference with 
the common law was necessary after the rapid social changes 
of the last two centuries, but state interference can 
seriously jeopardize the individual's freedom. A judiciary 
with an individualistic outlook consisting of strong 
personalities may provide an effective counter-balance to 
such tendencies. 
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